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Accompanying the introduction of a new outcomes-based curriculum, were significant 
shifts towards decentralised school-based management, which are seen as critical to 
the democratisation of schools. At the centre of this democratisation is the introduction 
of School Governing Bodies (SGBs) (Act 84 of 1996). SGBs, by virtue of how they are 
constituted, are considered as seedbeds for democratic participation. Through the 
South African Schools Act (Act 84 of 1996), SGBs are afforded unprecedented 
authority in the governance of public schools. Principals, educators, parents, as well 
as community members and learners (in the case of high schools) are provided with 
the opportunity to participate in collective decision-making regarding the daily 
functioning of schools. These functions include the design and formulation of all 
school-based policies, including that of language, which is the interest and focus of 
this thesis. 
No policy has generated more contestation and controversy than that of a school’s 
language policy. Significantly, most of this contestation has centred on Afrikaans-
medium schools – raising inevitable questions not only about language, but about the 
role of the SGB in relation to the formulation of language policy. This research looks 
at the formulation and implementation of a language policy at three public Afrikaans-
medium schools in the Western Cape. Using a phenomenological research paradigm, 
the study engaged with principals, educators and parents, as it tried to gain insights 
into the considerations of SGBs in relation to formulating a language policy. The 
findings reveal that SGBs are not necessarily representative of all learners and 
communities in their schools, and that a lack of adequate representation might hold 
particular consequences for a school’s language policy. SGB members do not 
necessarily have the requisite skills - that is, language policy formulation is undertaken 
by individuals who neither understand language policy and practice, nor the needs of 
learners. Despite new intakes of learners from various contexts and linguistic abilities, 
the language policy of a school is seldom changed. Moreover, while SGBs recognise 
that schools ought to serve a public good, they should have a degree of autonomy, 
which allows them to act in the best interests of their respective school communities, 
which includes formulating a language policy of their choice. 
In light of the surrounding contestations, which have resulted in numerous legal battles 
between SGBs and provincial education departments with regards to language 
policies, I consider the possibility of deliberative democracy as a viable way of 
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Since 1994, the South African education system has undergone severe changes as 
the country transitioned from apartheid to a constitutional democracy. There are two 
pieces of legislation that come to mind in this regard, viz. the South African Schools 
Act (Republic of South Africa [RSA], 1996a) and the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA, 1996b). Firstly, the Constitution states that South Africa “is one 
sovereign, democratic state founded on specific values” (RSA, 1996b:3). Secondly, 
SASA seeks to promote democracy by stating the following in the preamble: “the 
achievement of democracy in South Africa has consigned to history the past system 
of education which was based on racial inequality and segregation” (RSA, 1996a:1). 
SASA is a body of legislation that offers fundamental changes to school governance 
in the new South Africa (Naidoo, 2005:29).   
The underlying philosophy of SASA is to create a system of democratic school 
governance based on citizen participation, partnerships with the state, parents, 
learners and school staff, and with the community; and to devolve power to the 
individual school (Naidoo, 2005:29). SASA empowers school governing bodies 
(SGBs) to govern a school and to let those who govern be elected democratically. It 
is for this reason that so much emphasis is placed on section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 
1996a:22), which reads: “Subject to this Act, the governance of every public school is 
vested in its governing body and it may perform only such functions and obligations 
and exercise only such rights as prescribed by the Act.”. An SGB is a statutory body 
that is democratically elected and has a diversity of members such as parents, 
educators and a principal (RSA, 1996a:31). It has certain functions and powers, 
including the design and formulation of a school’s language policy, which serves as 
the central concern of this study.    
Even though the function of school governance is granted by SASA, school 
governance does not come without challenges. These challenges range from the 
parent-governors who are not educated to govern a school (Mabasa & Themane, 
2002:112; Van Wyk, 2004:53; Xaba, 2011:201). Uneven power relations between 
parents and educators, and between parents and principals, are also problematic 
(Mncube, 2007:135, 2008:85). Other factors that affect the efficiency and functionality 
of an SGB are argued by Mabasa and Themane (2002:122) to be that parents have a 
problem with the following: language use during meetings, administration-orientated 
work, nature of involvement and contribution to the SGB, policies and the content of 
SASA (parents usually delegate policy formulation to educators) (Xaba, 2011:206). 




the skills to interpret the content of SASA (Heystek, 2006:482). Therefore, although 
SASA grants the SGB the power to govern, there are many SGBs that experience 
challenges. This study looks at the role school governance plays in relation to 
language policy formulation at three public schools in the Western Cape, South Africa. 
This chapter contains the introductory remarks of the thesis which would be furthered 
in each chapter respectively. Therefore, this chapter will introduce the background of 
the study, there I will refer to the transformation of governance in South African 
schools, the functionality of SGBs and language planning and policy in South Africa 
as a nation and within the context of South African public schools. Furthermore, this 
chapter will contain brief references of the rationale of the study and the problem 
statement. This chapter will also introduce the research questions, the objectives, 
paradigm, methodology, design, and methods. I will also refer briefly to the contribution 
and the significance of the study and also the sampling methods and selection criteria 
of the sample. Last, I will mention the limitations of the study, ethical considerations, 
process of data analysis, followed by brief remarks of how trustworthiness, validity and 
reliability will be achieved and a brief review of the following chapters.  
 
1.2 The background to the study 
 
The following subsection looks at the background to the study. It contains brief 
information about the backdrop against what this study plays off. This section is further 
divided into the following: 1.2.1) The transformation of educational governance in 
South Africa; 1.2.2) the functionality of the SGB; 1.2.3) current language policy trends 
in schools and nationally; 1.2.4) the transformation of language policy inside a national 
cadre; and (1.2.5) language policy South African schools. 
 
1.2.1 The transformation of educational governance in South African schools 
 
Educational and school governance in South Africa has changed dramatically in the 
almost three decades of democracy. During the 1990s, the project of decentralisation 
began to become popular in education, initially for wrong reasons. The apartheid 
school system was characterised by a class system, which was divided into four 
models: Models A, B, C and D. The importance of these models in modern South 
Africa is the prevalence of a white-dominant minority and the existence of a neo-liberal 
system. The two most important models in public schools in South Africa were Model 
C and Model D. Model C school are schools that adopted an SGB and raised extra 
money through school fees, which would then translate into better facilities and extra 
educators (Naidoo, 2005:23). According to Pampalis (2005, cited in Radebe, 2015:2), 




unlimited numbers of black learners. The Model D schools are examples of the 
enduring legend of apartheid, as they were poor and had limited to zero resources. 
They are better known in the current dispensation as no-fees or Quintile 1 to 3 schools. 
Davies, Harber and Dzimadzi (2003, cited in Malhepi, 2015: 20)) argue that the 
decision about this decentralisation was made in bad faith: it was to prolong and 
protect white interests for the sake of the governance and admission policies of 
schools approaching 1994. It is clear in this case that decentralisation may have 
negative connotations.  
However, after 1994, when South Africa became a democracy, the intention of the 
adoption of SASA was to decentralise and democratise the education sector. It was 
with this intention that the government and department of education at the time thought 
that the introduction of SGB-structured governance would change the South African 
education landscape. It attempted to give the notion of decentralisation a populist and 
positive connotation. The project of decentralisation actually occurred in South African 
education policies much sooner than SASA. For example, the White Paper on 
Education and Training (Department of Education [DoE], 1995) introduced the concept 
of SGBs to South Africa, and Education White Paper 2 (DoE, 1996:70) stipulated that 
all governing bodies have core functions and should consist of democratically elected 
members. These two documents amalgamated to form SASA.  
The underlying philosophy of SASA is to create a system of democratic school 
governance based on citizen participation, partnerships with the state, parents, 
learners and school staff, and community; and to devolve power to the individual 
school (Naidoo, 2005:29). SASA empowers SGBs to govern a school and to let those 
who govern be elected democratically. It is for this reasons that so much emphasis is 
placed on section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:22), which reads as follows: “Subject 
to this Act, the governance of every public school is vested in its governing body and 
it may perform only such functions and obligations and exercise only such rights as 
prescribed by the Act.” An SGB is a statutory body that is democratically elected and 
has a diversity of members, such as parents, educators and a principal (RSA, 
1996a:31). An SGB has certain functions and powers, viz. language policy formulation, 
which is an important aspect of this study. 
As mentioned earlier, an SGB is not only a statutory body, but also a democratic entity 
that has the potential to further the democratic project of South Africa. This can be 
witnessed in the preamble of SASA, which uses the words, “Democratic 
transformation of [the] society” to indicate the intention of SASA (RSA, 1996a:1). An 
SGB (in South Africa) is a community-based entity that draws on a diverse range of 
stakeholders and voices (Bush & Heystek, 2003; Heystek, 2006:474; Woolman & 
Fleisch, 2008:48). Therefore, the hope is not only for the SGB to represent the school 
community, but also for the community to participate in the decision-making about the 
education of the learners. It thus leads one to argue that the democratic nature of the 
SGB lies within the members of the SGB, and their participation and representation. I 




According to SASA section 23, one can distinguish between elected members and co-
opted members (RSA, 1996a:31). Elected members of a governing body of an 
ordinary school are mostly parents of learners, teachers and non-teaching staff; the 
principal (in his official capacity); and learners of a high school (school that teaches up 
to grade 8) (RSA, 1996a:31). Co-opted members are members who are asked to join 
but are not voted for and cannot vote (RSA, 1996a). All stakeholders are important, 
but an SGB is designed by SASA to represent the parent base of the school. Singh, 
Mbokodi and Msila (2004) agree with the first White Paper on Education and Training 
(DoE, 1995), which states that SGBs should present parents as a collective 
stakeholder to represent the school community. There are many advantages of 
parental involvement in school governance. To listen to the voice of parents, to 
encourage their participation and to give them more power results in a better 
functioning school (Harber, 2004; Moggach, 2006:17, cited in Mncube, 2009) and 
better outcomes (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:315). However, this is an idealised 
version of the current reality in South African education governance. 
SGBs experience an array of challenges that complicate the functionality of the body 
and lead to a decline in that school governance. Three challenges of SGBs are 
parental education and training in school governance, unequal power relations, and 
the poor representation of the parent community. Adams and Waghid (2005:25) 
maintain that a lack of training is the reason why governors do not fulfil their duties 
efficiently, and practicality of the training, as it is stipulated in SASA section 15, is 
absent in most cases. As indicated by McLennan (2000, cited in Joubert & Van 
Rooyen, 2011:316), uneven power relations manifest as an “insider” and “outsider”, 
“lay” and “professional” relationship that creates coalitions and decision-making that 
are based on factions. Challenges of school governance happen on a regular basis 
and it is not only historically disadvantaged schools (HDS) that face challenges. SGB 
can never be compared because they are fluid in their context. Therefore, no SGB is 
perfect, and each SGB has its own challenges that derive from issues in the 
community or unique situations. This section has given a glimpse of the functionality 
of SGBs in South Africa. The next section looks at current language policy nationally, 
as well as language-in-education in South Africa 
 
1.2.2 The functionality of an SGB in post-Apartheid South Africa 
 
According to Kirkpatrick (1997, cited in Rangongo, 2011:10), “functionality” refers to 
useful, working, serviceable, running, in operation, how well you do. I use this term to 
denote the effective and efficient use or execution of the functions of sections 20 and 
21 and the powers of sections 5(5), 6(2), 7, 8(1) and 9 (RSA, 1996a). How well an 
SGB functions does not depend on one single function or power. An SGB, as I 
mentioned earlier, experiences a great number of challenges due to its contextual 




of everything. Each SGB is unique, meaning that every member of the SGB has a 
different opinion about governance in a scholastic environment. This does not mean, 
however, that one cannot say nothing in general about an SGB and its functions. SASA 
must be seen as the minimum requirement for the functioning of an SGB. Before one 
determines what an SGB must do and what powers it has, it is important to read closely 
how SASA is written. I refer to some remarks made in the literature. 
SASA refers to a set of mandatory functions named in section 20 (RSA, 1996a). This 
includes functions such as promoting the best interests of the school, adopting a 
constitution and developing a mission statement (RSA, 1996a:27). These section 20 
functions are not the most important, but are provided merely as illustration. Malherbe 
(2010:616) refers to these as “core functions”. Furthermore, an SGB has 
“additional/allocated functions”, which includes functions like maintaining the school 
property, formulating extramural activities and purchasing textbooks, to name a few 
(RSA, 1996a:30). The next set of powers or “competencies” (Malherbe, 2010:616) 
refer to: sections like 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the SASA (RSA, 1996a). Although the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (SCA) argued in Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body (140/2005) [2005] ZASCA 66 that an SGB is not an 
“organ of state”, even if it fulfils a public function or power, it does not fall under any 
governmental executive power. This, however, does not mean that an SGB does not 
fulfil a public function or public power. I have just shown that an SGB has functions 
and powers (competencies), although the Constitution does not distinguish what is 
meant by public function and/or public power. According to Malherbe (2010) and 
Mdumbe (2003:57), to make this distinction one can argue that a power is seen as 
upholding the Constitution, the principle of legality (rule of law) and case law. This has 
implications for the power of the HOD and for the SGB – it is clear that an SGB is not 
an “organ of state”, which problematises the argument of Woolman and Fleisch 
(2008:55) that an SGB is a “fourth sphere of government”. 
I divided SGB section 20 functions, section 21 functions and ‘competencies’ 
(Malherbe, 2010) into what can be called “statutory functions”, because the functions 
and powers must be fulfilled according to the statute itself. According to the preamble 
to SASA, the SGB also has a democratic function (RSA, 1996a:1), namely the 
“[d]emocratic transformation of [the] society”. The democratic nature of an SGB stems 
from the fact that members are democratically elected and governance is delegated 
to parents and other members, who form an integral part of their child’s education 
(DoE, 1995, 1997). Partnership governance and co-operative government are two of 
the pillars on which SASA is grounded. 
SGBs (in South Africa) are community-based entities that draw on a diverse range of 
stakeholders and voices (Bush & Heystek, 2003; Heystek, 2006:474; Woolman & 
Fleisch, 2008:48). Every member of the SGB must act in good faith and avoid 
behaviour that will lead to the destruction of the SGB’s moral and democratic fibre 
(Heystek, 2006:474). Policies like the White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 




2 (DoE, 1996) and the South African Schools Act (No. 84 of 1996) (RSA, 1996a) have 
collaboratively led to the installation of democratically elected members of SGBs. 
SASA section 28 and section 23, for example, iterate the democratic process of the 
election of members (RSA, 1996a:29). The democratic election of members and the 
diversity that results from that election help with the formation of a small-scale 
democracy. Therefore, the composition of an SGB with regard to the type of members 
is crucial. 
According to SASA section 23, one can distinguish between elected members and co-
opted members of an SGB (RSA, 1996a:31). Firstly, elected members of an SGB of 
an ordinary school are mostly parents of learners, teachers, non-teaching staff, the 
principal (in his official capacity), and the learners of a high school (school that teaches 
up to grade 8) (RSA, 1996a:31). The White Paper on Education and Training highlights 
parental involvement as pivotal for democratic school governance (DoE, 1995:70). 
Section 23(9) of SASA also stresses the importance of parents’ involvement and their 
mutual responsibility for the governance of a public school (Beckmann & Prinsloo, 
2009:174; RSA, 1996a:32). Section 29(2) only permits a parent-governor to be the 
chairperson of an SGB: parent leadership is therefore a statutory requirement (RSA, 
1996a:34).    
 
1.2.3 The transformation of language policy inside a national environment  
 
Language issues have always plagued the South African reality. South African has 
been enslaved to language imperialism for a long time, dating back to as early as 
Dutch colonialism. Before colonialism of any sort, indigenous languages were the 
spoken language of Southern Africa (Dollie, 2011:97). Dutch colonialists and the 
indigenous groups understood each other through interpreters and translators. The 
Dutch colonists brought slaves from West Africa, East Africa and the Malayo-
Indonesian archipelago, and used their labour instead of that of the local African Khoe 
and San people (Prah, 2018). Through communicating with their masters, these slaves 
altered the Dutch language and changed it to a lingua franca that would later be called 
a “kombuistaal” – kitchen language – which was Afrikaans-Hollands (Prah, 2018). This 
would be the earliest form of Afrikaans. The Dutch colonialists thus stripped away the 
indigenous culture and language of the slaves when they taught them their language. 
The same happened in the period of British colonialism, although involving other 
parties. The imperialistic endeavour did not lie in the imposition of English on 
indigenous languages, but the imposition of European variants of these language on 
their speakers via the judicial and educational system (Makoni & Makoni, 2010:8). 
However, the Boers, according to Němeček, (2010:30), were unable to speak English 
and were deemed to have a lower social and economic status because their English 
proficiency forced them to migrate to the countryside, where they did not have to be 




in 1875. However, equal language rights in this paradigm were shallow in nature 
because they did not include South African Bantu languages in the constitution 
(Němeček, 2010:30). The battle of languages intensified from here on, and linguistic 
imperialism seemed to partly breed apartheid.  
During apartheid, linguistic diversity was undermined and disregarded through the 
promotion of Afrikaans-only language policies. During the 1970s, Afrikaans as a 
medium of instruction caused political unrest. When the apartheid state enforced 
Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in 1976, black learners would be taught in two 
distinct “new” languages, first English in 1975, and then Afrikaans in 1976. According 
to Plüddemann (2015:189), black learners were taught in their mother tongue at 
primary schools (for eight years) between 1948 and 1994. Thereafter, black schools 
had to follow “non-mother tongue” dual-medium instruction, in which half of the 
subjects were taught in Afrikaans and the other half were taught in English. This is one 
of the reasons why African languages are still underutilised in society, and as a 
language of learning and teaching (LoLT) from grade 4 onwards. 
Although the Constitution of South Africa acknowledges 11 official languages, it still 
remains a question whether each language is used unilaterally (RSA, 1996b:3). The 
Language Plan Task Group (LANGTAG) (LANTAG 1996, cited in Ndhlovu, 2008:63).  
report emphasised, inter alia, the promotion of multilingualism and the elaboration and 
modernisation of African languages According to Beukes (2004:14, cited in Ndhlovu, 
2008:65), the LANGTAG report also included concern about a possible second-
language imperialism: departments in most of the spheres of South African society 
were turning to English as a medium, which meant that African languages were 
unrepresented. This was devastating to democracy in South Africa and led to a range 
of systematic and prevailing disadvantages to overcome. 
South Africa thus needed a strategic plan to overcome this division. This was done 
through the induction and introduction of two language policies, viz. the National 
Language Policy Framework (NLPF), which was accepted by the cabinet (Beukes, 
2009:40), and the creation of the Implementation Plan for the NLPF two months after 
the NLPF was accepted. The intention of these policies was clear, namely to promote 
multilingualism and advance the use of African languages. Although the intent was 
clear, there are no traces of these language policies in the South African linguistic 
reality. The Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) devised a further plan and drew up 
the Use of Official Languages Act (RSA, 2012) to regulate the use of all the official 
languages: if government bodies failed to supply their language policies in all 
languages, they hampered the process of implementing this act (RSA, 2012).     
All three these attempts were meaningless in terms of implementation, for many 
reasons. The Use of Official Languages Act (RSA, 2012) was critiqued in that it did 
not promote inclusive linguistic diversity (Pretorius, 2013:282). Furthermore, it acted 
on its own and had no “inclusivity-specific guidelines”; when viewed from the directive 
principles (section 6(3) of the Constitution), “it mandates unguided discretionary 




language policy implementation failures is that the formulation of these policies echoed 
apartheid and colonial language policies: indigenous languages are still being 
neglected in South African society and reality. English is still the default language in 
government spheres (Cakata & Segalo, 2017: 324). It seems that public schools depict 
the same picture as in the South African society.  
 
1.2.4 Language policy in South African public schools 
 
Madiba and Mabiletja (2008:221, cited in Coetzee-Van Rooy, 2018: 20) indicate that 
the lack of clear implementation goals leads to the failure to implement multilingual 
language policies in schools. Given the advantages of multilingual education, as 
explained by Le Cordeur (2015), the South African education sector still falls short of 
the actual acknowledgment of the 11 official languages of the country. Plüddemann 
(2015:192) notes that the implementation of language policies in public schools is 
hindered because of a disjuncture between a learner’s home language (HL) and the 
language of learning and teaching (LoLT). This is only one of the contradictions of 
language in South African schools. 
Another contradiction, which lies at the heart of language use in education (De Klerk, 
2002 cited in Heugh, 2013:218), is that the Language in Education Policy (DoE, 
1997a) and the curriculum (Curriculum 2005, RNCS, and now CAPS) were originally 
drafted by different parties that had different outlooks on multilingualism. This means 
there was a lack of communication between the two departments while the national 
language in education policy was being formulated. According to this policy, the LoLT 
must be an official language of the country (DoE, 1997a:3). The South African 
Language in Education Policy is based on the notion of additive multilingual (bilingual) 
education (DoE, 1997a). The LiEP requires that learners must have at least one 
language subject in Grade 1 and Grade 2 and, from Grade 3, learners will have their 
LoLT as a subject and one other (additional) language (DoE, 1997a:3). Curriculum 
2005 (DoE, 1997c) and the revisions that followed are based on an early transition to 
English (in grade 4), which, according to Heugh (2013:220), is against additive 
multilingual language policies. After Curriculum 2005 (DoE, 1997c) was introduced, 
The Revised National Curriculum Statement for Grade R – 9 (RNCS) introduced FAL 
in Grade 2 (DBE, 2002:20). Unlike the mother-tongue emphasis of the LiEP, the 
Curriculum Assessment and Policy Statements (DBE, 2011a) is designed to introduce 
English as a language subject much earlier than Curriculum 2005 (DoE, 1997c) and 
RNCS (DBE, 2002) – in grade 1 (actually informally in grade R) to support the change 
in LoLT to English in grade 4 (DBE, 2009:14). One therefore sees that the LiEP (DoE, 
1997a) focuses more on mother-tongue education with additive bi(multi)-lingualism, 
while the curriculum initiatives in South Africa focus more on the introduction of 
multilingualism and developing the other tongue similar to the FAL subject. The 




Incremental Introduction of African Languages in South African Schools (IIAL) (DBE, 
2013) does not promote African languages as an LoLT but as a second additional 
language (SAL). 
To bring this into an educational governance context, as the SASA section 6 (1 and 2) 
states that the national Minister of Education may produce norms and standards for 
language policy in public schools which could form a contradiction with the idea of a 
SGB be the sole authority to formulate language policy is a contradiction. The only 
norms that the Minister of Education may formulate were published in the LiEP (DoE, 
1997a), and were called Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy Published 
in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act (DBE, 1997b:2), which states 
that the SGB must indicate in its language policy how it intends to promote 
multilingualism, which language subjects will be taught and what language 
maintenance programme will be hosted. This keeps the SGB in check with regard to 
language policy formulation and theoretically would prohibit an SGB from 
discriminating against learners linguistically.     
New legislation, such as the Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill of 2017 
(Government DBE, 2017) seeks to impugn democratic school governance and alter 
the power of the SGB to formulate language policy through first submitting it to the 
HOD for approval. The HOD may approve a language policy formulated by the SGB, 
or may send it back with recommendations. The HOD must take certain aspects into 
consideration when he or she co-signs the formulation of the language policy: the SGB 
must also review this language policy every three years. More importantly, the 
Amendment Bill grants the HOD power to direct the SGB to adopt more than one LoLT. 
This poses a threat to school governance on the one hand, and to language policy 
formulation by the SGB on the other. This section and the previous section serve as a 
background to the study. 
1.3 Rationale for the study 
 
I perceived the need to explore language policy as a function of school governance in 
South African schools due to the mismatch of learners’ mother tongue and the 
language subjects some schools offer. I am an Afrikaans teacher in a high school in 
the Cape Winelands Education District, Western Cape in South Africa. I witness every 
day how learners are taught their second language as a HL subject at school. These 
learners seem to struggle with the language but, more problematically than that, they 
are required to think abstractly in a language that is not their mother tongue. This is a 
challenge, because learners struggle to understand what they are taught, which 
deems the education they receive (that which I teach) meaningless. 
Secondly, English-speaking learners that have Afrikaans at FAL level are not 
interested in this language, because some argue that they will not use it after school 
when they study at a university or college. This led me to believe that language is 




teachers are not given a lot of time to actually teach learners how to speak Afrikaans 
and, for that matter, how to speak a second language (FAL or SAL). Language is part 
of a learner and, for that matter, of a human’s immediate environment, and it is difficult 
to imagine oneself without using the language. 
Through close reading of the Norms and Standards for Language Policy in Schools  
(DBE, 1997b:2), I attempted to understand how members of the SGBs thought and 
perceived these norms in terms of their school’s language policy. Every SGB is tasked 
with the responsibility of formulating a language policy, but not all participants, in any 
case those that I studied, were language practitioners. Interestingly, language policy 
in public schools, or perceptions of the Norms and Standards of Language Policy and 
the manifestation of these norms in the different school language policies, are 
formulated by people who do not necessarily have the subject knowledge of language 
or language policy. This means that language policy formulation is undertaken by 
individuals who neither understand language policy and practice, nor the needs of 
learners. By engaging with SGB members, I have learnt that, despite new intakes of 
learners from various contexts and linguistic abilities, the language policy of a school 
is seldom changed. In a changing world and with learners’ linguistic needs that change 
every year, it is difficult to cope if one does not strengthen the school’s policy stance 
. 
1.4 Problem statement  
 
Single-medium public schools in South Africa, in the past, faced some pressure due 
to their language policy stance. Case law suggests that it is only Afrikaans single-
medium schools that have faced language policy contestation. Even though there 
could be a political explanation for this contestation, it remains unclear from this study 
what the reason is. Due to the abolishment of Apartheid and the Groups Area Act, it 
is logical to assume that past Afrikaans-only areas experienced an inflow of people 
with different mother tongues than Afrikaans. This means that learner demographics 
have changed in the new South Africa. The problem that arises here is that the 
language policy of some single-medium schools has been unresponsive to this shift, 
meaning that the language policy has remained the same. This leads to tension with 
regard to language policy formulation as a function of an SGB. 
Language policy as formulated by the SGB has come under severe of scrutiny and, 
due to this, SGBs have been questioned about their functionality. It has become 
unclear, in academic terms, who has the last say on language policy formulation, even 
though SASA states in section 6(2) that the formulation of the language policy of a 
public school rests upon the SGB (RSA, 1996a:11). Woolman and Fleisch (2008) and 
Smit (Smit, 2011:405) argue that the power to formulate and determine language 
policy in public schools ultimately rests with the HOD. On the other hand, Colditz and 
Deacon (2010) and Malherbe (2010) argue that the power to set language policy rests 




competency of the SGB and not of the HOD. It is unclear from this who has the 
authority or “the last say” in language policy formulation. To complicate this matter 
further, the HOD has the right to revoke or withdraw a function of the SGB. A debate 
is also ongoing on whether language policy formulation is a function or a power: 
according to Malherbe (2010), this will influence if a HOD may withdraw the 
power/function of an SGB. However, be it as it may, if an HOD withdraws the 
function/power to formulate language policy, this ‘privilege’ to formulate language 
policy is taken away from an SGB. Because an SGB consist mainly of parents, parents 
will now be disenfranchised and the democratic function of the SGB will be influenced. 
As stated in my selection criteria, I chose Afrikaans single-medium primary schools 
because they have, in the past, been subject to pressure from the DBE to change their 
language policy. There are certain instances of case law that question the authority of 
SGBs as formulating the language policy like: 
1.  Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v 
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another (CCT40/09) [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 
(CC) ; 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (14 October 2009),  
2. Governing Body of Mikro Primary School and Another v Western Cape Minister 
of Education and Others (332/05) [2005] ZAWCHC 14; 2005 (3) SA 504 (C) 
[2005] 2 All SA 37 (C) (18 February 2005). 
These are examples of Afrikaans single-medium schools (or former) that were 
pressurised by the HOD and MEC to change their language policy. Secondly, given 
that Afrikaans is the most spoken language in the Western Cape of South Africa, my 
interest in these schools grew because the irony involved in changing these school’s 
language policy highlighted the pressure outside the realm of a SGB’s power to 
formulate language policy and govern a school by means thereof. As indicated above, 
the power/function of language policy are embedded in the democratic school 
governance of a SGB according to SASA section 6 (RSA, 1996a: 11). In the light of 
the abovementioned case law, it came to be that the State, in terms of the intervention 
of the HOD in school governance has always been solved through legal actions which 
could lead to the demise of democratic school governance.   
 
1.5 Research question  
 
To address the problem stated above, the following main research question directed 
the study: 
 
Do governance and language policy in South African public schools provide an 
opportunity for deliberative democracy? 




1. Why should parents, as members of the SGB, and other members of the SGB 
have the right to determine a school’s language policy? 
2. How do democratic school governance and language policy formulation in 
public schools in South Africa intersect? 
3. What are the inherent tensions arising from the role of parents and SGBs in 
relation to determining language policy? 
4. On what basis does the HOD contest the language policy adopted by the SGB? 
5. How can deliberative democracy assist in mediating the tension between the 
state (HOD) and the SGB in terms of its language policy? 
 
1.6 Objectives of the research 
  
This study will serve as an exploration of language policy and school governance in 
three public schools in the Western Cape of South Africa. The following objectives 
were pursued:   
1. To gain information in order to explore the nature of parental involvement in 
language policy formulation as a larger project of democratic school 
governance. 
2. To explore the intersections of language policy in public schools and democratic 
school governance. 
3. To interrogate the role of and intervention by the HOD with regard to school 
governance and language policy formulation. 
4. To examine the possibility of deliberative democracy to mediate the relationship 
between an SGB and an HOD with regard to language policy formulation. 
 
1.7 Research paradigm  
 
The term paradigm refers to a research culture with its own set of beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that are consistent with a range of researchers when approaching 
research (Kuhn, 1977). A paradigm therefore refers to a general worldview that is 
interdependent with a certain way of thinking (Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlop, 1992: 16). 
Gephart (1999) classifies research paradigms into three distinct philosophical 




The paradigm for this particular study, especially because it is based on the polite 
experience of the SGB members, will mainly be interpretivist. Interpretivism is the 
belief that reality consists only of subjective experiences and where researchers reveal 
intersubjective epistemology and ontology which in turn gives rise to the creation of a 
reality that is also socially constructed (Gephart, 1999). The interpretive paradigm 
consists of numerous philosophical perspectives, viz. phenomenology and 
hermeneutical phenomenology (Burrell & Morgan, 1979).  
The core of the interpretive paradigm is to understand the subjective reality of human 
experience as the topic of research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Langdridge 2007:4). 
Schwandt (2007:314-317) states that meaning could be discovered through language, 
and not only through quantitative research methods. As I stated before, the research 
paradigm used for this study is interpretive due to the fact that the researcher wants 
to understand how participants view “school governance” and “language policy”. The 
policy analysis employed in this thesis also formed part of the interpretive research 
paradigm which would be illuminated in the following sections.   
 
1.8 Research methodology  
 
Harding (1987:2) notes that research methodology refers to the theory of epistemology 
or the framework of interpretation that systematically directs and guides research. 
Similarly, Schwardt (2007:195) declares that research methodology is a theoretical 
framework and a guideline for how an inquiry should commence. The research 
methodology thus is the theoretical and philosophical underpinning of the research 
enterprise.  
In conducting this study, I chose a phenomenological inquiry. Briefly stated, 
phenomenological inquiry hinges on what Collis and Hussey (2009:56-57) argue is the 
goal of interpretivist research, which is to understand and interpret mundane and 
everyday events (ideas) that are embedded in social experiences and systems, as 
well as the meaning that people project onto the phenomena. I sought to work with 
people’s thoughts on phenomena like “language policy” and “school governance”, how 
they viewed these phenomena, and how they made sense of these phenomena when 
thinking about them. According to Van Niekerk and Rossouw (2006:12), Husserl 
argues that, in the phenomenological ‘epoche’, one takes a distance from the validity 
of the natural world (physical world) and ‘brackets’ a certain aspect that lies beyond 
human consciousness, to be left with consciousness alone. Therefore, I was interested 







1.9 Research design 
 
Building on the interpretivist paradigm and phenomenological methodology, it is clear 
that the research design would be embedded in qualitative research strategy. 
Preliminary thoughts on qualitative research is to understand participants and their 
views (Merriam, 2009:3). In the same light, Creswell (2003) argues that the qualitative 
research approach is used for knowledge generation with regard to the multi facet 
meanings of individual’s views or the meanings that is socially and historically created.  
The research methods that flow out of an interpretive paradigm, phenomenological 
methodology and qualitative research design, is e-mail interviews and policy analysis. 
At its core, e-mail interviews as qualitative research, are a form of these frameworks 
because they capture what the participant views. One can easily dismiss policy 
analysis as a phenomenological endeavour, but as I will argue in the following 
subsections, the policy analysis employed in this thesis could easily be reconciled with 
phenomenological methodology. The reason therefore is, it captures how participants 
view a certain policy construct.   
 
1.10 Research methods 
 
In this study, I hoped to gain in-depth knowledge about language policy and 
governance in South African public schools by looking at the perceptions of selected 
members of the SGB of the participant schools.   
1.10.1 E-mail interviews 
 
E-mail interviews differ from face-to-face interviews in that they are a form of written 
communication and not oral communication (Hamilton & Bowers, 2006:829). E-mail 
interviews are not simply yes-no answers to questions or even short answers 
(Hamilton & Bowers, 2006:831). They are a form of semi-structured interview 
questions in which there are multiple exchanges of e-mails (Meho, 2006:1284). E-mail 
interviews must not be confused with e-mail surveys.   
E-mail interviews were used in this study because it was economic (my participants’ 
schools where not close to each other) and the interpretation of data was more 
coherent. E-mail interviews were conducted with an educator, a parent and a principal 
from each of the three primary schools, labelled Schools A, B and C, in the Western 
Cape of South Africa. I used this method because I was only interested in the 
perspectives of the participants, meaning that they would give a more nuanced 
response that they had actually thought about. Sometimes, face-to-face interviews 




epistemological and ontological distance between the participant and the researcher. 
Up to 200 e-mails were exchange between the researcher and the participants.  
 
1.10.2 Policy analysis 
 
Policy analysis refers to the nature, intentions and effects of social problems and the 
intention to solve these problems on an institutional level (Nagel, 1995:181). I have 
chosen to evaluate the language policy formulation process of three schools, labelled 
School A, B and C, in the Western Cape in South Africa. I will briefly refer to the nature 
of the evaluation of policy formulation and then state how I used this concept in the 
study. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, cited in Khan & Rahman, 2017: 175) argue 
that this evaluation of policy formulation looks not necessarily at the faulty logic, but at 
the logic as such that lies at the core of the policy. In this study, I focused on what lies 
at the core, i.e. the essence of language policy in the three sample schools. The 
essence of language policy as a function of an SGB is nationally formulated in the 
Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) 
of the South African Schools Act (DBE, 1997b:2). The introduction of the Norms and 
Standards will then differ from school to school, not only because their language 
policies differ, but because each participant views the language policy as a different 
manifestation of the Norms and Standards. 
I “bracketed” these norms to arrive at each participant’s view of how they are 
manifested in the school, i.e. what is the essence of the language policy and how 
participants make sense of it. I never looked at any of the language policies of the 
sample schools because I was interested in how the norms manifested in each school 
from the point of view by the participants. Each participant would therefore give me an 
account of how he/she thought the norms and standards were formulated and 
manifested in their school’s language policy. In turn, I looked at each perspective and 
viewed these critically by searching for connections with and deviations from the 
literature. 
1.11 Research context  
 
For the purpose of this study, three primary schools in the Western Cape of South 
Africa were selected to obtain data. The three primary schools shared the same 
province, but not the same educational district. Schools B and C were near each other 
in one town, but School A was 40 km away from these schools. Schools A and B had 
more or less the same ethos, but School C differed with regard to language, race and 
culture. The learners also came from a different socio-economic background. Schools 
A, B and C were Afrikaans-medium primary schools. However, the three schools 
reflected different subcultures of the Afrikaans community. Furthermore, they were 




A is in the northern suburbs of Cape Town in the Western Cape. The northern suburbs 
is a busy area that caters for learners from different backgrounds. School A houses 
many races from a higher economic background. School B is in a suburban area of 
the so-called Boland area in the Western Cape. School A and School B have 
expanded SGBs, comprising nine and 11 members respectively. They both attract a 
variety of races. School C is in a Coloured area, with largely Coloured people from 
poor backgrounds and most of the parents do not involve themselves in school 
governance. School C had five SGB members. 
 
1.12 Sampling techniques and selection 
 
Polit and Hungler (1999:37) describe a population as the total number of subjects, 
objects and participants with the same specifications and characteristics. The sample 
of a research study is used to gain specific information from a specific population (Frey, 
Botan & Kreps, 2000:125). When qualitative research is conducted, as in interviews, 
a sample is “drawn” from a given population (Latham, 2007:1). The population of the 
study is expressed by N, which is 25, and the sample, which is expressed by the letter 
n, which is 9 (Latham, 2007:1).For the purpose of this study, I used non-probability, 
purposive (judgemental) sampling. Non-probability sampling refers to the probability 
that all the characteristics of the participants are unknown (McMillan, 1996:91). The 
only known characteristic of the sample was that every participant was a member of 
the SGB or, in other words, the sample consisted of educators, parents and principals. 
With purposive sampling, the researcher chooses specific elements from the 
population that suit the research the best (McMillan, 1996:92). I chose purposive 
sampling because I decided to look only at the perceptions of educators, parents and 
the principal, and not those of the non-teaching staff members of an SGB. 
Furthermore, I chose these three schools mainly because they were Afrikaans-
medium primary schools representing different subcultures of Afrikaans. Furthermore, 
single-medium Afrikaans primary and secondary schools in South Africa receive 
varying amounts of pressure to change their language policy. Malherbe (2006:197) 
argues that solely Afrikaans-medium schools are treated as if they are the biggest 
obstacle to a transformation agenda, which is directly in contrast with constitutional 
language rights. Challenging these language policies is also, according to Malherbe 
(2006:197), against mother-tongue education.  
Purposive sampling indicates that there is a reason or goal behind the choice of 
sample. Also, in purposive sampling, argues Merriam (2009), one must indicate what 
the selection criteria are essential to choose the school and the members of the SGB. 
In criterion-based selection, the researcher considers certain attributes which is 
essential to his/her study and then find a unit matching the list (Merriam, 2009: 77). 




1. Province in South Africa 
The school had to be situated public school in the Western Cape of South Africa 
(WCED) which had an SGB according to SASA (RSA, 1996a).  
2. Language-of-teaching-and-learning (LoLT) 
The public schools in the Western Cape needed to be Afrikaans-medium. This was 
because Malherbe (2006:197) argued that Afrikaans-medium schools are targeted by 
the DBE (and therefore HOD) as the greatest obstacle towards achieving social 
transformation. Second, Afrikaans is the language that is most spoken in the Western 
Cape which would render this criterium in agreement with the status quo (Statistics 
South Africa, 2011). 
3. Specific members of the SGB 
I have chosen a parent, teacher and principal of each school to portray a diversity of 
insights into language policy formulation and school governance.  
    
1.13 Significance of the study  
 
Interpreting the provisions of SASA together with the Constitution does not provide a 
clear reflection of the South African educational field. These statutes are theoretically 
‘perfect’, but when it comes to the implementation thereof, and other language policies, 
the picture is not always clear cut. If one looks at significant case law and weighs it 
against statutes, viz. SASA, one can easily see the discrepancy. Case law can easily 
be ‘grafted’ onto SASA to reflect a better image of the South African education sector. 
When one takes language policy in public schools, for example, case law suggest a 
different picture to that suggested by SASA and other relevant language policies. 
Language policies in public schools are currently (2020) in the news headlines. In 
2018, the Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education 
Gauteng Province 2018 JDR 0005 (GP) case led not only to public sentiments 
regarding language in public schools, but also in relation to LoLT in general. The 
language debate in schools is based on false ideas of what language in schools ought 
to be: what the media seems to leave out is the question of language policies and 
democratic school governance, and how these two are intertwined. Therefore, as case 
law and the relevant language policies in South Africa suggest, there is a gap between 
language policy formulation in public schools on the one hand, and democratic school 
governance on the other.  
I worked at a high school that uses Afrikaans as an FAL language and English as its 
HL subject and LoLT. It came to my attention that more than 40% of the learners were 
children of refugees and people from Africa. This means that their mother tongue is 




language, but English is the LoLT and HL. Afrikaans is their third language, but it is 
offered as an FAL or on the second-language level. This iterates Nkosi v Vermaak NO 
& Other (77/2007) [2008] ZAKZHC 83 (Equality Court, Durban, 30 September 2008) 
where a school chose English as a HL and Afrikaans as a FAL in their language policy. 
However, most of the learners had a different mother-tongue than English i.e. isiZulu, 
the language policy of the school discriminated unfairly not because it had English as 
a HL but, Afrikaans as a FAL whereas many learners had a different mother-tongue. 
 that it is unfair discrimination to offer Afrikaans at a second-language level even 
though it is learners’ third language. It therefore is clear that learners from the 
surrounding neighbourhood do not receive tuition in their mother tongue. The school 
also changed its LoLT from Afrikaans to English, which indicates a movement to a 
colonial language policy and does not reflect equality and social justice. which the 
Constitution seeks to promote.  
As mentioned earlier, language policy formulation is a power entrusted to the SGB by 
SASA according to section 6(2) (RSA, 1996a:11). In the light of this, an SGB is a 
important entity in language policy formulation in public schools. An SGB must be in 
sync with the community to look after its linguistic needs and to ensure that there are 
no racial or other forms of discrimination when a language policy is formulated. 
According to section 6(2), the language policy of a school needs to be formulated in 
accordance with the Constitution and other provincial statutes (RSA, 1996b). It does 
not follow that a SGB has unlimited power when governing a school or fulfilling its 
functions, especially a power/function like formulating a language policy. Therefore, 
SASA gives permission for the HOD to withdraw certain functions and appoint persons 
who, after the withdrawal, must fulfil that function (RSA, 1996a). The more accurate a 
language policy corresponds with best practice that is inclusive and democratic, the 
better its functionality is. If language policy design follows this formation, then revoking 
the function will lead to a process in which an SGB cannot fulfil its democratic function.       
 
1.14 Contribution of the study  
 
This study seeks to join the fields of language policy in public schools and school 
governance. However, there are several considerations that are necessary before 
these fields coincide. There are numerous challenges facing school governance in 
South African schools (see Xaba, 2011). South Africa is also faced with language and 
language policy issues nationally and in public schools (see Cakata & Segalo (2017) 
and Plüddemann (2015) respectively). Research has been done on the intervention of 
the state in public schools (Prinsloo, 2006); and tensions between provincial 
educational departments and SGBs (Clase, Kok & Van der Merwe, 2007); and some 
body of research has been done on the Constitution, reasonableness and the HOD 




This study provides new insights into language policy formulation as a function/power 
of the SGB in South African public schools. Furthermore, the study revisits SASA 
(1996a), the LiEP (DoE, 1997a), and the Norms and Standards Regarding Language 
Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act (DoE, 
1997b:2). I also made use of other educational policies and language policies to inform 
the body of the research in the hope of joining language-in-education into a combined 
whole. The aim of my research was to gain more information about language policy 
and governance in South African schools by taking the perspectives of educators, 
parents and principals into consideration. The outcomes of the research is aimed at 
informing SGBs that they need to consider more policy options when they formulate a 
language policy and work with the HOD. Furthermore, the hope is of this study is that 
SGBs will revise their practices of governing and gain more knowledge about language 
issues in South Africa nationally, and in schools.  
  
1.15 Limitations of this study  
 
This study provides an exploration of language policy and governance in public 
schools. The study was limited to three primary schools in the Western Cape of South 
Africa. The study used a sample size of nine participants – three educators, three 
principals and three parents – from three different primary schools in the Western 
Cape. First, I used parents because their involvement has a direct effect on the 
democracy of the SGB. They also bring creative insights to the SGB due to the fact 
that they have different occupations. Second, I chose principals because they have 
expert knowledge about the functionality of schools, which is carried over to the 
functionality of the SGB. Third, I chose educators because they are closely involved 
in didactics and what learners want and need. 
The research was also limited by the methods I used, viz. e-mail interviews and policy 
analysis. E-mail interviews have shortcomings because one cannot see any non-
verbal cues, and policy analysis is limited to only evaluating the formulation of 
language policy through the perspective of members of the SGB and the instructions 
and guidelines in the Norms and Standards (DBE, 1997:2). Lastly, as mentioned in 
the problem statement regarding who is responsible for school governance between 
the SGB and the HOD with regard to language policy formulation, I did not interview 
the HOD of any province and the participants did not have direct contact with the HOD. 
The role and intervention of the HOD hinge solely on and are in terms of the 






1.16 Ethical considerations 
 
Ethical issues that usually arise when conducting qualitative interviews are: research 
and power relations, informed consent and issues with data dissemination (Burgess, 
1989:5-6; Ramrathan et al., 2016:444-445). In order to conduct this research, I 
received permission form the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) 
Research Division (Addendum B). Secondly, I received ethical clearance from 
Stellenbosch University (Addendum A) and, thirdly, I received written consent from the 
principals of the three schools. In addition, I received advice from my supervisor: Prof. 
Nuraan Davids on the ethics of the study. Before the e-mail interviews with the 
participants commenced, the principals gave me a list of members of the SGB from 
whom I could ask permission to conduct interviews. When these members (who are 
the participants) gave me permission, I informed them that the interview was voluntary. 
I gave each participant an electronic consent form (Addendum C) to sign and return 
to me containing a description of my research and proof of ethical clearance from the 
university. The participants were assured that their responses remained confidential 
and that their identity would remain anonymous. 
1.17  Data analysis   
 
Data analysis can be seen as the creation of meaning of data that was gathered by 
the researcher through employing the research methods according to Thomas et al. 
(2005, cited in Perry, 2010:49). According to Patton (2002), qualitative research is 
based on three phases. This thesis had also used these phases to analyse the 
compiled data using a phenomenological methodology (interpretative paradigm) and 
qualitative research design. Data was compiled and protected, and the researcher had 
also become acquainted with the data: this phase is called the preparatory phase 
(2002).  
After this phase, the researcher engaged into the descriptive phase (Patton, 2002). 
According to Patton (2002: 50) this phase involved the classification and coding of 
data. The following phase, the interpretative phase, was entered through the merging 
of data in a holistic way. These three phases together form what Maykut and 
Morehouse (1994: 134) call the constant comparative method: it is an inductive 
categorical coding that is accompanied by a comparison of units of meaning. The data 
analysis of this study is embedded in the constant comparative method. The 
transcribed e-mail interviews and policy analysis are divided into meaningful units and 
each one is given a different theme. Building on the aforementioned, the following 
themes were identified during the e-mail interviews: 
1. Parental involvement in language policy 




3. Role of and intervention by the HOD 
4. School governance and deliberative democracy 
 
1.18 Trustworthiness, validity and reliability  
 
Trustworthiness in qualitative research is summarised as the self-confidence a 
researcher has in his/her findings and conclusions (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994:145). 
To ensure trustworthiness, I used two research methods. To ensure transparency, I 
introduce my research findings and discuss the findings before I analyse the data. This 
will provide the reader with the full extent of my data.    
Reliability, for Bell (2002, cited in Bush, 2002:60), refers to getting “similar results 
under constant conditions on all occasions”. The e-mail interviews can be regarded as 
reliable because I asked each participant the same question. With regard to policy 
analysis, the choice of a framework to analyse policy will increase the reliability of the 
research method because the framework is a constant. 
The validity of a research method depends on how accurately the method describes 
the phenomenon that is being researched (Bush, 2002:65). E-mail interviews helped 
me to understand the SGB members’ views of school governance and the language 
policy to determine the. The framework of Ball (1993) and Regmi (2017) gave me the 
means to understand language policies in the chosen schools relative to the given 
framework.  
 
1.19 Brief chapter overview 
 
Chapter 1 – a brief introduction to the motivation for the study, the rationale, the 
research context and the research methods. This chapter also provides the research 
question and the sub-questions, which were translated into interview questions. There 
also is a brief background to the study and the research methodology. 
Chapter 2 – serves as the literature study on school governance in South Africa and 
contains the conceptual framework of the study. It analyses the functionality of the 
SGB and how SASA introduced the concepts of decentralisation and democratic 
school governance into public schools in South Africa. Furthermore, a distinction is 
made between the functions and powers of an SGB in order to position language policy 
as a power/function of the SGB. The members of the SGB with regard to the study are 
analysed, followed by a description of the challenges SGBs experience in South Africa 
to provide a detailed sketch of school governance in the country. It lastly looked at the 




Chapter 3 – a literature study on language policy and language use in South Africa 
and in public schools in the country. It starts with a theoretical position, which is a 
description of language policy and planning and a fluid definition of language as a 
concept. Furthermore, there is a discussion of language policy and language with 
regard to colonial times and during apartheid times. It then moves on to language 
planning and policy in South Africa, with the possible problems of language in South 
Africa nationally. It further looks at language policy in the country’s public schools, 
which is guided by the curriculum and other sources (policies) from a South African 
perspective. This chapter refers to the multiple language policies in South Africa 
nationally and in public schools. Lastly, it looks at language policy as a function/power 
of the SGB, emphasised by a description of the recent case law regarding language 
policy and school governance in South African public schools. 
Chapter 4 – discusses the research methodology and research methods. The 
research methodology is a phenomenological inquiry that form the base and the 
guiding principle of the research methods used. The description of the research 
methods includes information about e-mail interviews and policy analysis. Both these 
methods were used, and there is clear motivation for these methods. Furthermore, the 
research context provided in this chapter yields information about the functionality of 
the SGB and where these schools lie geographically. I then move on to ethical 
considerations and issues of trustworthiness and reliability. 
Chapter 5 – presents the themes of the research findings and the perspectives of the 
participants on the research subject.  
Chapter 6 – contains the critical discussion of the themes that arose from the findings. 
The information gathered from the e-mail interviews contains views and perspectives 
based on the questions I asked. The policy analysis looks at how participants viewed 
their own language policy through the unique manifestation of the Norms and 
Standards. 
Chapter 7 – focuses on the final discussion of the study, and makes recommendations 
for the participants, SGBs, HODs and possible policymakers with regard to language-
in-education policy in public schools in South Africa. The limitations of this study and 
recommendations for future research are discussed.  
 
1.20 Chapter Summary 
 
Chapter 1 served as an orientation to the research study, which deals with language 
policy and governance in three public primary schools in South Africa. The chapter 
was accompanied by the rationale for and background to the study, which includes 
trends in language policy nationally and in public schools and school governance in 
South Africa. This was followed by the objectives, motivation and a brief discussion of 




contains the limitations, significance, contribution, data analysis, trustworthiness, 
validity, reliability and the ethical considerations of the study, and a chapter overview. 
In the following chapter, I discuss concepts relating to school governance in South 





























CHAPTER 2  
 




As mentioned in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 focuses on school governance as vested in the 
SGB. In Chapter 1, I started briefly by discussing “decentralisation” and “governance” 
within the South African school system. SASA vests school governance in an SGB, 
which means that the SGB has the original power to govern a school. Due to the fact 
that an SGB is a statutory body, it is entrusted with powers and functions it is 
responsible for fulfilling. In this regard, Malherbe (2010) makes a distinction between 
competencies, functions and allocated functions of an SGB.  
Therefore, I look at the functionality and status of the SGB in an to attempt to 
understand the relationship between governance and language policy in public 
schools in South Africa in a different chapter -  Chapter 3. Certain powers and functions 
are given to an SGB by SASA, but they also have another function, i.e. a democratic 
function. SGBs are seedbeds of democratic participation due to the fact that they have 
a diversity of members and these members are democratically elected. Lastly, I 
discuss the conceptual framework, i.e. deliberative democracy. Preliminary thoughts 
on deliberative democracy yield its potential for strategic consensus based on 





For Townsend (1994, cited in Naidoo, 2005: 40), decentralisation became a worldwide 
event in the 1980s. Preliminary thoughts on decentralisation involve participation in 
decision-making, which hinges on relationships and shared power in a local authority 
(Naidoo, 2005:36). The assumption behind Naidoo’s (2005:36) study is the rationale 
behind decentralisation that the state cannot provide quality education for the country 
or province on their own (Melaphi, 2015:19). Decentralisation, as stated by Zajda and 
Rust (2009:4), results in a greater degree of participation by various stakeholders, 
such as the community, which in turn could possibly spill over into greater 
accountability: Decentralisation is often associated with greater democratic praxis 
because it empowers local publics to participate in governance, i.e. parent-governors 
and the community (Naidoo, 2005:39). According to Davies, Harber and Schweisfurth 
(2002, cited in Mncube & Harber, 2010) all state departments were aligned with the 





However, decentralisation does not guarantee democracy but, where governors are 
democratically elected and participation by members of the school community is intact, 
it will likely be present (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:320). Furthermore, according to 
Olssen and Peters (2005, cited in Heystek, 2011: 456), decentralisation is coupled 
with neo-liberal ideology because it emphasises a lack of direct influence of central 
government in local educational settings. I further look at the denotation of the concept 
of decentralisation as it is forwarded by the notion of educational decentralisation. 
According Lauglo and McLean (1985, cited in Sayed, 1997: 355), and Prawda (1993, 
cited in Sayed, 1997: 355), educational decentralisation means the redistribution, 
sharing and extension of power beyond the confines of a central [education] authority. 
To elaborate on this notion, McGinn and Welch (1999, cited in Mwinjuma, Kadir, 
Hamzah, Basri, 2015: 34) define educational decentralisation as a movement of power 
from one level of an education organisation to another level, i.e. the local level. 
Decentralisation does not mean that schools are autonomous, but rather that local 
settings are entrusted with resources because they are in contact with local demands 
and implementation (Heystek, 2011:456). Therefore, educational decentralisation puts 
forward the idea that lower levels of government have authority, but that does not 
detract from the fact that they have absolute power. Naidoo (2005:41) states that 
decentralisation goes hand in hand with policy choices such as the curriculum 
changes, assessment reforms, and parental choice of schools. Jansen (2000, cited in 
Naidoo, 2005:41) questions the intentions of policy-making after Apartheid because 
he is sceptical about the intentions of policies during this period for not fundamentally 
changing educational landscapes and processes. 
Mwinjuma et al. (2015) highlight three concepts that accompanies the understanding 
of educational decentralisation, i.e. deconcentration, devolution and delegation. 
Deconcentration denotes the movement that increases the power of local agencies 
such as schools (Mwinjuma et al., 2015:35). Firstly, every province in South Africa has 
its own DBE, e.g. the Western Cape Education Department (WCED), which is 
responsible for quality education in the province. Secondly, and to further the 
downward movement of power, SASA promotes decentralisation through the 
mandatory introduction of SGBs in public schools in South Africa. Accordingly, the 
terms “local agencies” and “schools” can easily be substituted by the notion of an SGB. 
According to Lauglo (1995, cited in in Mwinjuma et al., 2015: 35), schools, or in this 
case SGBs, are granted the power to make certain decisions that they would not have 
been able to make under a centralised authority [national/provincial education 
department] (my emphasis). 
According to Fiske (1996: 10, cited in Mwinjuma et al., 2015: 35), Devolution expands 
the notion of deconcentration by specifying what portfolios will be sent down to the 
school to fulfil, i.e. finance, school curriculum, governance, pedagogy, etc. Therefore, 
devolution of power fosters a responsibility by stakeholders to perform a certain 
degree of decision-making and involvement in policy matters of schools. The SASA 




i.e. manage the finance of a school set up a language policy, religious policy and a 
code of conduct, just to name a few. According to Fiske (1996:10, cited in Mwinjuma 
et al., 2015: 35), delegation refers to the handing over of tasks and work by a central 
authority through the line of management to school principals, SGBs, teachers (and 
parents). Emphasis is placed on the SMT of a public school to manage the day-to-day 
activities of the school. In addition, and from a theoretical point of view, 
decentralisation could open the possibility for good and sound governance (Bradhan, 
2002:185).  
The history of decentralisation in South Africa can be traced back to the apartheid era. 
Near the end of apartheid, decentralisation was a result because of the poor economic 
performance in the 1980s and 1990s (Melhapi, 2015:23). Lehulere (1997, cited in 
Malhepi, 2015: 18) and Marais (2001, cited in Malhepi, 2015: 18) argue that the 
economic recession was due to great fiscal spending: balance-of-payments deficits, 
large capital outflows, financial sanctions, low foreign direct investment, an unskilled 
labour force, rampant poverty and major unemployment. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
the government welcomed decentralisation in white schools (Melhapi, 2015:23). 
According to Sayed (1997, cited in Melhapi, 2015:23) the government allowed 
educational decentralisation because it allowed greater control of schooling for those 
who paid for it, and it would enhance the efficiency, effectivity and quality of the 
nation’s schools.  
In the post-Apartheid era, the institutional commitment to educational decentralisation 
is based on the notion of participation and democratisation (Naidoo, 2005:18). Still, 
not all schools enjoyed or still enjoy the positive effects of decentralisation in post-
Apartheid South Africa. Naidoo (2005) emphasises that decentralisation bred a two-
tier system of public schooling, where the one tier was well-resourced and the other 
relied on the state. Decentralisation in the form of educational transformation has 
benefit only some schools due to the absence of integrated infrastructure for capacity 
building, and the fact that some schools had to deal with change on a large scale 
(Naidoo, 2005:121). Furthermore, due to a neoliberal system in South Africa, the 
education sector has been adversely affected by the unequal quality of education 
(Melaphi, 2015:26-27). Decentralisation is coupled with the issue of funds, i.e. school 
fees, because there is a direct correlation between school fees and the quality of 
education (Melaphi, 2015:26-27).  
Seekings and Nattrass (2002, cited in Melhapi, 2015: 26 - 27)) argue that public 
historically advantaged schools (HAS) can appoint educators with higher 
qualifications, while historically disadvantaged schools (HDS) or state public schools 
have poorly qualified teachers with less of a work ethic. According to the DOE (2003), 
HDS need to catch up because they have minimal to no resources and the teachers 
and learners in these schools are expected to achieve the same levels of learning and 
teaching as HAS, when there are also disproportions in the personal income of the 
learners’ parents (Melaphi, 2015:27). The lesson we learn here is that decentralisation 




education system. Decentralisation inspired school governance in South Africa in the 
Apartheid era and in the post-Apartheid era. The following section builds on 
decentralisation and its influence on school governance in South Africa. 
 
2.3 School governance 
 
The governing of individual schools in South Africa took off in the early 1990s 
(Heystek, 2011:455). As stated above, even the Apartheid government moved to self-
governance in public schools at that stage. However, as also stated above, the idea 
behind this form of school governance was not based on democratic principles, but on 
the authority of state control. Be that as it may, the large-scale democratisation in 
South Africa after 1994 brought about school governance that was structured by local 
political contexts and international trends of the 1990s (Heystek, 2011:456). South 
Africa followed the school governance structures as found in countries like England 
and Wales, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain (Bush & Heystek, 
2003:127). Self-management characterised by “community involvement, 
decentralized decisions and decentralization of funds” was a new trend (ideal) in the 
new South African education system (Heystek, 2011:456). This norm was created by 
SASA and various white papers, but there are multiple deviations. 
Webber (2002, cited in Heystek, 2011: 457) says that the devolution of school 
management in South Africa was introduced in former white schools during the 1990s. 
This movement is seen by Heystek (2011:457) as “politically and financially driven”, 
rather than to improve the quality of education. The Clase Models were devised by 
Piet Clase, the Minister of Education in the House of Assembly, in September 1990 to 
set forth a new admissions policy, which according to Naidoo (2005:23) was intended 
to secure the status quo for white parents. This system had four models: A, B, C and 
D (Naidoo, 2005:23). In short, Model A schools were state schools that became private 
schools and were run by a management committee or board of governors who 
determined the admissions policy. Model B schools were state schools under the 
management of a committee, with open admission in terms of the DOE regulations. 
Model C schools were semi-private, state-aided schools run by a management 
committee and the principal. 
In Model C schools, some costs and salaries were funded by the state, and the 
management committee had the power to appoint teachers, decide on admission 
policies and set fees (Naidoo, 2005:23). Model C schools had all the benefits a school 
would have under the governance of a governing body (Heystek, 2011:457). However, 
this proved to be the opposite for black schools. According to Pampalis (2002, cited in 
Radebe, 2015:2) Model D schools were state funded, had no race restrictions and 
could admit unlimited black learners of all the models together . Davies et al. (2003, 




in bad faith: it was to prolong and protect white interests for the sake of the governance 
and admission policy in schools approaching 1994.  
During Apartheid, various systems in different departments included a form of 
community participation in the form of school councils, management committees and 
school boards, which comprised elected and non-elected members of the local 
community (Naidoo, 2005:22). There was more autonomy in the white system, in 
which there were more educated parents to play a supervisory and advisory role, but 
some black, coloured and Indian schools also had school governance structures with 
advisory roles (Naidoo, 2005:22). Black schools did not have self-managing status, 
which limited the involvement of parents and other important stakeholders (Heystek, 
2011:457). Webber (2002, cited in Heystek, 2011: 458) notes that high-quality and 
sound governance structures were less important than granting parents the right to 
democratic participation. Learners in former white schools came from better socio-
economic environments than learners in black schools (Heystek, 2011:458).  
The White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 1995) was the first instalment of 
democratic school governance and provided early statutory elements of SASA that 
were implemented in 1997 (RSA, 1996a). According to numerous authors, such as 
(Christie, 2006, Sayed and Soudien, 2005 and Woolman and Fleisch, 2008, cited in 
Heystek, 2011: 458), the introduction of SGBs into the South African educational 
context did not only have financial benefits for the central government, but was a 
political step towards democratic participation.  
As stated earlier, SASA had many positive effects, but I focus only on the following. 
Firstly, it institutionalised the act of decentralisation through stating that SGBs would 
be the instantiation of school governance. Secondly, it made the existence of SGBs 
mandatory and statutory. SASA is legislation that offers fundamental structural 
changes to school governance in the new South Africa (Naidoo, 2005:29). SASA 
reaffirmed the ample policies on governance that were released before, which iterated 
principles such as equity, quality and democratic governance (Naidoo, 2005:29). For 
Naidoo (2005:29), the underlying philosophy of SASA was to create a system of 
democratic school governance based on citizen participation, partnerships with the 
state, parents, learners and school staff, and community, and to devolve power to the 
individual school. It therefore provides mechanisms for stakeholders to participate in 
decision-making and emphasises the power of certain stakeholders to participate 
(Naidoo, 2005:29). SASA provides for the election of SGBs by learners, staff and 
parents (Naidoo, 2005:29). For Khuzwayo (2007:5), school governance denotes the 
act of determining policies by which schools are organised, and determining rules for 
implementation of [SASA and the Constitution] (my emphasis). In South Africa, 
policies like the White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 1995:70) proclaimed 
that the words “school governing body” be synonymous with school governance 
structures. However, school governance entails much more than the act of drafting 
policies. An SGB, as I will discuss later, is a seedbed for democratic participation 




Xaba (2004:314) explains that school governance happens when all members of an 
SGB strive for the best interests of the school and the learners. School governance 
can be closely related to communitarian and societal understandings of the role public 
schools play in a democratic society and members of the SGB and other members 
such as parents (not only parents on the SGB) communities, political leaders, elites 
and educational experts who under all logical necessity play a role in school policy 
(Gomez-Velez, 2008:299). Here we are introduced to a “co-operative” governance 
structure which in all awe seems to be attractive, but highly contradictory.  
Sound socio-economic environments necessarily lead to better functioning SGB’s 
(Heystek, 2011:458). According to Taylor (2006:3, cited in Smit and Oostehuizen, 
2011:61). While former white schools had an upper middle-class parent community, 
former non-white schools did not have that advantage. This can lead to a lack 
financing, poor governance, and effectively a poor quality of education. Neo-liberalism, 
coupled with a market economy, reproduced the status of historically disadvantaged 
schools. In other words, HDS did not have the necessary cultural, social and economic 
capital to function properly, or to compete with former HAS. For this reason, certain 
schools and SGBs still struggle with challenges to functioning adequately. 
According to Joubert and Van Rooyen (2011:302), SASA’s “cooperative design” 
embodies a “compromise” between a “centralized and decentralized system”. Smit 
(2011:403) agrees with this notion by emphasising the partnership between the state 
and school governance, as it is intended with an SGB. The phrase in “partnership with 
the State” occurs in the preamble to SASA (RSA, 1996a:1). It is common cause that 
the DoE and the provincial DoE cannot deliver quality education to all their 
constituencies on their own (this can be confirmed by mere observation). SASA allows 
the SGB to help in this regard. There are “checks and balances” (section 22 and 25) 
that hold SGBs accountable: yes, the SGB may govern a school, but this is not an 
absolute power. According to section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:22):  
“Subject to this Act, the governance of every public school is vested in its governing 
body and it may perform only such functions and obligations and exercise only such 
rights as prescribed by the Act.” 
However, when read with section 16(4), it is clear that the HOD may intervene on 
“reasonable grounds” in case of an “emergency” (RSA, 1996a:23). Furthermore, the 
HOD has a stake in school governance after consulting on the policy in relation to 
NEPA (RSA, 1996c; RSA, 1996a:1-2). Also, according to section 22 of SASA, the 
HOD may withdraw a “function” of the SGB. SASA does not specify the meaning of 
“function” (as it is used in section 20) and what the status of the other sections, such 
as 6(2) – the determining of language policy, and section 8(1) – the formulation of a 
code of conduct (RSA, 1996a:11-12). The powers entrusted to SGBs by SASA would 
seem to be the heart of decentralised South African school governance (Melhapi, 
2015:24). The following section provides a description of the legal status of the SGB. 
This is important because it gives more information on how the SGB functions as an 




2.4 The status of a SGB: Organ of state or not? 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, an SGB has a legal status. Woolman and 
Fleisch (2008:55) argue that an SGB is a “fourth level of democratic government” that 
promotes “popular political participation that is quite real”. It is unclear, however, what 
these authors mean by “fourth level of democratic government”. I agree that SGBs are 
not “constitutionally mandated”: the functioning of SGBs is never mentioned in the 
formal Constitution (RSA, 1996a; Woolman & Fleisch, 2008:55). Only, the Interim 
Constitution stipulated that the government will not interfere with the “rights, powers 
and functions of the governing body” but that was before the introduction of the SASA 
(RSA, 1993). Ignoring the Interim Constitution, this implies that SASA, which grants a 
SGB the power to govern a school, is only provisional and could be changed through 
alteration and amendments of the SASA (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008: 55).  
The deconstruction of the term “public power” problematise and complicates the 
nature and status of a SGB’s power to govern. If an SGB is executing “public power”, 
or any “public function” for that matter, can it automatically be described as an “organ 
of state”? A “fourth level of democratic government” implies that an SGB in fact has 
constitutional status; via being an “organ of state”.  
According to the Constitution, an: 
organ of state” means— 
(a) any department of state or administration in the national, provincial or 
local sphere of government; or 
(b) any other functionary or institution— 
(i) exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in 
terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial 
officer … 
If an SGB is a “fourth level of democratic government” (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008:55), 
and given subsection b(ii) of the Constitution, SGBs “exercise a public power or 
perform a public function in terms of any legislation” (RSA, 1996a:122). According to 
section 20(1a) of SASA, an SGB delivers a “public function” through “the provision of 
quality education” under the legislation of SASA (RSA, 1996b:27). Distinguishing a 
power of an SGB from a function, I take the following stance. There is a difference 
between a power of an SGB and a function of an SGB. To make this distinction, one 
can argue that a power is seen as upholding the Constitution, the principle of legality 




If an SGB should be an ‘organ of state’, it has to exhaust all other remedies before 
legal action is taken. The Constitution renders us compelling insights: according to 
section 41(3) (RSA, 1996b:22):  
an organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must make every 
reasonable effort to settle the dispute by means of mechanisms and 
procedures provided for that purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies 
before it approaches a court to resolve the dispute.  
This implies that an organ of state should not be taken to court for what it had allegedly 
done wrong. Other mechanisms must be used to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, 
because an SGB is not constitutionally mandated and only has power through SASA, 
it does not, as was ruled in some case law, fall under national, provincial or local 
executive control and falls outside any sphere of government (par. 21 of the second 
Mikro-case). However, in the past, the HOD and its office has taken an SGB to court, 
which renders the SGB as not being an “organ of state” and not part of any executive 
government. The passage above is necessary in this thesis because it indicates 
directly how and under what circumstances the SGB functions legally and socially. 
The following section expands on the notion of the “functionality” of the SGB by 
referring to its different functions and powers.   
 
2.5 The functionality of SGBs in South Africa   
 
The SGB has a unique functionality, and also has the capability of being a legal 
person, as mentioned briefly above. The following comments on this unique 
functionality can be regarded as important. Firstly, according to section 15 of SASA, 
every public school has a legal status: “every public school [SGB] is a juristic person, 
with legal capacity to perform its functions in terms of this Act” (RSA, 1996a:22). This 
means an SGB is a statutory body with formal “functions” as provided by SASA. An 
SGB is “independent” and may apply for court proceedings. Secondly, functionality 
refers to effective and efficient fulfilment of an SGB’s functions to ultimately reach its 
goals (Rangongo, 2011:32). The effectiveness of an SGB does not only lie in the fact 
that it must adhere to SASA, but also how well it links with the overall project of 
democracy. It follows that the fulfilment of statutory functions leads to the fulfilment of 
democratic functions, i.e. elections and a diversity of stakeholders. According to 
Kirkpatrick (1997:321, cited in in Rangongo, 2011: 10), “functionality” refers to useful, 
working, serviceable, running, in operation, how well you do. I use this term to denote 
the effective and efficient use or execution of the functions in sections 20 and 21 and 
the powers of sections 5(5), 6(2), 7, 8(1) and 9 (RSA, 1996a).    
On the one hand, the literature problematises the term “function” as it is used or not 
being used in SASA (Malherbe, 2010; Smit, 2011). The Minister of Education (Western 




3 All SA 436 (SCA) (27 June 2005) case supplies us with insight into what the SCA 
views as a “function of an SGB”. it is argued that the functions of an SGB cannot simply 
be used to refer to section 21 functions in SASA, with the eye on withdrawing that 
function, as the HOD is allowed in terms of section 22 (para. 38 p. 21 of the above 
mentioned case). According to this case, when the HOD, for example, withdraws 
functions according to section 22 of SASA (as I will discuss later), it refers to all the 
functions an SGB has in terms of SASA (para. p. 21 of the above mentioned case). 
This means that SGBs are entrusted with powers to govern a public school, but that 
does not necessarily mean that is not the SGBs’ function (p. 4 of the above mentioned 
case). However, Malherbe (2010:616) argues that the terms “competency/power” and 
“function” are used as if they are the same terms. Due to this ambiguity, I use the 
terms as set out by Malherbe (2010). 
Malherbe (2010:616) distinguishes “competencies” and “core functions” from 
“allocated/additional functions”. This indicates that there is a semantic difference 
between the terms “competency/power” of an SGB and “function” of an SGB. I will 
refer to all three these groups as “statutory functions”, which can be distinguished from 
the “democratic functions” of an SGB. All three these “functions” are mandated by 
SASA. The “power” of an SGB has to do with the governing of a public school, which 
is seen as an “original power” with regard to SASA and the Constitution (although the 
Constitution does not mandate the existence of an SGB). The SGB has no “original 
powers” to act outside the provisions in SASA, but it has original powers to act in 
accordance with SASA (Beckmann & Prinsloo, 2009:172). Delegated powers would 
imply that another authority figure bestows power on the SGBs (Nwagbara, 2015:82).  
To be exact, section 16(1) of SASA reads: “… the governance of every public school 
is vested in its governing body and it may perform only such functions and obligations 
and exercise only such rights as prescribed by the SASA” (RSA, 1996a:22). This gives 
an SGB the “power” (governance is not a function of an SGB) to govern a public school 
and to stand as a public school’s trust (section 16(2)) – meaning that an SGB must 
always act in the best interest of the school (Beckmann & Prinsloo, 2009:173; RSA, 
1996a:22-23). The SGB has autonomy over certain domestic affairs that are conferred 
by statute (i.e. not by the state)” (Smit, 2011:403). I will expand on the notion of 
functionality with regard to the “statutory functions” (which are contained in SASA) and 
the democratic functions in the following section. 
 
2.5.1 “Statutory functions” of an SGB 
 
The previous section gave an outline of the term functionality with regard to SGBs. 
Tangled up with functionality is the carrying out of the functions of the SGB. I agree 
with Malherbe about dividing, “statutory functions”, as I call them, into three sections, 
viz. “core functions”, “additional/allocated functions” and “competencies/powers” 




determine what I mean by “public function” and “public power”. I will use the previous 
mentioned terms to clarify what SASA refers to as “function”, and what falls beyond 
this term. According to Malherbe (2010:616), “core functions” imply “section 20 
functions” that are transferred directly to an SGB. The “section 20 functions” are 
named “core functions” by the SCA in the Ermelo case (Malherbe, 2010:616). I refer 
the reader back to SASA for a full reading of section 20. Below are the majority of an 
SGB’s functions (RSA, 1996b:27-29): 
(1) Subject to this Act, the governing body of a public school must—  
a) promote the best interests of the school and strive to ensure 
its development through the provision of quality education for all 
learners at the school;  
(b) adopt a constitution;  
(c) develop the mission statement of the school;  
(d) adopt a code of conduct for learners at the school;  
(e) support the principal, educators and other staff of the school 
in the performance of their professional functions;  
(e) adhere to any actions taken by the Head of Department in 
terms of section 16 of the Employment of Educators Act, 1998 
(Act No. 76 of 1998), to address the incapacity of a principal or 
educator to carry out his or her duties effectively; [Para. (eA) 
inserted by s. 9 (a) of Act No. 31 of 2007.]  
(f) determine times of the school day consistent with any 
applicable conditions of employment of staff at the school;  
(g) administer and control the school’s property, and buildings 
and grounds occupied by the school, including school hostels, 
but the exercise of this power must not in any manner interfere 
with or otherwise hamper the implementation of a decision made 
by the Member of the Executive Council or Head of Department 
in terms of any law or policy; [Para. (g) substituted by s. 9 (b) of 
Act No. 31 of 2007.] Wording of Sections  
(h) encourage parents, learners, educators and other staff at the 
school to render voluntary services to the school;  
(i) recommend to the Head of Department the appointment of 
educators at the school, subject to the Employment of Educators 
Act, 1998 (Act No. 76 of 1998), and the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 (Act No. 66 of 1995); 




l) discharge all other functions imposed upon the governing body by or 
under this Act; and 
[m] The governing body may join a voluntary association representing 
governing bodies of public schools. 
Furthermore, “additional/allocated functions” are functions that bear “financial 
implications”, and an SGB may apply for these functions if it has the capacity to fulfil 
them (Malherbe, 2010:617). They are “section 21 function” (RSA, 1996b:30): 
1) Subject to this Act, a governing body may apply to the Head of 
Department in writing to be allocated any of the following functions:  
(a) To maintain and improve the school’s property, and buildings and 
grounds occupied by the school, including school hostels, if 
applicable;  
(b) to determine the extra-mural curriculum of the school and the 
choice of subject options in terms of provincial curriculum policy;  
(c) to purchase textbooks, educational materials or equipment for the 
school;  
(d) to pay for services to the school;  
(dA) to provide an adult basic education and training class or centre 
subject to any applicable law; or [Para. (dA) inserted by s. 10 (b) of 
Act No. 48 of 1999.]  
(e) other functions consistent with this Act and any applicable 
provincial law.  
(2) The Head of Department may refuse an application contemplated in 
subsection  
(1) only if the governing body concerned does not have the capacity to 
perform such function effectively.  
(3) The Head of Department may approve such application unconditionally 
or subject to conditions.  
(4) The decision of the Head of Department on such application must be 
conveyed in writing to the governing body concerned, giving reasons.  
(5) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Head of Department in terms 
of this section may appeal to the Member of the Executive Council.  
(6) The Member of the Executive Council may, by notice in the Provincial 
Gazette, determine that some governing bodies may exercise one or more 




(a) the or she is satisfied that the governing bodies concerned have 
the capacity to perform such function effectively; and  
(b) there is a reasonable and equitable basis for doing so.   
To start with, as mentioned earlier, section 16(1) permits the SGB of a school the 
“power” to govern that school (RSA, 1996a:22). “Competencies” or “powers” refer to 
sections 5(5), 6(2), 7, 8(1) and 9 (Malherbe, 2010:616; RSA, 1996b). In SASA, section 
5(5) reads as follows (RSA, 1996b:8): “subject to this Act [SASA] and any applicable 
provincial law, the admission policy of a public school is determined by the governing 
body of such school.” According to section 6(2) of SASA (RSA, 1996b:11), “the 
governing body of a public school may determine the language policy of the school 
subject to the Constitution, this Act [SASA] and any applicable provincial law”. The 
nature of the previously mentioned “competency/power” is important for this study. I 
expand on this “competency” or “power” more in Chapter 3. In this regard, it is 
interesting that the words “may determine” are used with regard to this power: 
according to Malherbe (2010: 616), the wording “may” implies a “competency” and not 
a “function”. According to this author, the word “function” with regard to the language 
policy formulation of public schools is not used uniquely in jurisprudence, neither in 
legislation nor in the literature (Malherbe, 2010:616). In Chapter 3 I focus, inter alia, 
on language policy as a function/power of the SGB per se.   
Section 7 of SASA (RSA, 1996b:12) stipulates that: 
subject to the Constitution and any applicable provincial law, religious 
observances may be conducted at a public school under rules issued by 
the governing body if such observances are conducted on an equitable 
basis and attendance at them by learners and members of staff is free and 
voluntary.  
Furthermore, section 8(1) reads that, “subject to any applicable provincial law, a 
governing body of a public school must adopt a code of conduct for the learners after 
consultation with the learners, parents and educators of the school” (RSA, 1996b:12). 
Lastly, section 9 (RSA, 1996b:15) stipulates that: 
the governing body may, on reasonable grounds and as a precautionary 
measure, suspend a learner who is suspected of serious misconduct from 
attending school, but may only enforce such suspension after the learner 
has been granted a reasonable opportunity to make representations to it in 
relation to such suspension. 
See the rest of section 9 of SASA for information about disciplinary actions. Most of 
these competencies or powers involve the act of policy formulation. Van Wyk and 
Marumoloa (2012) argue that the SMT can formulate and implement school policies. 
Given that an SMT “can” implement does not mean that it “may” formulate and 
implement school policies. At worst, and in practice, the SMT could aid the SGB in the 




(2012), an SMT does not have the power to formulate school policies, which implies 
that their suggestion is unlawful according to SASA. However, the SMT could aid the 
SGB through deliberating on policy formulation, which in turn will lead to co-operative 
governance (Van Wyk & Marumoloa, 2012). The section above provides an outline of 
the “statutory functions” of the SGB. I will now look at the democratic functions the 
SGB fulfils.     
 
2.5.2 Democratic school governance and the “democratic functions” of an 
SGB 
 
Because democracy has no universal meaning, I firstly undertake a conceptual 
analysis of the term and then apply it to certain functions of SGBs. The term 
democracy goes back as far as the philosophers of Athens. It can also be analysed 
with regard to its Greek morphemes, viz. “demos”, which means “the people”, and 
“kratos (kratein)”, which is “to rule” (Holden, 1993:9). This is the grassroots definition 
of democracy, in a literal sense. In educational reality, democracy refers to a free act 
of governance. If one takes Woolman and Fleisch’s (2008:55) notion of a “fourth level 
of democratic government” seriously – which means that an SGB serves as a local 
government for the school – a local government is seen as one of the fewest direct 
forms of democracy due to its closeness to the people (Geldenhuys, 1996). I therefore 
use this concept to denote the governance as a form of local government, i.e. the SGB 
that governs the school. The idea was to allow all citizens to participate in the activities 
of local government through meetings in order to address common interests 
(Gildenhuys, Fox & Wissink, 1991:140).   
According to Dalton, Jou and Shin (2007:143), democracy could be explained by 
referring to the institutions and procedures that constitute democratic governance. 
Furthermore, my use of this concept will imply that these procedures and institutions 
include a citizen who “can participate equally in free and fair elections, and if those 
elections direct the actions of government, then the standards of democracy are met”. 
(Dalton et al., 2007:143). The application of this concept will further enforce that 
democratic governance is meaningless if an aspect of the principles and virtues that 
constitute a “quality” democracy is not present: rule of law, participation, competition, 
accountability, freedom, equality and responsiveness (Diamond & Morlino, 2004:23-
28).  
In terms of this theory, SASA states the need for the “[d]emocratic transformation of 
society” in its preamble (RSA, 1996a). The democratic nature of an SGB stems from 
the fact that members are democratically elected and that governance is delegated to 
parents and other members who form an integral part of the child’s education (DoE, 
1995, 1997). Partnership governance and co-operative government are two of the 
pillars on which SASA is grounded. In turn, The organisation, governance and funding 




bodies have core functions and consist of democratically elected members. In 1997, 
SASA gave SGBs the original power to govern public schools according to section 
16(1) (RSA, 1996a:22). SASA is the only document that provides SGBs with the 
authority to govern schools; outside the parameters of SASA, the existence of the SGB 
is meaningless and invalid. Beckmann (2002, cited in Woolman & Fleisch, 2008: 53) 
offers the reading that SASA is a form of “disguised centralization”, i.e. the autonomy 
granted to SGBs by SASA is so narrowly defined that it is contradictory to the concept 
of power and authority. 
SGBs [in South Africa] are community-based entities that draw on a diverse range of 
stakeholders and voices (Bush & Heystek, 2003; Heystek, 2006:474; Woolman & 
Fleisch, 2008:48). Every member of the SGB must act in good faith and avoid 
behaviour that will lead to the destruction of an SGB’s moral and democratic fibre 
(Heystek, 2006:474). Policies like the White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 
1995), Education White Paper 2 (DoE, 1996) and the South African Schools Act (No. 
84 of 1996; RSA, 1996a) have collaboratively led to the introduction of democratically 
elected members of SGBs. SASA section 28 and section 23, for example, iterate the 
democratic process of the election of members (RSA, 1996a:29). The democratic 
election of members and the diversity that results from that election helps with the 
formation of a small-scale democracy. Therefore, the composition of an SGB with 
regard to the type of members is crucial. 
According to SASA section 23, one can distinguish between elected members and co-
opted members of an SGB (RSA, 1996a:31). Firstly, elected members of the SGB of 
an ordinary school are mostly parents of learners, teachers, non-teaching staff, the 
principal (in his official capacity), and the learners of a high school (school that teach 
up to grade 8) (RSA, 1996a:31). The White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 
1995:70) highlights parental involvement as pivotal for democratic school governance. 
Section 23(9) of SASA also stresses the importance of parents’ involvement and their 
mutual responsibility in the governance of a public school (Beckmann & Prinsloo, 
2009:174; RSA, 1996a:32). Section 29(2) only permits a parent-governor to be the 
chairperson of an SGB: parent leadership is therefore a statutory requirement (RSA, 
1996a:34). 
Furthermore, according to section 23(9) of SASA, there must be one more parent “than 
the combined total of other members of a governing body who has voting rights” (RSA, 
1996a:32). Secondly, according to section 23(6), co-opted members are usually 
community leaders, i.e. who know the community and are acquainted with the school 
(RSA, 1996a:32). However, according to section 23(8), co-opted members of an SGB 
do not have voting rights (RSA, 1996a:32). Co-opted members may only have 
temporarily voting rights when the number of parents does not exceed the total non-
parent-governors by one (RSA, 1996a:32). 
Public school governance reveals a level of democratic participation even if it is a 
minimalist vision in which decision-making rests only in government officials (Gomez-




[School] governance is the force that determines the degree to which 
procedures are in place to include and empower parents, communities and 
the public to support informed, deliberative decision-making and to prepare 
stakeholders for broader democratic participation.  
I thus agree with Woolman and Fleisch (2008:47) that the legal status of an SGB does 
not necessarily enhance local democracy, but an SGB creates social networks that 
“generate new stores of social capital”. One therefore can see that SASA promotes 
decentralisation through democratic decision-making and participation, i.e. elections 
of SGB members and the participation of parents and other members in school 
governance (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:320). However, Heystek (2004:309) argues 
that sections 20 and 21 of SASA give the SGB a list of functions; what they fail to do, 
however, is to mention what each member’s function is in the SGB. Each SGB must 
choose individually who must be the first member to draw up a policy (Heystek, 
2004:309). In the light of the aforementioned, Woolman and Fleisch (2008:50) argue 
that SGBs are inclusive and participatory. Therefore, these two aspects are both 
constitutive of a democracy (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008:51). SGBs remind us that 
democracy is an everyday practice in which a majority citizens are involved (Woolman 
& Fleisch, 2008:51). 
Apple and Beane (2007, cited in Mncube and Naicker, 2011: 145) iterate that all 
institutions in a democratic society have the responsibility to promote the democratic 
way of life. Collaboration is a cornerstone in a democracy and in a democratic school, 
and stakeholders look for possible ways to work together to make decisions (Mncube 
& Naicker, 2011:145). In a study by Mncube and Naicker (2011:149), SGB members 
noted that people participated and were involved in the governance of the school. One 
participant noted that everybody talked with each other about problems they were 
facing (Mncube & Naicker, 2011:145). However, there are situations in which the 
democratic fibre of an SGB is hampered by elements such as power imbalances 
caused by principals, poor parental participation, poor learner participation (Mncube & 
Naicker, 2011:157) and deficiencies in SGB elections (Smit, 2015).  
Smit (2015:2142-2143) argues that, in the past two decades, there have been 
deficiencies in the election of SGBs that hinder their democratic viability and also pose 
other problems:  
… the inability to reach a 15% quorum of voters, the ineligibility of persons 
posing as the guardians of learners, inadequate parental participation, non-
compliance with the National Election Guidelines, and the incorrect 
application of election procedures by school electoral officers. Furthermore, 
more than 50% of the School Governing Bodies of public schools in South 
Africa are in essence dysfunctional …  
The following section analyses all the literature about the stakeholders involved in the 




2.6 Stakeholder involvement and their challenges in school governance      
 
In the previous section I referred to the functionality of the SGB with regard to fulfilling 
its “statutory” and “democratic” functions. It is important to note that an SGB can only 
function when there is coherence among its members. For Onderi and Makori 
(2013:265), governors ought to be trained to be committed and competent to gain the 
experience needed. Stakeholders in an SGB are everyone who has an interest in the 
efficacy of a school and how the school should operate (Warring, 1999:180). All 
stakeholders must participate in order to democratise the education system along 
managerial and governing lines (DoE, 1995,1996). Participation is therefore a 
significant democratic ideal that fosters co-operation between the school and the 
community. According to Woolman and Fleisch (2008:50), SGBs have an inclusive 
and participatory role, which is in essence part of a bigger form of participatory and 
direct democracy. However, stakeholders can also cause challenges within an SGB. 
Bayat, Louw and Rena (2014:360) found that SGBs in underperforming schools in the 
Western Cape of South Africa were ineffective, had management issues, had a lack 
of capacity that had a negative impact on teaching and learning, and that there was 
chronic conflict between SGBs and the school staff. For Xaba (2011:209), the ultimate 
challenges for school governance in South Africa is “the specialist nature of the 
prescribed functions themselves”. On that note, SASA is unclear about what it expects 
of each member or stakeholder in an SGB (Xaba, 2011:209). In this section I describe 
three main stakeholders or governors in an SGB, viz. parents, educators and 
principals. I look at how they can promote democracy and how the ineffective 
management of these stakeholders leads to challenges for an SGB and its democracy.  
2.6.1 Parents and SGBs  
 
Parents are the backbone of democratic school governance. Education White Paper 
2 (DoE, 1996:21) states the following about parents with regard to school governance: 
Parents or guardians have the primary responsibility for the education of 
their children, and have the right to be consulted by the state authorities 
with respect to the form that education should take and to take part in its 
governance. Parents have the inalienable right to choose the form of 
education which is best for their children, particularly in the early years of 
schooling, whether provided by the state or not, subject to reasonable 
safeguards which may be required by law. The parents' right to choose 
includes choice of the language, cultural or religious basis of the child's 
education, with due regard to the rights of others and the rights of choice of 
the growing child. 
Singh et al. (2004) agree with the First White Paper on Education and Training (DoE, 




represent the school community. Furthermore, SASA creates a significant space for 
partnership governance through which parents could voice their opinions of their 
children’s education (Singh et al., 2004). SASA could create a system where school 
educators can work together with parents to ensure quality education, which includes 
issues with the school curriculum (Singh et al., 2004). The role of parents in an SGB 
represents a form of democratic participation and decision-making in school 
governance. Theoretically, parents have a say in their children’s education and in other 
educational matters. The governance of a public school is a collaboration of elected 
members, co-opted members (in some cases the co-opted members are also parents 
of the school) and the principal. According to section 23 of SASA, elected members 
are one entity that may serve on a governing body: elected members could possibly 
be parents, teachers and other members of staff, for example, and co-opted members 
can be any person who represents the school community (RSA, 1996a:32). 
Parents who are involved in their children’s schooling have a greater appreciation for 
their education (McBride, 1991). To listen to the voices of parents, to encourage their 
participation and to give them more power results in a better-functioning school 
(Harber, 2004 and Moggach, 2006:17 cited in in Mncube, 2009), and better outcomes 
(Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:315). Parents are positioned in terms of resources and 
time (this is contestable) to participate in school governance; they have time to spend 
on school activities (which is also contestable and not in all cases), and are aligned 
with the context, culture and needs of the school (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:302).  
Parental involvement has a range of advantages that stretch from better educational 
attainment to more informed decision-making (Mncube, Harber & Du Plessis, 
2011:216). Cave (1970:46) expressed concern that the school cannot be the sole 
provider of schooling and needs stakeholders like parents. The role of the parent is 
therefore important to construct “home-school” partnerships (Epstein, 1991:261). 
Parents and schools must be in a reciprocal partnership, which in turn is based on 
communication and mutuality. These advantages do not always manifest in all 
schools, and there are challenges with regard to parents and SGBs. 
According to Mabasa and Themane (2002:122) and Xaba (2011:206), the parents in 
their sample had a problem with the following: language use during meetings, 
administration-orientated work, nature of involvement and contribution to the SGB, 
policies and the content of SASA (parents usually delegate policy formulation to 
educators). Mncube (2007:137) found that the parents in his sample were often ill-
represented because they could not attend meetings regularly due to a lack of 
transport; as a result, some parents conferred their rights to others. If schools want 
parents and learners to participate, they need to accommodate them, for example in 
the time and length of meetings.  
Some schools (SGBs) hold their meetings during school hours, which actively and 
deliberately excludes some parents from raising their voices (Mncube, 2007:138). 
However, parent-governors often cite that the relationship with educator-governors is 




disciplinary matters because they are overshadowed by educators: disciplinary action 
is seen as part of professional management and not school governance (parents often 
do not understand the difference between the two) (Xaba, 2011:205-206). In some 
HDS, parents do not have the time to participate in school governance because they 
work in the informal sector, which in its turn implies that they work in shifts. 
Consequently, Xaba (2011:206) states that educators view parents as illiterates and 
therefore no teamwork or solidarity is found within the context of school governance. 
Also, in HDS, grandparents of learners serve on the SGB, which could skew the inputs 
because their viewpoints are not those of the learners’ parents (Mabasa & Themane, 
2002:114). 
In some HDS, stakeholders (like parents and learners) are ill-represented in the SGB 
due to power struggles and uneven power relations (Mncube, 2007:135, 2008:85). As 
indicated by McLennan (2000, cited in Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:316 ), uneven 
power relations manifest in an “insider” and “outsider”, “lay” and “professional” 
relationship that creates coalition and decision-making based on factions. In HDS, 
parents tend not to be involved when educators do not want them there, or they believe 
school governing is a professional matter that does not require their participation 
(Sibuyi, 2000). In some circumstances, educators and the principal seem to dominate 
the meetings and overall governance (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:316). It seems as 
if many of the problems and challenges in the SGBs of HDS stem mostly from parent-
stakeholders’ education (Mabasa & Themane, 2002:112; Van Wyk, 2004:53; Xaba, 
2011:201). Adams and Waghid (2005:25) maintain that a lack of training is the reason 
why governors do not fulfil their duties efficiently, and the practicality of training as 
stipulated in SASA section 15 is absent in most cases. Additionally, these governors 
are parents of learners from HDS (Van Wyk, 2007; Xaba, 2011). Xaba (2011) similarly 
shows what challenges parent-governors pose for the effective functioning of an SGB 
and the best interests of a school. Educational decentralisation is only effective and 
efficient when members of an SGB have the necessary skills and training to govern a 
school (Van Wyk, 2007:137).  
 
The management of school finances is one of the biggest responsibilities of an SGB 
(RSA, 1996a:37). There is a lack of financial management skills in some HDS, which 
leads to the ineffective allocation of funds and a range of other functions not being 
carried out (Bush & Heystek, 2003; Mestry & Naidoo, 2009). Governors need financial 
training, inter alia to budget and to manage the allocation of money effectively. Where 
the provincial DBE and HODs cannot provide training for SGBs, they must affiliate with 
tertiary institutions and other entities that specialise in financial management, and for 
that matter in other functional structures of public schools (Mestry, 2006:35). 
Professional bodies like the Federation of Governing Bodies in South Africa (FEDSAS) 
or any other professional association for that matter, can also contribute to close the 
gap between functioning and non-functioning governing bodies according to section 
20(3) (RSA, 1996a: 29). Training in general will provide a tool and mechanism for 




projects (Mestry, 2006:35). This can add to a governor’s capacity to improve the 
overall quality of teaching and learning of a school (Mestry, 2004 cited in Mestry, 
2006:35).   
Parents who do not participate in training or who undertake insufficient training lack 
the skills to interpret the content of SASA (Heystek, 2006:482). Because 
decentralisation and neo-liberalism favour pre-determine skills and competencies: a 
lack of parent education and skills could be reproduced which leads to parents with a 
predisposition and they are potentially worse off. If these skills are not disseminated 
beyond SGBs, SGBs and schools will not benefit from the South African democracy 
(Karlsson, 2002:132). Van Wyk (2007:135) found that the skills, education and training 
of parents influenced their participation, which affects the efficacy of SGBs. Although 
parents are attuned to grassroots knowledge of the local community and the 
shortcomings within that community, some parents lack the knowledge of provincial 
and national educational issues, which leads to a disparate course of action (Levin, 
1998 cited in Tsotesti, et al., 2008:395). Many parents feel “out of their depth” when it 
comes to governing a school (Heystek, 2006: 478). In some cases, the parents tend 
to depend on the principal (Van Wyk, 2007:135; Xaba, 2011:205). 
In the light of the discussion above, it is important to note that the HOD has a statutory 
responsibility and obligation to train an SGB and supply continued training for the 
purposes stated above. Ironically, this is not what happens in South Africa. According 
to section 19(1a and 1b) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:26), the HOD must: 
(a) provide introductory training for newly elected governing bodies to 
enable them to perform their functions; and 
(b) provide continuing training to governing bodies to promote the effective 
performance of their functions or to enable them to assume additional 
functions 
Lastly, the training of parent-governors must be seen as a professional 
accomplishment and governors should be given something like a certificate to 
incentivise the continued improvement of their skills (Van Wyk, 2007:137). Follow-up 
training is beneficial for governors to ensure continued improvement (Van Wyk, 
2007:137). While parents are seen as key role players within an SGB, educators also 
bring a new and unique perspective to school governance.  
 
2.6.2 Educators and the SGB  
 
The previous section iterated how the involvement of parents could enhance the 
democratic capability of the SGB, but highlighted the challenges parent-governors 
could bring with them. The relationship between an educator and an SGB manifests 




according to SASA (RSA, 1996a:27) and Earley and Crease (2000:485, cited in Xaba, 
2004: 314). Educator-governors in Xaba’s (2004:316) sample use their role mainly to 
protect the interests of other educator-colleagues and the educator corps in general. 
Educators relate to other educators because of the nature of their workload and the 
conversational aspects of their experience of the learners – which makes the act of 
representing other educators a lot easier. Educators have a unique and creative 
outlook on and experience of the functioning of the school: they are employed by the 
school and understand how the management of the school works (Xaba, 2004:316). 
They therefore have the potential to be the actual link between the management team 
(SMT and SGB) and learners. 
Earley and Crease (2000:485, cited in Xaba, 2004: 314) view a hypothetical educator-
governor as contributing in the same way as the other governors in decision-making. 
Usually, educators who contribute effectively to the promotion of the school and 
learners, and incorporate other educators’ views, stand to become governors; 
however, this could vary according (Earley & Crease, 2000:485 cited in Xaba, 2004: 
314). Older educators are tired of serving the SGB because of years of service, even 
though they have the most experience. According to my limited time in education, it 
sometimes happens that younger educators stand to serve on the SGB for this reason. 
The possibility exists that an SGB could be a space in which educators could represent 
the entire teacher corps of the school. Due to the low representation of educators in 
the SGB, they may feel that their input into school governance is undervalued (Van 
Wyk, 2004:51).   
Educators from HDS mostly feel that malfunctioning SGBs influence the interests of 
the school negatively, have low levels of literacy and a lack of training (Van Wyk, 
2007:137). As Motala and Mungadi (1999:15, cited in Van Wyk, 2004:51) note, the 
introduction of school governance was done with insufficient school-level preparation, 
which meant that educators felt the policies were implemented “top-down”. Xaba 
(2004:315) indicates that most of the educators in his sample did not always meet their 
educator colleagues prior to SGB meetings to discuss the agenda. Xaba (2004:315) 
also indicates that fewer than half of the educators in his sample reported back to their 
teaching colleagues. It appears that educators are sometimes uncertain of their roles 
as SGB members; are not interested in the work of the SGB; dislike the interference 
of the SGB; and view the SGB as consisting only of parents (Xaba, 2004:315). In some 
cases, educators only perform the role of “watchdogs”, meaning that their colleagues 
only see the educator-governor as conveying information about the inner spheres of 
the SGB and consequently do not see themselves as governors (Xaba, 
2004:314).Teachers in these schools see the SGB as invisible, “worth nothing”, and 
that it “added no value” (Bayat et al., 2014:360). The next section deals with principals 





2.6.3 The principal and SGB 
 
In the previous section, attention was paid to educators and their function in an SGB 
and in democratic school governance, and it was found that their position on the SGB 
comes with challenges. The same can be said about principals with regard to their 
membership of the governing body. According to section 16(1) of SASA, governance 
is the mandate of the SGB, which grants the principal the following according to section 
16(3): “the professional management of a public school must be undertaken by the 
principal under the authority of the Head of Department” (RSA, 1996a:23). Section 
16A(2) highlights the principal’s functions on an SGB, which ranges from the 
“participation of principals on SGB meetings” and also emphasises the need for them 
to “assist and inform” the SGB (RSA, 1996a:23-25). According to SASA, section 
16A(1a), the principal also represents the HOD in fulfilling his/her duties in the SGB 
(RSA, 1996a:23) Furthermore, the principal’s membership status implies that his/her 
capacity, according to section 23(2b), stretches only so far as ex officio in representing 
the DBE, which means in his/her official capacity (Prinsloo, 2016:1; RSA, 1996a:31). 
Prinsloo (2016:8) notes that, although a principal has a statutory obligation to 
participate in school governance in his/her official capacity, he/she can receive 
contrasting and conflicting assignments form the DBE and the governing body. 
According to Prinsloo (2016), if a principal refuses to comply with the DBE, disciplinary 
action may be taken against the principal according to the Employment of Educators 
Act (Act 76 of 1998). Research shows that the relationship between principals and the 
SGBs of public schools in South Africa does not always come down to sound practice, 
according to Heystek and Bush (2003:10, in Heystek, 2004:309). Principals often do 
not trust SGB members in confidential issues and, in turn, often do not trust principals: 
this leads to conflict and parties that are disempowered (Hartell, Dippenaar, Moen & 
Dladla, 2016:129; Heystek, 2004:309). Some principals argue that SGB members 
(parent-governors) allegedly could keep a degree of confidentiality when they were in 
a meeting or at the school, but as soon as the parent-governors left the premises 
information seemed to leak to the community (Hartell et al., 2016:129). Heystek 
(2004:310) emphasises the significance of a good working relationship between SGBs 
and principals. 
Variance usually occurs when functions like finance and budget setting are on the 
table (Heystek, 2004:310). In settings where parents do not necessarily have the skills 
to govern a school, they regard the inputs of principals as being more trustworthy 
(Heystek, 2004:310). Trust is therefore mandatory for better governance and the 
existence of a sound working relationship between an SGB and a principal. It must be 
added that parents could easily overstep their power to govern a public school via the 
SGB by intruding into “professional management”, where they usually support 
members of the SGB (Heystek, 2004:310). For example, parents think they can 
address teachers’ relationships in SGB meetings, but this is seen by principals as 




principals also do not necessarily abide by the rights and responsibilities set out in 
SASA.  
 
Due to the decentralisation of funds for governing bodies, there is pressure to deliver 
quality education, “because decentralization of funds to governing bodies is a 
cornerstone of self-managing school principals” (Heystek, 2011:464). Dibete 
(2015:107) shows that some members of the SGB are not trained to manage the 
finances of the school. Some of the research on principals in the study undertaken by 
Dibete (2015:108) shows that certain principals rely only on the “one-day workshop” 
held by the circuit office and on documents provided by the circuit office to manage 
the school’s funds. One principal in this study noted that the training was not effective 
(Dibete, 2015:108). The pressure to manage funds is also present in “no-fee” schools 
(Marishane, 2013). 
In some cases, principals use their status to influence decision-making (Mncube, 
2007:135). Principals are unwilling to share their power of school governance due to 
uneven power relations. Consequently, there is a lack of co-operation and partnership 
in governance. The principals of some HDS do not act in their ex officio position as 
stated by SASA and act as the chairperson of the SGB (Mncube, 2007:135). As 
Mncube (2007) suggests, this irregularity seem to be a norm in some historically HDS. 
In some schools, the principal does not adhere to the rules and laws: parents are 
suspicious of what the principal is doing. The principal largely influences the 
relationship between parents and the school: if a principal dominates SGB meetings, 
parents will not feel they want or need to participate (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 
2011:315).  
 
According to SASA, the principal does not possess the power to govern. In some 
cases, the training of governors lies in the hands of the principal because the training 
provided by the WCED is not good enough. However, the training of governors should 
not be the principals’ responsibility: the principal, according to SASA, is not in the 
position to educate and train governors. According to section 19(2) of SASA, the 
principal and other officers from the education department must merely lend 
assistance to governing bodies in the fulfilment of their functions in terms of the Act 
(RSA, 1996a:26). This leads to power imbalances and disparate power relations. The 
responsibility rests with the DoE, i.e. the HOD (RSA, 1996a:26). To summarise, the 
different stakeholders have the inherent ability to expand the notion of democratic 
school governance, but also bring along certain challenges, which I highlighted above. 







2.7 The role of the Head of Department (HOD) in school governance according 
to SASA 
 
The previous sections highlighted the role of parents, educators and principals in 
democratic school governance. However, there is another role player external to the 
SGB: the Head of the Department of the provincial DBE. The HOD holds a unique 
position in democratic school governance, which often is, and in the past has been, 
considered a potential endangerment. I will expand more in Chapter 3 on how the 
HOD and SGB function together and what conflict there has been between these two 
in the past. SASA provides a clear explanation of the power of an HOD. According to 
section 2(2) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:6), the powers of the HOD and MEC are the 
following: 
… A Member of the Executive Council and a Head of Department must 
exercise any power conferred upon them by or under this Act, after taking 
full account of the applicable policy determined in terms of the National 
Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act No. 27 of 1996). 
This means that an HOD is empowered by SASA to perform certain functions that 
must be according to SASA, however, he/she must also respect the formulated school-
based policy that was drafted by an SGB. An HOD is not formally part of the drafting 
of certain school-based policies; as I mentioned in the “statutory functions” in sections 
6,7,8, 9, of SASA (RSA, 1996a), the SGB has the authority to formulate policies. 
Furthermore, the appointment of an HOD is largely political and administrative in 
nature. He/she does not deal with schools directly – not even in court cases. He/she 
has a legal team that defends him/her in legal proceedings. Before one thinks of the 
HOD and his/her role, it is important to note that there is a certain hierarchy within the 
executive branch of a provincial DBE. The hierarchical chain starts with the MEC of 
the National Department of Basic Education, which in this case is Angie Motshekga, 
and then a provincial MEC who works under her. There are nine provincial MECs of 
Education due to the fact that there are nine provinces in South Africa. Thereafter 
comes the Head of Department of each individual provincial DBE, which also adds up 
to nine because there are nine provincial departments of education.  
The three positions above are merely administrative, which means they do not 
encounter schools directly or influence school-based policies directly. Operating 
underneath these three authority figures is the district office, which has circuits. Each 
school belongs to a circuit, and thereafter to a district. Also, each school has what is 
known as a “link team”, which consists of curriculum advisors, circuit managers, 
educational psychologists and learning support offices, etc. It is the circuit manager 
who is responsible for advising management and governance at the school level. This 
is the person who will request to see policies and who sits with the school to appoint 




The picture that was sketched of the SGB being the only authority to govern a school 
is problematised by the existence of the positions discussed above. Court cases that 
involve matters of the extent of the HOD’s power such as the cases of Middelburg, 
Mikro and Overvaal (which is fully referenced in chapter 3) and other literature 
(Malherbe, 2010; Smit, 2011), suggest that when the HOD intervenes in school affairs 
the SGB’s power to govern a school and perform its functions is compromised. 
However, the power of an SGB to govern a school and fulfil its functions according to 
SASA is not an absolute power, which effectively means that functions may be 
revoked or withdrawn by the HOD. I am only referring to the HOD powers according 
to SASA and the SGB’s power (function) to formulate language policy in public 
schools.      
It is well within the HOD’s power to withdraw a function(s) of an SGB under certain 
conditions. Section 22 of SASA (RSA, 1996a:31) states that:  
(1) The Head of Department may, on reasonable grounds, withdraw a 
function of a governing body.  
(2) The Head of Department may not take action under subsection (1) 
unless he or she has— 
(a) informed the governing body of his or her intention so to act and 
the reasons therefor;  
(b) granted the governing body a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations to him or her relating to such intention; and  
(c) given due consideration to any such representations received. 
(3) In cases of urgency, the Head of Department may act in terms of 
subsection (1) without prior communication to such governing body, if the 
Head of Department thereafter—  
(a) furnishes the governing body with reasons for his or her actions;  
(b) gives the governing body a reasonable opportunity to make 
representations relating to such actions; and  
(c) duly considers any such representations received.  
(4) The Head of Department may for sufficient reasons reverse or suspend 
his or her action in terms of subsection (3).  
(5) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Head of Department in terms 
of this section may appeal against the decision to the Member of the 
Executive Council.  
On the one hand, this section of SASA compromises the “sovereignty” of an SGB, 
prevents an SGB from effectively fulfilling its functions, prevents the democratic 




seeks to promote. On the other hand, it has the advantage of preventing an SGB from 
abusing its power. Notably, the literature tends to see this in a negative light (Malherbe, 
2010; Prinsloo, 2006; Smit, 2011). The word “may” occurs in section 22 of SASA (RSA, 
1996a), which refers back to my discussion about what is seen as a “function” or as a 
“power. As we have seen in the past, no power is absolute and can be altered by law; 
South Africa has a constitutional democracy, which renders the Constitution supreme 
(RSA, 1996b). This is exactly what the rule of law means. In other words, the HOD is 
held accountable by the Constitution and the conditions in section 22(2) (RSA, 
1996a:30-31). I repeat that section 22 of SASA poses serious threats for democratic 
participation. The only limit to the HOD’s power to withdraw a function is the 
Constitution and section 22(2 and 3) (RSA, 1996a:30-31). After a function(s) is 
withdrawn, an HOD is further empowered by section 25 of SASA (RSA, 1996a:33), 
which reads: 
(1) If the Head of Department determines on reasonable grounds that a 
governing body has ceased to perform functions allocated to it in terms of 
this Act or has failed to perform one or more of such functions, he or she 
must appoint sufficient persons to perform all such functions or one or more 
of such functions, as the case may be, for a period not exceeding three 
months. 
(2) The Head of Department may extend the period referred to in subsection 
(1), by further periods not exceeding three months each, but the total period 
may not exceed one year.  
(3) If a governing body has ceased to perform its functions, the Head of 
Department must ensure that a governing body is elected in terms of this 
Act within a year after the appointment of persons contemplated in 
subsection (1).  
(4) If a governing body fails to perform any of its functions, the persons 
contemplated in subsection (1) must build the necessary capacity within the 
period of their appointment to ensure that the governing body performs its 
functions. 
Sections 22 and 25 of SASA (RSA, 1996a) need to be read together to form a holistic 
view of the HOD’s power concerning SGBs and school governance. In this chapter so 
far, I have looked at the functionality of the SGB and concepts like school governance 
and decentralisation in educational governance, which are applied to the educational 
reality of South Africa. Thereafter, I looked at multiple stakeholders in the SGB, which 
I will also be interviewing. As a stakeholder, the HOD has certain powers. Although I 
have quoted literature that the HOD in some cases misuses his power, the true 
function of an HOD according to SASA is to keep an SGB’s powers in check. Next, I 
will introduce the conceptual framework of the study, which was used to address the 




2.8 Conceptual framework 
 
The interest of this research was to focus on the role school governance in relation to 
language policy formulation at three primary schools in the Western Cape. I was 
particularly interested in deliberative democracy as a means of engagement. Past 
conflicts that has arisen from issues with governance and language policy in schools 
has been treated as a legal matter – which then poses a threat to deliberation and 
deliberative democracy, as indicated in Chapter 1. In the discussion below, I focus on 
Gutmann and Thompson’s (2004) seminal work as a conceptual framework for this 
study. In this research study, I propose deliberative democracy as an instrumental 
means to achieve a different understanding of the relationship between the SGB and 
the HOD with regard to issues of governance and language policy in three public 
primary schools.   
To start with, a deliberative democracy is a form of direct democracy in which 
democratic legitimacy lies within the cadre of public deliberation by citizens (Rostbøll, 
2001:166). Gutmann and Thompson argue that a deliberative democracy can be 
divided into elements, such as the provision of reasons for certain points of view, the 
accessibility of these reasons, the binding character of decisions that flow from 
deliberation, and the dynamism of deliberative practices (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004:3-6). I will discuss each of these elements of deliberative democracy as set out 
by Gutmann and Thompson (2004).  
 
2.8.1 Reason-giving as a form of argumentation   
  
Firstly, reason-giving is a process through which a reason cannot be reasonably 
rejected (Gutmann &Thompson, 2004:3). Reasons must be accepted by “free and 
equal persons seeking fair terms of co-operation”, recognising elements like pluralism 
and mutual respect (Gutmann &Thompson, 2004:3; see Habermas, 1996a on 
“communicative action”). Deliberation refers to the rational justification or 
argumentation of decisions (Gutmann &Thompson, 2004:3; Smith, 2011). It is a free 
and equal act in which citizens (people) have an “open-minded dialogue about a 
matter of public concern” (Myers & Mendelberg, 2013:701). According to this standard, 
every view needs to be “articulated, defended and criticised through the use of reasons 
that are, in principle, not only fully accessible to all deliberators but also designed to 
win their endorsement” (Smith, 2011:2). Deliberating on matters grants members of 
an SGB an opportunity to critically weigh the merits of multiple reasons for relevant 
matters, which leads to a better understanding of their own point of view and of shared 
problems to make better informed decisions (Chambers, 1996; Smith, 2011). 
Deliberation could even lead participants to “reconsider” their judgements and claims 




However, for Young (2001:56), restricting communication and deliberation to 
argumentation is an unequal process of delivering information. Deliberation cannot 
exist if citizens do not contest each other and ask each other why they hold certain 
views (Young, 2001:5). Arguments follow in a linear fashion, which needs logical 
connections – not everybody has the talent or ability to argue (Young, 2001:5). Young 
(2001:57-77) presents three other ways in which deliberation could take place: 
greeting, narrative and rhetoric. The benefits of a deliberative democracy are vast and 
I will refer only to the following few examples. Bohman (1996, cited in Pellizzoni, 2001: 
75) argues that [deliberative democracy] could possibly be a solution for deep-lying 
problems: this implies that deliberation is more than argumentation and reasoning, but 
rather a co-operative activity that leads to mutual respect. Young believes that 
deliberation leads to the manifestation of multiple virtues, such co-operation, solving 
collective problems and the expansion of justice. Deliberative democracy leads to 
enhanced empathy, enlightened preferences and solutions to underlying conflict, a 
better understanding of differences and procedures; tolerance of the views of others; 
willingness to compromise; and changes perceptions of legitimacy (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 1996; Mendelberg, 2002; Mutz, 2008).  
Deliberation is not merely procedural or substantive but a means of supplying a 
positive environment to produce democratic outcomes (Mendelberg, 2002). The 
procedural and substance debate could be summarised as follows: procedural 
deliberative democracies depend on deliberation as a means to an end (process to 
achieve democratic and just outcomes or decisions), and substantive deliberative 
democracies hinge on the fact that deliberation is inherently good and must be valued 
as such (Rostbøll, 2001:169). This distinction is important because it necessarily 
changes the structure of a deliberative democracy and deliberation itself. It further 
implies that discourse should result in an acceptable outcome for everybody, which is 
not limited to a priori structures: participants may use different reasons, and this 
prevents co-operation from being interrupted (Pellizzoni, 2001:76). Consequently, 
participants contribute to the process of decision-making even if they disagree with the 
reasons and arguments of the other party (Pellizzoni, 2001:76). According to Pellizzoni 
(2001:73)., there is no common basis for the judgment of arguments: this means that 
there cannot be a “better argument”, which is devastating for decision-making. Rawls 
refers to this circumstance as a “reasonable disagreement”, which involves the notion 
that there are multiple reasons for one solution. Although deliberative democracy is a 
moral and normative endeavour (Habermas, 1996a), the possibility exists that it has 
empirical value (Chambers, 2003). Deliberative democracy as deliberation could be 







2.8.2 Accessibility of reasons within argumentation  
 
Secondly, all reasons must be accessible to everybody whom they address (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004:4). Someone who imposes their will on you needs to state 
comprehensively why they want to do it in that way (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:4). 
When citizens deliberate in this sense, there is a relationship of reciprocity (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004:4). This reciprocity presupposes public affirmation, where one 
cannot deliberate as Rousseau meant in one’s own mind with the content of reasons 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:4). The moral principle of deliberation is reciprocity, 
which is in its turn is built on the foundation of mutually accessible argumentation. If 
the public and other citizens do not understand a reason or a line of reasoning, then 
deliberation is meaningless: if there is no public sphere, deliberation is a mere myth 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:4).  
 
2.8.3 Binding nature of deliberation  
 
Thirdly, the decisions made in a deliberative process must be binding in nature 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:5). A decision must last for a period of time, otherwise 
the deliberative process has no meaning in itself (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:5). A 
reason or argument itself has the purpose of influencing decision-making – the 
deliberation happens before the decision is made, so it is safe to say that deliberation 
helps informed decision-making. Collective decision-making stems from negotiation 
and bargaining (Warntjen, 2010:667). A form of bargaining that stands out in this 
regard is “distributive bargaining”: an actor only accepts a point of view if he will be 
“better off than the best alternative” (Warntjen, 2010:667).  
It is attractive to assume that the binding character of a deliberative democracy is to 
achieve a consensus or agreement, according to Habermas (1996, cited in Mabovula, 
2009:222; Pellizzoni, 2001:71; Ţuţui, 2015:184-185), is based on the most convincing 
argument. Habermas distinguishes between two types of consensus (Pettit, 
1982:215). Distributive consensus refers to when each person is in agreement, either 
after discussion or in awareness or what one thinks (Pettit, 1982:215). Collective 
consensus is reached when the people who are involved have a discussion as a group, 
which leads to an unanimous decision (Pettit, 1982:215). On the other hand, 
deliberation seeks “reasoned consensus”, which could translate directly to the power 
of the “better argument” and common reason. The comments of Risse (2000, cited in 
Warntjen 2010: 670) and Ţuţui (2015: 184) are in line with Pettit (1982). 
A solution to the “better argument” is to reconsider the purpose of deliberation:  never 
rendering it as a means to achieve consensus through reasons alone (common 
reason), but rather to reach non-strategic agreement on practices (Pellizzoni, 




to fail in reasoning when one reasons to the advantage of oneself. If one is not 
committed to conveying the “best argument”, one has to appeal to the other’s 
“deliberative” orientation, i.e. virtues (Pellizzoni, 2001:77). Deliberation does not seek 
for consensus if that consensus means uniformity and agreement; the “consensus” 
deliberation is seeking is co-operation through the reconciliation of common virtues, 
which leads to a common problem that could be resolved through an open discussion. 
A legitimate decision follows from open and equal discussion, which in turn leads to 
co-operation: participants contribute even if they disagree (Pellizzoni, 2001:77). 
Mutually acceptable reasoning among parties is also at the heart of reciprocity, which 
is the leading moral principle in a deliberative democracy. 
 
2.8.4 Dynamism of deliberative practices  
 
Fourthly, it is important for a deliberative practice to be dynamic (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004:6). The aim of deliberation is a justifiable decision, but that does not 
mean that the decision will be justified in the present or in the near future (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004:5). Being contextual in nature – deliberations and decisions – it 
implies a continuous dialogue – where citizens and parties can criticise previous 
decisions and move on from there (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:6). In other words, 
deliberation seeks a common value structure to derive a contextual agreement (or 
commensurability of arguments) (Pellizzoni, 2001:80). Therefore, parties with 
conflicting interests ought to deliberate; they seek common ground but not necessarily 
common reasons; deliberation rather requires common virtues like “openness” and 
“equality”, which results in a common problem in which the agreement is mere 
contextual and situational per se. Decisions following from open discussion have 
greater legitimacy (Pellizzoni, 2001:66). Deliberation presupposes that there is a 
shared problem that can be solved by a plurality of reasons and virtues: political values 
can be cultured despite any preordained force (Pellizzoni, 2001:78). An orientation or 
deeper understanding results of better decision-making: if opinions are not based in 
permanence, then deliberation may result in different and more fruitful points of views 
(Pellizzoni, 2001:66).  
Deliberation is not a panacea for undemocratic behaviour, but it opens opportunities 
for other forms of decision-making, like bargaining (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:3). 
The only prerequisite for other types of decision-making is that decisions need to be 
justified somewhere along the line (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:3). On the other 
hand, deliberation cannot be characterised by “reason-giving” and “justification” alone. 
The ideal for deliberation is not justification per se (Vallier, 2015:142). Vallier 
(2015:142) distinguishes between deliberation and public justification to form an ideal 
of deliberative restraint as public justification: deliberative restraint does not entail legal 
restrictions, but rather denotes a moral duty. For Fishkin (2009:33-34), “deliberation” 




competing arguments in the discussion”. This emphasises a bona fide transaction 
between parties. Additionally, deliberation can be cultured, but has no meaning if it 
does not include notions like friendship and trust (Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle, (350 
B.C.). The fact that everybody’s reasons are listened to creates trust amongst the 
participants, which in turn emphasises a mode of political unity, i.e. everybody has a 
set of virtues that allows open and equal discussion (Pellizzoni, 2001:78). 
Gutmann (1999) states that the moral foundation of deliberative educational 
governance in a democracy is non-repressive and non-discriminating. Non-repressive 
behaviour stems from the presupposition that education will not be used by the state 
to control the rational deliberation of a “good life” and the “good society” (Gutmann, 
1999:44). According to Habermas, “the good” in ethical discourse refers to what is 
valuable and is only possible in a context-specific situation according to (Habermas, 
1996, cited in Bonotti, 2015:639). In other words, “the good” can be achieved through 
free and rational deliberation in a specific context like a community. On the other hand, 
non-discrimination within an educational cadre means that the state cannot deny 
anyone education, and education can only limit itself through social purpose 
(Gutmann, 1999:45). Gutmann (1999:46) iterates that rights like the freedom of 
expression cannot be limited by die reproduction of social inequalities.   
Young’s (2001) account of a democracy is a communicative model: communication 
encapsulates more meaning than deliberation. Deliberation implies rational argument, 
in which communication is more than mere argumentation. In this model, every 
member of the SGB could have a “voice” and may raise their opinion. Due to the 
subjective nature of a point of view, not everybody can express their point of view in 
the same manner. This implies that different people have different ways of expressing 
themselves. Also, in this model, an SGB could have a specific role to negotiate its 
stance and to influence decision-making and set policies, e.g. a language policy. This 
has two implications: parents can now feel free to deliberate with a HOD before 
decision-making takes place. Nevertheless, deliberation must be built on bona fide 
grounds and not have ulterior motives or bad faith (mala vides). Where extrajudicial 
deliberative actions have failed, SGBs or the HOD can confront the court to play the 
role of mediator.  
Schools can be transformed into sites of deliberative democracy and mutual respect. 
Gutmann and Thompson (2004) view education as a perfect context for deliberation 
and deliberative action. Waghid acknowledges three ideas of deliberation in schools. 
Firstly, deliberation in schools takes place through an enabling environment of 
exchange and reason amongst educators, the SMT, parents and circuit managers 
(Waghid, 2002:95). Schools are responsible for the provision of policies that produce 
the inevitable opportunity for the “systemic exchange of information” (Waghid, 
2002:95). Secondly, deliberation is public and inclusive, meaning that anybody can 
take part in the exchange of information at any stage (Waghid, 2002:96). Lastly, 
deliberation in schools is bound by communication and the rules of argumentation, i.e. 




introduce topics, to make contributions, and to suggest and criticise proposals 
(Waghid, 2002:96). The “better argument” is not forced upon someone (Waghid, 
2002:96). To summarise, deliberation is a talk-centric approach to decision-making 
that counteracts coercive power relationships (Chambers, 2003).  
It is now clear that deliberative democracy holds the inherent potential not only to 
achieve better and fruitful outcomes, but to change the process of decision-making to 
become more inclusive. Parties could benefit from deliberative democracy because it 
does not presume a “better argument” or consensus. It rather seeks solutions for 
common problems. However, one must not be trapped into seeing deliberation only 
for its instrumental value: deliberative democracy has value in itself. The practical 
implication thereof presumes the transmission of values and virtues.  
 
2.9 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter, I built on what was mentioned briefly in Chapter 1. I looked at the 
concepts of decentralisation and school governance in a South African educational 
context. School governance was analysed with regard to public schools in South Africa 
according to numerous legislation and policies, viz. SASA and the First and Second 
White Papers (RSA, 1996a; DoE, 1995, 1997). According to this chapter, it is difficult 
to determine academically whether or not an SGB is an “organ of state”. We have to 
follow the verdict of the highest court (SCA) in the second Mikro-case which dealt with 
the nature of the functions of an SGB. This debate is important because it could 
change how conflict is dealt with between the SGB and other state departments, and 
what the functionality of the SGB implies in a democratic context. I have argued that 
an SGB has two sets of functions, namely statutory functions and democratic functions 
and thereafter looked at stakeholder involvement in the SGB, focusing on the influence 
of  principals, parents and educators in an SGB which will also serve as the choice of 
participants for the research. I also highlighted the challenges that parents, principals 
and educators bring to school governance in South African public schools. I also 
looked at the role of the HOD in terms of SASA. Lastly, in the conceptual framework I 
focused on deliberative democracy and analysed alternatives to “the better argument” 









LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2 I highlighted the democratic fibre of an SGB and how an SGB, within its 
legal capacity, has certain functions that can extend the South African democratic 
project. It therefore is important to note that an SGB is a statutory and democratic 
entity that transcends mere school governance. In this chapter, I started by mapping 
the theory of language planning and policy (LPP) and language issues in South Africa 
and South African public schools. This will help to put language movement in South 
Africa into a theoretical and scientific context.  
I will then look at the historical emergence and dominance of particular languages 
during colonialism and apartheid. I will provide a glimpse of what the language issues 
were during the Dutch and British colonialism. Here it is important to underscore the 
linguistic imperialism within these two historical moments. Under the same banner and 
with the same emphasis, I provide another glimpse of language issues during 
apartheid, and discuss to what extent Afrikaans led to the suppression of African 
languages and how Afrikaans was seen as a political tool to promote racial 
segregation and provide black and coloured people with an impoverished education 
(Alexander, 2007). These glimpses are ultimately important, because they create a 
historical narrative for the language struggle in South Africa. 
I then turn to language policy and planning (LPP) in a democratic South Africa. This 
summarises trends within the South African linguistic context by looking at policy 
initiatives that range from the Constitution (RSA, 1996b), to the LANGTAG report 
(LANTAG 1996, cited in Ndhlovu, 2008:63) to the NPLF (DAC, 2003a) and its 
Implementation Plan (DAC, 2003b). Through this, the problem with the implementation 
of a multilingual language policy in South Africa comes to the fore (Alexander, 2004, 
2007), and this led me to clarify multilingualism and multilingual education in South 
Africa, i.e. additive bilingualism (McArthur, 1992). This sets the tone for a discussion 
of LPP in South African schools, in which I highlight the content of the LiEP (DoE, 
2017) and various other language policies with regard to public schools, i.e. the IIAL 
(DBE, 2013). By drawing on the abovementioned aspects, I elaborate on language 
policy formulation as a function of an SGB (RSA, 1996a; DoE, 1997a). Lastly, I 
conclude this chapter by bringing together language policy formulation and school 
governance by referring to issues revolving around these two elements; there is a body 






3.2 Language, language planning and policy (LPP)  
 
Because South Africa has multiple “democratic language policies”, theoretical inquiry 
is necessary to understand the current issues relating to language policy in South 
Africa. Language planning and policy are a complex democratic endeavour that refers 
to the politics that accompanies a language. The process entails the acceptance of 
language as a social artefact that is always already embedded in political roots, and 
studies these roots. The following discussions focus on the underlying theory of 
language planning and language policy. The application of this theory will lead to an 
understanding of power imbalances in relation to language practices. SGBs could 
benefit from this theoretical discussion because it will show them where they fit in as 
actors in language policy formulation. Given this, I look at a more philosophically 
pronounced definition of language and then move to the theory of language policy and 
planning as a field of study. This aids the study because of the analysis of the socio-
political nature of language policy in South Africa.  
 
3.2.1 The term ‘language’ as it is used in the study  
 
In the post-modern time, language moves beyond a system to language as a 
discourse (McCarthy & Clancy, 2018:2-3). The difference is not meaning as such, but 
how meaning is created (McCarthy & Clancy, 2018). McCarthy and Clancy (2018) 
indicate that meaning is created inside a discourse when one is communicating. It is 
also too elementary and narrow to define language as the medium in which one 
communicates. However, it is superfluous to contemplate language in its full 
philosophical identity in this thesis. On this note, Bourdieu (1972) indicates that 
language is not a mere tool for communication, or even an epistemology, but is a way 
to assert power over a subject. In addition, Foucault’s (1977) idea of language as 
discourse and power describes discourse as a “thing” that shape what is thought and 
said in the presence of power and authority. Language use and policy in South Africa 
during colonialism and apartheid teaches us that linguistic segregation leads to social 
classism and imperialism. Therefore, language is a social and historical discourse that 
classifies a specific identity with an individual and projects a certain ideology via power 
onto them.       
Following Foucault (1977:49), discourses can be seen as “practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak. In addition, discourses are not 
about objects; they do not identify objects, they constitute them and in the practice of 
doing so conceal their own invention”. This means that discourse, and therefore 
language, construct social identity and are maintained by those who are in charge of 
language policy formulation. To this end, there is no language that is neutral and free 
from power. This is important if one looks at the past and present language planning 




Blommaert (2005: 214) defines ethnolinguistic identity as the identity constructed by 
belonging to a specific language community. In a multilingual society like South Africa, 
it is difficult to determine what exactly the relationship between the identity of each 
speaker is. For Parmegiani (2014:686), it is important that the study of language, 
power and identity are accompanied by language ownership. There is no doubt that 
the speaker’s mother tongue influences his/her language ownership directly, but this 
cannot be the only measure of language ownership. Parmegiani (2014:687) uses 
Rampton (1990:99) to expand the notion of language ownership: categories like 
“expertise (how well he speaks the language), inheritance (born in a certain language 
group), and affiliation (identifies him/herself with a language)” have a profound effect 
on how a speaker takes ownership of his/her language. In sum, language is a 
discourse that has the power and authority to produce certain social hierarchies. The 
postmodern idea of language as discourse and power has a spill-over effect towards 
the theory of language policy and planning and reinforces this policy endeavour. 
 
3.2.2 Language planning and policy (LPP) as a field of study 
 
In the discussion that follows, the content of a language policy transcends the mere 
stipulation of language use(s) or, in the case of education, the media of instruction 
(see how the following authors use the term “language policy” – Heugh, 2013; 
Plüddemann, 2015; Woolman & Fleisch, 2008. For Spolsky (2004:5), however, the 
language policy of a speech community consists of three components. Firstly, 
language policy consists of language practices; language practices are the continuous 
process of language selection from different linguistic repertoires. This means one 
chooses a language or parts of a language from the broader spectrum of languages. 
Secondly, language policy is a set of language beliefs and ideologies; this is the 
specific belief system and ideology accompanying a language choice. Lastly, 
language intervention, planning and management are undertaken to modify specific 
language practices as part of language policy. Although Spolsky (2004) uses a 
completely different component for language planning and management, the first two 
components of language policy are also in themselves part of the process of language 
planning. Because language planning is a process that informs and reinforces 
language policy as such, it is necessary to expand on this notion.        
Language planning as a field of study assumes that language problems do not merely 
evolve from a linguistic perspective, but that there also is a socio-political factor 
underlying these language problems (Cooper, 1989; Fishman, 1972). According to 
Alexander and Heugh (1999, cited in Ngcobo, 2007: 4), language planning is rather a 
social construct in which one studies the discursive production of language policy. The 
term language planning was first used in 1959 by Haugen (1959:8) as: “the activity of 
preparing a normative orthography, grammar, and dictionary for the guidance of 




1983, cited in Johnson & Ricento, 2013:8) continues by referring to language planning 
as norm selection, codification through orthography, grammar and lexicon. This, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis. One could draw the conclusion that 
language planning forms part of language policy through the study of sociolinguistics 
and society. Cooper (1989) and Leibowitz (1969) also emphasise the social factor of 
language planning.  
Cooper (1989:45) argues that language planning is the deliberate attempt to control/ 
influence the behaviour of others with regard to the “acquisition, structure and 
functional allocation of their language codes”. Cooper (1989:164) emphasises the 
socio-political ramifications of a language and adds that language planning is a study 
or management of social change. To “influence behaviour” and “social change”, as 
highlighted by Cooper (1989:45), implies that there is an underlying political and 
ideological agenda that accompanies language planning and policy (Fairclough, 
1993). There are three aspects of language planning that reinforce language policy: 
corpus planning and status planning (Kloss, 1969), and acquisition planning (Cooper, 
1989).  
I rather want to draw attention to status planning and acquisition planning, which for 
the sake of this study could provide information about the language policy situation in 
South Africa and in South African public schools. Status planning, according to Bright 
(1992:311, cited in Wiley & García, 2016:50), deals with the choice of language, the 
attitudes towards other languages, and the political implications of different choices. 
According to Cooper (1989, cited in Johnson & Ricento, 2013:11), acquisition planning 
captures language teaching and other educational activities to increase the users or 
use of a language. According Tollefson (2013, cited in Wiley & García, 2016:50) and 
Tollefson & Tsui (2004, cited in Wiley & García, 2016:50) point out that acquisition 
planning invites “the formulation of policies that guide practice on a large scale, 
including which language will be used as a [medium] of instruction”. Language policy 
in public schools will thus encapsulate this process of language planning and 
information gathered from the language-planning process, and could then be used to 
formulate language policy in public schools in South Africa.  
According to Ngcobo (2007:161), most developing countries like South Africa take a 
policy approach to language planning that focuses more on status planning than on 
corpus planning. But corpus planning is just as important for language development. 
Ngcobo (2007:161), says that [language] policies ought to be formulated according to 
the corpus of the language. Even if policy could increase the status of a language, 
corpus planning could be used for its practical experience to improve the 
implementation of a policy. Wiley and García (2016:50) point out that language policy 
could differ according to its formality or explicitness. They (2016) list seven possible 
language policy orientations, which I narrow down to those that are applicable to South 
Africa. According to their typography, the orientation of post-apartheid South African 
language policy could be summarised as focusing on promotion-orientation, and 




South Africa’s language policies are promotion-orientated because they seek to 
promote all 11 official languages, along with multilingualism. The language policies of 
the new South Africa attempt to erase the nature of Apartheid, i.e. they want to be 
differentiated from the Apartheid language policy and erase any visible and historical 
memory of certain languages and ideologies that accompany them. Although South 
Africa has multiple language policies, ranging from legislation to other documents, viz 
the NLPF (Department of Arts and culture [DAC], 2003a), the Implementation Plan 
(DAC, 2003b), the Constitution (RSA, 1996b), and the Use of Official Languages Act 
(RSA, 2012), these documents do not necessarily meet the need for intervention. 
Therefore, South Africa has examples of ‘null language policies’ with regard to national 
and educational language issues. The example could also be made that South African 
language policies aim only at improving and promoting the status of the official 
languages in South Africa, without developing the corpus (linguistics) of those 
languages.    
According to Tollefson (1991, cited in Johnson & Ricento, 2013:11), South Africa’s 
language policies follow a “historical-structural approach”. This approach, as Johnson 
& Ricento 2013:11) emphasises, shows that a language policy serves the interest of 
the dominant social group and therefore has political and ideological traits. During 
Apartheid, as I have shown, language-in-education policies, but more specifically 
bilingual Afrikaans-English, were used as political tools to oppress black people with 
regard to their language practices. To conclude, language planning and policy are 
indeed necessary for this research project to understand the content, nature and 
ramifications of language policy in South Africa. I now attempt to analyse language 
issues, stretching from Dutch and British colonialism to apartheid and the new South 
Africa.  
3.3 Historical context of language in South Africa 
3.3.1 During colonialism 
The following subsection focuses on language situations during colonial South Africa 
in both coherent and incoherent ways, i.e. the imposition of one language on another 
and one variant over an original dialect (Makoni & Makoni, 2010:5). Before colonialism, 
indigenous languages were the oral language of Southern Africa (Dollie, 2011:97). 
According to Alexander (1989a:9), indigenous groups were initially not forced to adopt 
the colonial language during the mercantilist period (Dutch rule), since the Dutch 
colonists and the indigenous groups understood each other through interpreters and 
translators. However, says Alexander (1989a:10), as the economic intention of the 
Dutch colonists changed and deepened, a growing demand for communication 
between them and the indigenous people existed. As a result of the free burghers 
along the Liesbeeck River in 1657, speakers of indigenous languages started to 
decrease in the Cape of Good Hope, except in the northern districts and parts across 




they reacted by refusing to be “labour tenants to ‘white’ farms” (Alexander, 1989a:9-
10; Dollie, 2011:96).  
The Dutch colonists brought slaves from West Africa, East Africa and the Malayo-
Indonesian archipelago, and used their labour instead of that of the local African Khoe 
and San people (Prah, 2018). Through communicating with their masters, these slaves 
altered the Dutch language and changed it to a lingua franca, which could later be 
called a “kombuistaal” – kitchen language – which was Afrikaans-Hollands (Prah, 
2018). Belcher (1987:18, cited in Alexander, 1989:10) noted that, during this period 
“Afrikaans-Hollands” (a form of Dutch) became the language of commerce, religion 
and education among white and non-white folk within eight years. The Dutch colonists 
had no intention of learning the indigenous languages: the Europeans found the 
Khoikhoi phonetics very difficult, and they also had difficulty pronouncing the “clicks” 
– which are a unique aspect of this language (Alexander, 1989a:10).  
Alexander (1989a:11) explains that, as slavery advanced, the Dutch East India 
Company made attempts to teach “Dutch Reformed religion” to slaves and their 
children; needless to say, the medium of instruction was Dutch. These missionary 
attempts, says Alexander (1989a:12), manifested as the first movement towards 
modernised schooling and the first attempts at a language policy in a segregated yet 
multilingual South Africa. By the end of the 17th century, most inhabitants of the Cape 
Colony started to speak in a lingua franca that was an early form of Afrikaans; for the 
children of some slaves, this was probably their home language (Alexander, 
1989a:12). Among the East Indian slaves at the Cape of Good Hope (when the 
Khoikhoi people started entering services with the slaves, Afrikaans-Hollands became 
the language of white-brown relations), there emerged a particular variety of Afrikaans-
Hollands, “a dialect related in complex ways of the Islam in the Cape” (Alexander, 
1989a:10-11).  
At the beginning of the 19th century, the British settlers began to challenge the Dutch 
colonists’ dominance in the Cape: language became an essential part of this power 
struggle (Prah, 2018). British colonists succeeded by replacing the Dutch and, by 
1822, English was proclaimed as the only official language of the Cape Colony. This 
language policy position of the British was formulated to anglicise the Dutch culturally 
(Prah, 2018). However, the Dutch settlers were still able to speak Dutch unofficially 
(Němeček, 2010:29). The movement to English resulted in the Great Trek, during 
which many Dutch settlers migrated away from British rule (Prah, 2018). The British 
saw this as an opportunity to hire educators and other clergymen with the intention to 
keep English as the official language (Němeček, 2010:29). 
Makoni and Makoni (2010:8), on the other hand, argue that a degree of proficiency in 
local Bantu languages was necessary to enforce colonial orders and to learn the 
customary law of the natives. In the British colonial enterprise, they used their own 
language to control indigenous groups. In British colonial Africa, the colonists did not 
deem it necessary to impose their own language on the local population. Therefore, 




imposition of English on indigenous languages, but the imposition of European 
variants of these languages on their speakers via the judicial and educational system. 
For Makoni and Makoni (2010:5), the written form of the original indigenous languages 
is not indigenous at all: these written products are actually “foreign languages”.  
As explained by Němeček (2010:30), the first British settlers were mainly from the 
working class and spoke a different kind of English dialect; this was not standard 
English. This English dialect was influenced by other languages spoken in the area, 
i.e. mainly Afrikaans-Hollands, but other indigenous languages as well (Němeček, 
2010:29). The Boers, according to Němeček (2010:30), were unable to speak English 
and were deemed to be of a lower social and economic status because their English 
proficiency forced them to migrate to the countryside, where they did not have to be 
taught English.  
Nonetheless, the Boer community successfully achieved recognition for Afrikaans in 
1875. However, equal language rights in this paradigm were shallow in nature, 
because they did not include South African Bantu languages in the constitution 
(Němeček, 2010:30). Along with the unification of South Africa in 1910, English and 
Dutch were proclaimed the official languages (Němeček, 2010:30). From this point of 
view, the Dutch, and later the British, brought a Eurocentric linguistic ideology that 
marginalised indigenous languages and their speakers (Rudwick, 2018:255). In sum, 
suppression took place during the Dutch colonial times in the form of the subjugation 
of indigenous languages. 
 
3.3.2 During Apartheid  
 
Language issues during apartheid arose prior to the acknowledgement of Afrikaans 
as the language of national unity. Afrikaans, says Brenzinger (2017:41), failed to be 
incorporated into the Union of South Africa Constitution and did not replace Dutch until 
the National Party joined the pact government of the Union of South Africa in 1924. 
According to Brenzinger (2017:41), the recognition of Afrikaans was an urgent priority 
in the Union Act (no. 8 of 1925), which states that the word “Dutch” would be replaced 
by the word “Afrikaans”.  
In 1961, when South Africa left the Commonwealth, the South African Constitution 
(Act no. 32 of 1961) refers to Afrikaans as an official language and includes Dutch and 
English (Brenzinger 2017:41). It was the Republic of South Africa Constitution (Act no. 
110 of 1983) that omitted Dutch and made equal provision for Afrikaans and English 
(Brenzinger, 2017:41). Afrikaans only received official status in 1925 (Gough, 1996:2; 
Prah, 2018). The institutional struggle for the acknowledgment of Afrikaans is one of 
the reasons why indigenous languages remained in a submissive position.  
According to Stultz (1974:82, cited in Brenzinger, 2017:41), the National Party in the 




“supplemental language, on an equal footing”. Despite the subordinate status afforded 
to the English language, English-speaking whites were still viewed as major role 
players in the economy (Brenzinger, 2017:41). However, it was at this stage, state 
Webb and Kriel (2000:19), that Afrikaans became interwoven with the apartheid state 
and the National Party’s ideology, Afrikaner Nationalism. Given that Afrikaner 
nationalism is a form of linguistic nationalism, and formed the identity of Afrikaners, 
Afrikaans as a language was a tool to mobilise a political vehicle (Webb & Kriel, 2000: 
27). During Apartheid, linguistic diversity was undermined and disregarded through 
the promotion of Afrikaans-only language policies. Hence, Alexander (2007:1) argues 
that Afrikaans carries a negative stigma in this regard; here, language policy was used 
as a tool to limit black social mobility, and consequently Afrikaans was considered as 
the “language of the oppressor”. Alexander (1989a:12-13) states his outrage clearly, 
namely that the Afrikaner nationalists who lyrically praised Afrikaans for the originality 
of a national heritage were created in the mouths of “East Indian and African slaves, 
European Free Burghers and indigenous Khoisan people”.  
Apartheid language policy intensified British [and Dutch] colonial language policy 
(Alexander, 1989a:19). The Eiselen-Verwoerd language policy, as I will discuss later, 
was based on missionary theory and practice in relation to the indigenous languages: 
the logical grounds for this language policy lay in seeing each human in an “ethnic” 
group as having a right to promote his/her language and culture (Alexander, 
1989a:19). However, as Alexander (1989a:19) points out, it was the breaking up of 
black people into large groups that gave rise to this policy. Thompson and Wilson 
(1969, cited in Alexander, 1989a:10) note that vernacular instruction was the main tool 
to promote segregation. According to the Verwoerd blueprint (Alexander, 1989a:19), 
Afrikaner-Nationalism was based on the same philosophy as “Central European” 
social theory, and was employed to identify 10 ethnic groups among the African people 
in South Africa.   
During the 1970s, Afrikaans as a medium of instruction caused political unrest. 
According to the Bantu Education Act, section 15, the Apartheid government could 
dictate the education sector of African schools (Union of South Africa, 1953:9). Section 
15(e) further stipulates that the Apartheid government may prescribe the medium of 
instruction of all South African schools, meaning that it had the power to favour 
Afrikaans and English over African and indigenous languages (Union of South Africa, 
1953:9). Ndlovu (2011:327) states that the Department of Bantu Education 
disseminated a circular (no. 2 of 1973) with the name, “Medium of Instruction in 
Secondary Schools (and Std 5 which is the new Grade 7) in White Areas”. This policy 
document sought to bring Afrikaans to a significant level, i.e. making it a medium of 
instruction in most public schools in South Africa (Botha, 1974). This policy stated that 
Afrikaans and English as official language of instruction must have a 50:50 status in 





Following on the above, the Soweto Uprising of 1976 was a protest against the 
imperialism of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. When the apartheid state 
enforced Afrikaans as the medium of instruction in 1976, black learners would be 
taught in two distinct ‘new’ languages, first English in 1975 and then Afrikaans in 1976 
(Ndlovu, 2011:327). Punt Janson (in Motshekga, 2015), the deputy Minister of Bantu 
Education in 1974, stated that he would not consult African people about the language 
issue: non-white people would find that the oppressor only spoke Afrikaans or English 
and that these two languages would be to their advantage.  
The jump to a different medium of instruction meant that learners could not understand 
what they were being taught. Some noted that the only way black learners could learn 
was via rote learning: there was no critical engagement with the work whatsoever 
(Ndlovu, 2011:327). What made this educational project more unequal and inhumane 
was that Verwoerd argued that there was no place for the Bantu in the European 
community with regard to certain forms of labour: he argued that it was useless to 
teach non-white learners normal school subjects because they would never be used 
in practice (Hendrik Verwoerd, in Lapping, 1987). The expectation arose that black 
learners would learn non-language subjects in the medium of Afrikaans and that 
teachers who got appointed for only teaching Afrikaans had to teach these non-
language subjects (Ngcobo in Ndlovu, 2011:328).  
According to Plüddemann (2015:189), black learners were taught in their mother 
tongue at primary schools between 1948 and 1994 (for eight years). Thereafter, non-
white schools had to follow “non-mother-tongue” dual-medium instruction, in which 
half of the subjects were taught in Afrikaans and the half were taught in English. 
Principals of black schools, says Ndlovu (2011:327), received a letter stating that 
subjects like “General Science, Practical Subjects (Homecraft, Needlework, 
Woodwork, Metalwork, Art and Craft and Agricultural Science) will be conducted in 
English while Mathematics and Social Sciences must be conducted in Afrikaans”. This 
became the fundamental reason why black South Africans saw Afrikaans as the 
“language of the oppressor”, and led to the affirmation of English as their chosen 
language and medium of instruction, which in turn led to the violent uprising in Soweto 
on 16 June 1976 (Reagan, 1987:305).  
According to Reagan (1987:305), English was considered as the “language of 
liberation” – meaning that the use of the language would free people from an Afrikaner 
nationalist identity. Notwithstanding, with English being the “language of liberation”, it 
was, as an LoLT, ironically implemented at the expense of African and other 
indigenous languages (Plüddemann, 2015:189). For black schools in South Africa, an 
early exit transition to English was on the horizon, which meant that African languages 
were demoted from being a home language (LoLT) to a mere language subject 
(Plüddemann, 2015:189). Non-white schools lost their ability to teach in learners’ 
mother tongue, which led to large-scale confusion because black teachers and 




Colonialism and apartheid in South Africa revealed an intrinsic relationship between 
language (discourse), power and identity. McKinney (2017:8) argues that discourse 
“forms the objects of which they speak”, i.e. dominant discourses creates the dominant 
identity. Colonial discourses had the power to make “colonial subjects”, inasmuch as 
the indigenous identities were subject to a greater power, i.e. colonial power. Colonial 
schooling, asserts Enslin (2017:2), had the purpose to serve as the “colonizing power” 
that was “dismissive of indigenous culture”. Hence, “colonized subjects” received an 
inferior identity, whilst a colonial identity was projected onto them.  
Apartheid had the same imperialistic language effect on the black people of South 
Africa. Afrikaans had an alienating and “othering” effect, i.e. the ideology of Afrikaner 
Nationalism alienated black people and gave them a subjected identity. The 
importance of power and colonial discourse can be applied to black identity during 
apartheid and post-apartheid. Because some hold the view that black languages are 
“incompatible with the objectives of learning”, black people are introduced to certain 
social spaces that condone “humiliation, exclusion and discrimination and racism” 
(Davids, 2018a:1- 5).   
This adds to Frantz Fanon’s (1967, cited in Enslin, 2017:5) analogy of black people 
wearing “white masks”, which in its turn indicates how the power of colonial subjects 
was enslaved psychologically and emotionally via language imposition. Discourse has 
the power to confine black languages as blackness, which is form of a “othering”, and 
hence is seen as undesirable (Davids, 2018a:4). To conclude, the story of language 
in South Africa moves beyond struggles but emphasises how indigenous languages 
experienced difficulty to receive official status through the auspices of racial 
segregation. The following section continues the chronological study of language in 
South Africa through a discussion of the current language and language policy 
situation in the country. 
 
3.4 Language and language policy in post-apartheid South Africa 
 
On paper, South Africa’s language policies a display remarkable movement away from 
the apartheid regime and language practices. After the first democratic election in 
1994, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (RSA, 1996b) became the most 
profound piece of legislation written by the new, democratically elected government to 
change the political and linguistic landscape of South Africa. Below, a few sections 
that deal with the promotion of the 11 official languages of South Africa.  
Section 6(2) of the Constitution reads as follows: 
Recognising the historically diminished use and status of the indigenous 
languages of our people, the state must take practical and positive 





and therefore the Constitution acknowledges 11 languages in section 6(1): 
The official languages of the Republic are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, 
siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and 
isiZulu.  
With regard to language rights and education, section 29(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 
1996b:14) states the following:  
Everyone has the right to receive education in the official language or 
languages of their choice in public educational institutions where that 
education is reasonably practicable. In order to ensure the effective access 
to, and implementation of, this right, the state must consider all reasonable 
educational alternatives, including single medium institutions, taking into 
account— 
(a) equity; 
(b) practicability; and 
(c) the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws and 
practices.  
The sections above are evidence that the newly elected government prioritised 
indigenous language promotion, at least on the policy level. The following graph shows 
what percentage of the country’s population has one of the 11 official languages of 
South Africa as a mother tongue according the Census (Statistics South Africa, 2011). 
 
 
Note that, within the new political dispensation, two African languages are the most 
frequently spoken languages in South Africa, viz. IsiZulu (22.7%) and IsiXhosa (16%). 
Note that Afrikaans is spoken more frequently that English, and it is also the most 




Africa, 2011). Language negotiations started prior to the coming of democracy. After 
apartheid, language diversity was a priority for the newly elected government. The 
Constitution of 1996 embraces the notion of language as a basic human right and 
multilingualism as a national resource, which acknowledges the 11 official languages 
(Hornberger & Vaish, 2008:312). The rule of law promotes multilingualism, in which 
every language “must enjoy parity of esteem and must be treated equally” (Beukes, 
2004:5). According to Currie (1996, cited in Ngcobo, 2007:166), “parity of esteem” 
denotes the putting aside of practicality, which in turn triggers an effort to ensure no 
language is dominated by another.  
After the first democratic election in 1994, the Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology appointed the Language Task Group (LANGTAG) in 1996 to construct a 
policy and implementation plan for the provisions made in section 6 of the Constitution 
(Beukes, 2009:39). According to Beukes (2009:39) and Alexander (2004:125), the 
entity aimed to change language policy formulation to a bottom-up process by 
providing a contact point between government and language stakeholders. Ngcobo 
(2007:162) adds that LANGTAG was a forerunner of the Pan South African Language 
Board. According to Ngcobo (2007:162) the PanSALB replaced LANGTAG and 
compiled reports, made recommendations, but it was created during the “transition” 
period when much policy and legislation was introduced to remedy the effects of 
apartheid (Beukes, 2009: 39; Ngcobo, 2012: 184).   
Consultations were held in a participatory and accountable manner, involving 
language experts and other stakeholders, to construct a comprehensive document 
called the Final LANGTAG Report in 1996 that stipulated South Africa’s language 
needs, and a framework for language policy initiatives with policy decisions, including 
language-in-education policy (Beukes, 2009:39). The LANGTAG report emphasised, 
inter alia, the promotion of multilingualism and the need to elaborate and modernise 
African languages (LANGTAG, 1996 cited in Ndhlovu, 2008:63). According to Beukes 
(2004:14, cited in Ndhlovu,2008: 65) the LANGTAG report also included concern that 
a possible second language imperialism is approaching: departments in most of the 
spheres of South African society are turning towards English as a medium, which 
means that African languages are again unrepresented. 
The Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology then appointed an Advisory 
Panel of experts to draft a language policy and implementation plan built on the 
LANGTAG report (Beukes, 2009:39). Webb (2002) states that the Department of Arts, 
Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) was the state department tasked with 
managing language policy development: they appointed an Advisory Panel to propose 
a language policy for South Africa. Their proposals were presented in March 2000 
(Webb, 2002). The Advisory Panel was responsible for the first draft of the Language 
Policy and Plan for South Africa, and the South African Languages Draft Bill (Beukes, 
2009:39).      
Post-apartheid South Africa gave birth to numerous language implementation bodies 




National Language Forum is an entity that consists of government structures and 
NGOs that were created by the National Language Services in 2004 to monitor policy 
implementation (Beukes, 2009:42). The National Language Service is a 
“comprehensive language office in government’s executive arm in language matters, 
the DAC, [and] is in charge of policy and planning matters” (Beukes, 2009:43). There 
are other statutory bodies that attempt to foster a multilingual society, viz. the 
Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities (Beukes, 2009:42). The Human Rights Commission mandates 
the promotion of linguistic rights (Beukes, 2009:42). According to Heugh (2003:126, 
cited in Ngcobo, 2012:184), however, pre-1994, the National Party (NP), the African 
National Congress (ANC) and NGO, the National Language Project, were the role 
players when language matters came into discussion. 
PanSALB was established in 1995. It is an independent language planning agency 
that is constitutionally mandated not only to promote a multilingual society, as noted 
by Posel and Zeller (2016:358), but according to Brenzinger (2017:48), PanSALB 
“fosters and monitor the implementation of the Constitution by promoting and creating 
conditions for the development and use of all eleven official languages, as well as the 
“Khoi, Nama and San” languages. South African Sign Language is included in this list 
of languages, along with “heritage languages” (Brenzinger, 2017:48). PanSALB was 
set in motion by section 6(5) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:5) and by the Pan South 
African Language Board Act (this act was amended in 1999) (RSA, 1995). It has nine 
provincial language committees, 11 lexicography units, and language bodies for every 
official language and entities for Sign Language (Beukes, 2009:41). According to the 
DAC (2003c, cited in Beukes, 2009: 43), the National Language Service and the DAC 
oversee the language planning and policy endeavours of the country, and PanSALB 
is seen as a “strategic partner” in language matters.  
The Language Policy and Plan for South Africa and the Draft Bill were revised, and 
the National Language Policy Framework (NLPF) was accepted by the cabinet only in 
2003 (Beukes, 2009:40). However, the Bill was not accepted and had to be revised, 
which implied that alternative routes had to be used to implement the National 
Language Policy Framework (NLPF) (DAC, 2003a). The NLPF will include all 
government structures, but private enterprises are not bound by this document, 
although they are encouraged to support the policy by means of participation in 
equitable language practices (DAC, 2003a:13).  
The NLPF is designed for the following purposes (DAC, 2003a:10): 
• [to] promote the equitable use of the 11 official languages;  
• facilitate equitable access to government services, knowledge and 
information;  





• [to] initiate and sustain a vibrant discourse on multilingualism with all 
language communities;  
• [to] encourage the learning of other official indigenous languages to 
promote national unity, and linguistic and cultural diversity; and  
• [to] promote good language management for efficient public service 
administration to meet client expectations and needs. 
The NLPF Implementation Plan also commenced in 2003. The creation of the 
Implementation Plan for the NLPF followed two months after the NLPF was accepted. 
The Implementation Plan is a flexible proposal aimed at realising multilingualism in 
public spheres (DAC, 2003b:5). The Implementation Plan was designed to foster the 
agency to disseminate the content of the NLPF over a reasonable period (DAC, 
2003b:8). Furthermore, the policy sets out to change the cultural linguistic formation 
by changing attitudes towards indigenous languages (DAC, 2003b:8). Implementation 
without ad hoc grassroots structures is a mere ideal. Therefore, the Implementation 
Plan sets out to create certain structures that would increase the probability of a 
multilingual society for South Africa (DAC, 2003b:12). The National Language Service 
(NLS) of the DAC would facilitate all the ad hoc structures, with the Pan South African 
Language Board (PanSALB) at the forefront (DAC, 2003b:12).  
According to Beukes (2009:40), the government seeks to materialise these aims 
through a process of “functional multilingualism”. This principle indicates the usage of 
any official languages, as groups and audiences differ. According to Ngcobo 
(2007:163), PanSALB completed the NLPF and denotes a co-operative effort between 
the Advisory Panel and other bodies. With the NLPF came a range of language 
policies or initiatives, namely a Policy Statement, an Implementation Plan, the South 
African Languages Act, and the South African Language Practitioners’ Council Act 
(Beukes, 2009:40). The South African Languages Bill (DAC, 2003c) emphasised the 
promotion of multilingualism as a constitutional principle, and equated the use of the 
official languages as “a matter of right” (South African Languages Bill, cited in 
Pretorius, 2013:307). It also contained more pronounced guidelines for language 
policy, but the cabinet did not pass the Bill and asked for a more non-legislative way 
to regulate the use of official languages within government structures (Pretorius, 
2013:307). The South African Languages Bill led to the Use of Official Languages Act 
in 2012. In 2014, the Minister of Arts and Culture sent an urgent notice to all 
government agencies, saying that each agency must have a language policy (DAC, 
2014). The Uses of the Official Languages Act was created to regulate the use of all 
the official languages: if government bodies fail to supply their language policies, they 






The use of South African official languages is institutionalised in the Use of Official 
Languages Act (Act 12 of 2012) (RSA, 2012). According to section 4(1): 
Every national department, national public entity and national public 
enterprise must adopt a language policy regarding its use of official 
languages for government purposes within 18 months of the 
commencement of this Act or such further period as the Minister may 
prescribe, provided that such prescribed period may not exceed six months 
(RSA, 2012:2).  
According to section 4(2): 
A language policy adopted in terms of subsection (I) must-  
(a) comply with the provisions of section 6(3)(a) of the Constitution;  
(b) identify at least three official languages that the national department, 
national public entity or national public enterprise will use for government 
purposes;  
(c) stipulate how official languages will be used, amongst other things, in 
effectively communicating with the public, official notices, government 
publications and inter- and intragovernment communications;  
(d) describe how the national department, national public entity or national 
public enterprise will effectively communicate with members of the public 
whose language of choice is- (i) not an official language contemplated in 
paragraph (b); or (ii) South African sign language.  
(e) describe how members of the public can access the language policy;  
(f) provide a complaints mechanism to enable members of the public to 
lodge complaints regarding the 
(g) use of official languages by a national department, national public entity 
or national public enterprise;  
(h) provide for any other matter that the Minister may prescribe; and  
(i) be published in the Gazette as soon as reasonably practicable, but within 
days of its adoption (RSA, 2012:3). 
One therefore can see that the language policy initiatives of the new South Africa had 
a profound interest in developing a multilingual society through the promotion of the 
Constitution (RSA, 1996b). This does not come without any problems. The next 







3.5 Problems with language planning and policy in South Africa 
3.5.1 Policies and laws 
 
The previous section provided introductory remarks on the language policies in South 
Africa. Due to the vast parameters of the Constitution, which promotes 11 official 
languages, there are numerous challenges and problems with its implementation. 
Beukes (2009:35) believes that language policy and planning have fallen into an 
implementation gap. The Use of Official Languages Act seeks to promote the 
monitoring and regulation of official languages by the national government for 
government purposes (RSA, 2012:1). However, the provisions of this act are made 
exclusively for government structures by institutionally binding them to certain criteria, 
and the act does not promote inclusive linguistic diversity itself (Pretorius, 2013:282).  
It seems as if the Use of Official Languages Act (RSA, 2012) is built on a rocky 
foundation, which would lead to inclusive linguistic diversity that is accomplished when 
the “policy-making competence of administrative bodies” is achieved (Pretorius, 
2013:302). The act on its own has no “inclusivity-specific guidelines” and, when served 
from the directive principles (section 6(3) of the Constitution), “it mandates unguided 
discretionary powers to limit official language use” (Pretorius, 2013:303). The Use of 
Official Languages Act (RSA, 2012) does not promote multilingualism, and the act is 
delegated down to only implement the multilingualism of non-independent advisory 
and monitoring bodies (Pretorius, 2013:304). 
In the new dispensation, language and language policy are institutionally protected by 
the Constitution (RSA, 1996b). The protection of languages in the Constitution does 
not necessarily mean that this happens in practice. Language policy formulation and 
production does not secure language policy implementation, as I discuss next. Firstly, 
the post-apartheid government built its democratic language policies on the language 
policies of the apartheid era. In a study conducted by Cakata and Segalo (2017:324), 
one of the research participants noted that replacing a “white minister” with a “black 
minister” is policy reformation, and not deconstruction of apartheid systems and 
language policies (Cakata & Segalo, 2017:324). The policies in the democratic era are 
also a mere continuation of colonial practices: indigenous languages (South African 
African languages) are physically acknowledged in the Constitution and other 
language policies, but English is still the default in government spheres (Cakata & 
Segalo, 2017:324). The language policies may have changed from Afrikaans to 
English, but that does not imply a deconstruction of apartheid and colonial language 
policies: indigenous languages need to be at the front and centre – meaning they must 
be used in schools as LoLT and HL (Home Language). Hence Cakata and Segalo’s 
(2017) argument that South African language policy initiatives need to start from a 




Secondly, as Cakata and Segalo (2017:325) state, the legal language of South African 
language policy is English: translated documents do not get passed in government. It 
is the English written policy that receives the official status and is passed by 
government. The treatment of English as superior to other languages presupposes 
colonial language policies. Furthermore, Cakata and Segalo (2017:326) contend that, 
while Afrikaans has been labelled as the “language of the oppressor”, English has 
escaped interrogation and is viewed as the “language of liberation”, despite being as, 
if not more, oppressive than Afrikaans during colonialism.  
Thirdly, according to Cakata and Segalo (2017:326), many government structures use 
section 6(3)(a) of the Constitution as an excuse for not implementing language 
policies. Section 6(3)(a) of the Constitution goes as follows:  
The national government and provincial governments may use any 
particular official languages for the purposes of government, taking into 
account usage, practicality, expense, regional circumstances and the 
balance of the needs and preferences of the population as a whole or in the 
province concerned; but the national government and each provincial 
government must use at least two official languages (RSA, 1996b:4). 
The founding principle of the Constitution is the notion of democracy and democratic 
principles: this is a blessing and a vice. Government structures and schools can 
choose their language policy, which often means a choice between English or 
Afrikaans, and in turn means that they implement either a colonial or an apartheid 
discourse and language policy. One cannot help but note that black languages, along 
with their accompanying identities, are still (in a post-apartheid era) seen as the “other” 
in some schools and other spaces (Davids, 2018b). In a postcolonial and post-
apartheid South Africa, these types of “othering” still take place in the form of 
egalitarianism in social spaces such as schools and cultural places.Nicholson (2016, 
cited in Davids, 2018b) notes that, in some cases, black learners are prohibited from 
speaking their mother tongue, i.e. South African African languages, in classrooms. 
Afrikaans had what is called “elite closure”: this indicates that the linguistic patterns of 
the elite are promoted by language policy through limiting the social mobility of the 
masses (Alexander, 2004:5). This also causes what Alexander calls “static 
maintenance syndrome”, in terms of which black South Africans speak their mother 
tongue at home and in private spaces, but do not believe that their mother tongue has 
the power to become the language of power (dominant language) (Alexander, 2004:6). 
But, as stated by Alexander (2004:5), in a multilingual society it is a smart move to 
learn the dominant language of that society. If one is fluent in the dominant language, 
one possesses the cultural capital to participate in the economic life for upwards social 
mobility. 
People use English at the expense of their mother tongue because of its status (“world 
language”) and, whoever does not use and understand it, misses crucial opportunities 
(Alexander, 2000:87). The adoption of such a policy will cost less than a multilingual 




(Alexander, 2000:87). Phaahla (2006:57) indicates that black people immediately 
associate the realm of business with English. Most centres’ and shops’ default 
language is English – English is seen as the language of commerce. Those who are 
fluent in English possess the right cultural capital that could get them certain 
occupations in a time of unemployment (Alexander, 2000:87). Non-English-speaking 
learners realise that their epistemic linguistic world is only knowable to a few people 
and, if they cannot express themselves in the language of power (English in this case), 
they lose out on job opportunities and critical labour-related information. This tendency 
can occur even if they do not speak English in their lived spaces. 
At the height of apartheid, Alexander’s solution was to democratise language policy – 
the first solution in this regard seems to be the question whether English could serve 
as a lingua franca (Alexander, 1989a:52-53). At the time, Alexander did not have 
enough research to make an informed decision, but he mentioned English had to stay 
as an official language, joined by other languages such as the indigenous African 
languages. He did not mean that English must be used in the Anglocentric sense of 
language policy (Alexander, 1989a:52).  English would be the linking language that 
unified all South Africans (Alexander, 1989a:53). Furthermore, he advised that South 
Africa needs to adopt language policy initiatives that acknowledge the indigenous 
languages and promote mother-tongue education. For Ngcobo (2012:185), 
multilingual language policy needs to shift in meaning over time and space: to create 
a continuum and to remain inclusive of language planning, linguistic behaviour and 
new languages. The forces of social practices, like “new South African nationalism”, 
as well as areas such as the media, government and education, tend to influence the 
policy production process, and continue to challenge the authority of language policy 
(Ngcobo, 2012:184). In sum, there are mixed arguments that focus on the introduction 
of English-only language policies. The next section deals with the problems of 
language institutions in South Africa. 
 
3.5.2  Language institutions  
 
According to Beukes (2009:44), language bodies in South Africa have lost their 
credibility. Lafon & Webb (2008:19) argues that these bodies need to be held 
accountable by assessing their activities against their outcomes. In South Africa one 
can easily see that there is a mismatch between language planning and policy 
implementation, i.e. there is a mismatch between the NLPF objectives and the NLPF 
Implementation Plan. Due to the lack of necessary skills, participation by citizens and 
inadequate attention being paid to African languages, the NLPF was and still is 
doomed to fail (Docrat & Kaschula, 2015:2). Kaschula (1999) emphasises how 
important “people” are for the implementation of a language policy in South Africa. The 




propagates, does not reflect the current language practices in South Africa. English-
only policies seem to dominate the language policy landscape, for many reasons. 
The 2016/2017 Annual Report of PanSALB noted that PanSALB was underperforming 
as a constitutional language entity (PanSALB et al., 2017). PanSALB is fraught with 
financial malpractice and could not employ the necessary expertise to send off a large-
scale attempt to implement multilingualism and multilingual language policies 
(PanSALB et al., 2017; Kaschula, 2004:14). The Annual Performance Plan of the 
Department of Arts and Culture for 2018/2019 emphasises the ideal and importance 
of PanSALB to perform as its mandate states, viz. to give priority to marginalised 
languages (DAC, 2018:32). The DAC (2018:32) argues that it will continue to develop 
technical terminologies to support the enterprise of multilingualism. 
One can add to this that 11 official languages do not reflect the entire speech 
community of the variants that reside within the language itself. Three examples that 
stand out are Afrikaans, isiNdebele and Sepedi. Afrikaans has more than one variant, 
but one that stands out the most is Kaaps (derived from “die Kaap” (the Cape)) (Le 
Cordeur, 2015:713). Le Cordeur (2015:718) contends that, although Afrikaans is 
sometimes seen as a “white man’s language”, this is not the case in the new South 
Africa. According to the Census (Statistics South Africa, 2011), Afrikaans is spoken by 
more “Coloured people” than by white people in the post-Apartheid period; 76% of all 
coloured people in South Africa speak Afrikaans, and 61% of white people speak 
Afrikaans as their mother tongue. Kaaps, as a variant of Afrikaans, suffered through 
Apartheid and still suffers through misrecognition (Le Cordeur, 2015).  
The same goes for isiNdebele – no provisions are made in the Constitution for 
Northern isiNdebele, and the Constitution does not account for the different variants 
of Sepedi – but the Constitution provides for each language of the Nguni clan, i.e. 
isiXhosa, isiZulu and siSwati (Ndhlovu, 2008:66). This is a structural flaw in South 
Africa’s constitutional provisions for language and practically falls short of the 
democratic language ideals that it envisions. 
Justice Yacoob (2008, cited in Docrat and Kaschula, 2015:4) use the term “meaningful 
engagement” to denote a situation in which government and affected parties must 
search for common ground or a solution to any dispute, e.g. language issues. These 
authors apply this concept to language legislation to reflect the true language reality 
of South Africa and to implement language goals set forth by the language legislation 
(Docrat & Kaschula, 2015:4). By legislation is meant the Use of Official Languages 
Act, no. 12 of 2012 (RSA, 2012) and the Constitution (RSA, 1996a). Through 
“meaningful engagement”, language policy has the potential to reach the intended 
communities and people (Docrat & Kaschula, 2015:4). The proposed concept opens 
up the opportunity for creative solutions to South Africa’s language policy issues. 
Alexander (2013, cited in Docrat and Kaschula, 2015: 4) comments that, if we do not 
have the tools to negotiate solutions, we must rather not criticise. Bearing this in mind, 




The crucial question, says Alexander (1989a:6), is whether people have to speak to 
one another in one particular language in order to be a nation. The question originated 
from a European nationalist ideology, arising from Portugal, Spain, Great Britain, 
France and the Netherlands (Alexander, 1989a:5). The question ventures and implies 
that one need not speak one language to be a nation (Alexander, 1989a:6). 
Communication in South Africa is possible because one has the freedom to switch to 
“the most appropriate language by a particular situation” (Alexander, 1989a:6). Most 
countries in the world are multilingual, which means that people have different mother 
tongues, although language barriers certainly exist (Alexander, 1989a:6). If one is to 
break away from apartheid’s ideology of segregation, one needs a democratic answer 
to this question (Alexander, 1989a:7). Racism and racial prejudice hide behind 
language barriers: if we, as advised by Alexander (1989a:7), want to break down 
racism and prejudice, we first need to break down language barriers in South Africa.  
The linguistic composition of the post-Apartheid South African society provides a 
theoretical, multicultural and multilingual narrative. However, practical examples offer 
a different picture. Dollie (2011:107) argues that the “South African language question” 
has remained the same since the democratic elections of 1994. For Dollie (2011:107), 
“the language question” can be formulated in the following way: Why was English 
used, and indeed chosen, and not Zulu or Xhosa, as a national means of 
communication in the government? What are the historical and political reasons for 
continuing with the use of English as a lingua franca? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of developing written standards for the Nguni and Sotho clusters of 
languages?  
A linguistic movement has started to take place in South Africa that is in sharp contrast 
with the democratic language policies the new South African government has to offer. 
The excerpt above serves as an introduction to this movement or “problem”: 
institutions nationwide have spontaneously started to use English as the medium of 
communication and business. Actually, one finds traces of English in other structures 
as well, and not only in government (Cakata & Segalo, 2017:322). One usually sees 
the domination of English at the expense of other languages; in South Africa, the 
dominance of English is at the expense of indigenous languages (the official 
languages of South Africa except Afrikaans) (Cakata & Segalo, 2017:321).  
According to the socio-linguistic composition of South Africa, one cannot consider all 
the indigenous languages of South Africa as minority languages, because almost 40% 
of the population speaks isiZulu and isiXhosa. English seems to dominate in the public 
sphere, even though only 9.6% of the South African population is mother-tongue 
English speakers. This problem seems to manifest in different ways. Alexander 
(2004:13) posits that African languages can only receive “market value” once 
language-in-education policies move towards African languages being the LoLT. 
According to Kaschula (1999), people are needed to implement policy and, if these 
people do not allow scope for the policies’ aims, the policies and their content are mere 




improves academic literacy, African language speakers will develop a more nuanced 
skill set, which not only will promote democratic participation, but also will promote 
economic development. Alexander (2004:14) adds that, because South African 
language policy is determined by exogenous and endogenous factors, it needs to 
address the mother-tongue debate in African languages, the hegemony of English and 
literacy levels by means of successful language-in-education policies and the 
implementation of language-in-education policy to ensure economic development. 
Other powers and departments in different spheres of the society are also 
implementing language policy of South Africa. 
As I mentioned earlier, a multilingual language policy needs to shift in meaning over 
time and space, to create a continuum and to remain inclusive of language planning, 
linguistic behaviour and new languages per se (Ngcobo, 2012:185). This implies that 
language policy entails a range of role players and elements. Ngcobo (2012:185) 
shows us that the courts can have a profound influence on language policy – they 
interpret and re-interpret language policies to form new ones. The development of 
school policies cannot be separated from government’s transformation agenda 
(Joubert & Van Rooyen, 2011:304). This means that parents can only influence policy 
formulation as far as it is in concord with SASA and the Constitution and any provincial 
laws. Gale (1999:397 cited in Ngcobo, 2012) argues that judges become mediators of 
policy and citizens rely on them to appropriate policy in a context, and thus bring a 
temporary settlement in times of crisis in policy production. Judges create new policy 
formulation contexts, which result in an “inter-discursive struggle” between discourses 
that employ new strategies that lead to the continuation of dominance or that challenge 
the dominance of language and political barriers (Ngcobo, 2012:185). Gale (1999, 
cited in Ngcobo, 2012) notes that policy settlements are asymmetrical, temporary and 
context-specific. The discussion above serves as continuation of the imperialism of 
the English-only language policy in a multilingual South African society. Before I move 
to language policy in South African schools, I want to stress the idealistic notion and 
content of a multilingual education policy and the benefits it could bring for South 
African public schools. 
 
3.6 Multilingualism and multilingual education  
 
The previous section dealt with the problems of language planning and policy within a 
national context. It is easy to argue that a multilingual language policy in schools would 
better the situation on the ground, but this is an ideal situation and the implementation 
will still be difficult, although the policy intention would at least be bona fide. In this 
section, I focus on what the policy intention is for a universal, multilingual language-in-
education policy would look like. Multilingualism is not a new concept, either 
internationally or in South Africa. This term has been overused during the post-




to multilingualism in South Africa. Multilingualism can be defined as the ability to use 
three or more languages, separately or while one switches codes (McArthur, 
1992:673). Also, according to the European Commission (2007, cited in Cenoz, 
2013:5) builds on this definition by including the ability of individuals and societies to 
engage with multiple languages on a regular basis in normal daily tasks.  
McArthur (1992) also notes that each language has a different purpose and that 
proficiency in each language depends on factors like register, occupation and 
education. Multilingualism is a phenomenon that fluctuates depending on the 
speakers: multilingualism does not only involve characteristics and components of 
bilingualism and monolingualism but rather addresses the languages that is learnt 
after the second language. Therefore, there is a connection between bi- and 
multilingualism. As discussed earlier, South African language policies seeks to 
promote the use of the country’s 11 official languages, and hence multilingualism as 
such.       
According to Cook and Basetti (2011, cited in Cenoz, 2013:7), bilingualism is a term 
used to denote proficiency in two languages, but sometimes it includes the proficiency 
in more languages. Following Aronin and Singleton (2008, cited in Cenoz, 2013:8), 
bilingualism and trilingualism are instances of multilingualism. The South African 
government with its NLPF believes in “functional multilingualism”, which means that 
different languages are used for different social situations (Beukes, 2009:40). South 
Africa’s language-in-education policies and other curriculum policies (LiEP, RNCS and 
CAPS) emphasise mother-tongue education through the concept of “additive bi-
(multi)lingualism” (DoE, 1997a:2). Additive bilingualism is the process by which 
someone acquires an additional language without the loss of proficiency in his/her 
mother tongue (Dampier, 2014:38). According to Banda (2009:5, cited in Coetzee-Van 
Rooy, 2018:22), it effective when a language is “added” to a monolingual linguistic 
repertoire, and not when a person is already bi-(multilingual). I argue that additive 
bilingualism could be broken down into “mother-tongue education” and “second 
language acquisition”.     
Mother-tongue education taps into a learner’s prior knowledge via his/her linguistic 
repertoire (Le Cordeur, 2011:441). But mother-tongue education cannot be practised 
in isolation: it needs to be complemented by second-language or even third-language 
acquisition. Mother-tongue education is important for various reasons; however, I only 
focus on a few of these. First, Webb (2006, cited in Le Cordeur, 2011:441) noticed 
that mother-tongue education facilitates knowledge and understanding by developing 
cognitive skills through unlocking the learner’s fund of knowledge. Learners’ prior 
knowledge is locked up in their mother tongue, and the use of this language as the 
LoLT makes it easier for the learner to study other subjects. According to Khan 
(2014:149), mother-tongue education can enhance cognitive abilities to acquire and 
learn a second language. Second, according to Webb (2006, cited in Le Cordeur, 




abilities. School discourse mixes the academic language with a learner’s use of his 
mother tongue to make learning more meaningful.  
Third, according to Fakeye (2011, cited in Khan, 2014:149), mother-tongue education 
makes cultural knowledge more accessible. Fourth, according to Webb (2006, cited in 
Le Cordeur, 2011:442), mother-tongue education is more cost effective because 
learners in these settings will not [necessarily] repeat grades, which effectively 
increases the pass rate of learners. Mother-tongue education is not without any flaws, 
but it has a sustainable role in knowledge creation. For people who suffered during 
apartheid due to language policies, inter alia, mother-tongue education has a different 
meaning. I will now move to second-language acquisition as a component of additive 
bi- or multilingualism.  
If one evaluates second-language acquisition, a reading of the didactics of language 
teaching would give information on how successfully it will function as a policy 
imperative. Mother-tongue-based bilingual education implies that a learner is taught in 
his or her mother tongue for as long as possible, whilst an additional (second) 
language is introduced as a school subject (Le Cordeur, 2011:447). A learner is not 
supposed to be educated in his or her second language, unless he or she has 
mastered the home language (Le Cordeur, 2011:447). Khan (2014:149) argues that a 
learner’s mother tongue is used to foster sound second-language use. From a 
Hegelian perspective, second-language learning and acquisition foster mutual 
recognition and universalisation, i.e. Universal Grammar (Wu, 2018:44). Universal 
Grammar is a linguistic universal that manifests as knowledge and principles that apply 
to all languages (Dampier, 2014:40). Wu (2018) argues that second-language 
teaching and learning can either empower or enslave learners.  
According to Wu (2018:43-45), second-language learning can empower learners by 
providing them with intersubjective experiences and a higher level of consciousness. 
Learners achieve mutual recognition by transcending themselves and entering a state 
of ‘ethical substance’ in which they can express themselves universally. When learning 
a new language, one breaks away from the conscious stream of thoughts that goes 
with the native language; this enhances the opportunity to participate in society, which 
in turn fosters cultural learning. Wu (2018:41), on the other hand, believes that second-
language teaching can also enslave learners by the mere projection of the dichotomy 
of the master-and-slave relationship. The teacher takes the role of the master and the 
learner is the slave. Furthermore, the enslavement takes a form of “linguistic 
imperialism”, which creates structural and cultural inequalities through the dominance 
of English (Wu, 2018:41). I agree with this, for the simple reason that second-language 
teaching often represents colonial language policies. An “English-only language-in-
education policy is due to many reasons which economic and ideological reasons are 
a part of (Alexander, 2000:87). Now that I have shed some light on the concept of 
multilingualism in a South African public schools sphere, I look at language policy in 
public schools in South Africa and show how language policy in these schools falls 




3.7  Language policy in public schools of post-Apartheid South Africa 
 
This section sketches a view of language in education in South Africa thus far. South 
Africa has a conglomerate of language-in-education policies, which include South 
African curriculum policies up until now. As Alexander (2007:14) explains, language 
policy in South Africa, and every language policy for that matter, is influenced by 
exogenous and endogenous factors. Endogenous factors in the South African 
educational context include the South African school and curriculum situation, while 
exogenous factors include language education internationally. Alexander (2007) 
maintains further that, if mother-tongue-based multilingual education policy is deemed 
to be successful, one needs to consider a revision of South Africa’s language-in-
education policies. The key challenges of language policy in South Africa are the 
hegemony of English; literacy levels, which are directly correlated with South African 
language-in-education policies; and the demonstration of a positive relationship 
between functional multilingualism and economic efficacy and productivity (Alexander, 
2007:14). South Africa, says Alexander (2007:119), is caught up between two 
language ideologies, viz. ethnic nationalism and Anglocentrism (anglicisation) – where 
rights are allocated to 11 official languages, but there is only one language that 
dominates linguistic narratives, viz. English. 
Jansen (2002:203, cited in Coetzee-Van Rooy, 2018:20) contemplates the policy 
intention or the policy agenda of the then newly installed government in relation to 
education: he believes that, in most cases, the implementation of policies at that time 
were never on the new government’s agenda. This explains why there were problems 
with the implementation of the South African LiEP (DoE, 1997a). On this note, Madiba 
and Mabiletja (2008:221, cited in Coetzee-Van Rooy, (2018:20) indicate that the lack 
of clear implementation goals leads to the failure to implement multilingual language 
policies in schools. The same authors reason that there must be a fit between policy 
representation and the linguistic reality of learners to ensure sound implementation 
(Coetzee-Van Rooy, 2018:22). Webb (1999:358, cited in Coetzee-Van Rooy 
(2018:22) says that language policy formulation must take into account “socio-
linguistic diversity” and, in the case of language-in-education policy, the learners’ 
linguistic repertoire and that different language policies must be developed for different 
sociolinguistic situations.  
Plüddemann (2015:192) notes that the implementation of language policies in public 
schools is hindered because of a disjuncture between a learner’s home language (HL) 
and the language of learning and teaching (LoLT). The Language in Education Policy 
(DoE, 1997a) was the first document that sought to change the language of teaching 
and the teaching of language in South African schools. The policy is designed to 
celebrate cultural diversity through the promotion of multilingualism and the 
development of the official languages (DoE, 1997a:2). According to this policy, 
individual multilingualism is the global norm: it assumes that the “learning of more than 




Heugh, 2013:218) argues that the LiEP and the curriculum policy were originally 
drafted by different parties, which had different outlooks on multilingualism. Heugh 
(2003, cited in Heugh, 2013:219) states that experts who were included in the 
LANGTAG process to formulate the language-in-education policy were excluded from 
the curriculum discussion, as was the case during apartheid. Heugh (2013:219) states 
that policy documents included principles of functional and additive multilingualism, 
but the explanatory text that was needed to accompany these documents was left out. 
It was said that these texts would be included in the implementation of language in 
education that was to follow, but this never materialised (Heugh, 2013:219).   
Some schools with English as a LoLT opted to drop African Languages as their FAL 
policy, and took Afrikaans as the FAL policy for the Foundation Phase. The reasons, 
as argued by Woolman and Fleisch (2014), are threefold. Foundation Phase teachers 
are trained to teach Afrikaans at the FAL level (Woolman & Fleisch, 2014:139). 
Another reason is that schools that had taught Afrikaans at the FAL level already had 
teaching and learning materials supporting their FAL of choice (Woolman & Fleisch, 
2014:139). Lastly, African languages at the FAL level for matric exams are difficult 
even for isiXhosa people or other learners who have an African language as a mother 
tongue (Woolman & Fleisch, 2014:139). Afrikaans as an FAL language subject is 
therefore “easier” than other African language at the FAL level, because learners know 
what to expect in the matric exams and therefore can perform well in these exams 
(Woolman & Fleisch, 2014:139). 
Curriculum 2005 (DoE, 1997c) and the revisions that followed were based on an early 
transition to English (in Grade 4) which, according to Heugh (2013:220), is against 
additive multilingual language policies. Until 2013, no attempts were made to use 
African languages as the LoLT, which complicates the transition, because black 
learners who come from mother-tongue education are expected to have an expanded 
vocabulary (Heugh, 2013). This is an unrealistic expectation, because these learners 
only received tuition in their mother tongue and had English as an FAL, and this is not 
even guaranteed.  
Le Cordeur (2011:444) notes that,  the DBE set out the LiEP (DOE, 1997:1) in the 
Revised National Curriculum Statement for Grade R - 9 (RNCS), which proclaimed 
that an “additive or incremental approach to multilingualism” is a priority. According to 
the RNCS, “all learners learn their home language and at least one additional official 
language” (DBE, 2002:20). Motshekga states that a FAL is taught from Grade 2 in this 
policy. The RNCS (DBE, 2002:20) allowed for three language subjects, viz. HL, FAL 
and SAL. The policy furthers promotes a learner’s HL as a LoLT and deems it 
important in the Foundation Phase, when learners learn to read and write. The policy 
states that when a learner moves from a HL to an FAL as LoLT, caution and planning 
are prerequisite. The RNCS (DBE 2002:17-18) provides time frames to indicate how 
long subjects will be taught, e.g. 40% is allocated for literacy during the Foundation 
Phase and 25% in the Intermediate and Senior Phase. In the RNCS, English FAL had 




each grade, viz i.e. 2 500 words by the end of Grade 4 (Heugh, 2013:223). This is 
highly problematic because English and Afrikaans learners have fewer expectations 
due to the fact that they do not have to learn in their FAL (Heugh, 2013:224). The end 
product, as Heugh (2013: 221) points out, is translanguaging: learners are taught 
through code-mixing and code-switching, with the expectation that they still must be 
able to read and write in English.    
Unlike the mother-tongue emphasis of the LiEP, CAPS (the current South African 
curriculum since 2012 and still commencing in 2020) is designed to introduce English 
as a language subject much earlier – in Grade 1 (actually informally in Grade R) to 
support the change in LoLT in Grade 4 (DBE, 2009:14; DBE, 2010). A fourth subject 
– an additional language subject – was additionally introduced in the foundation phase 
from Grade 1 and not in Grade 3, as prescribed by the LiEP (Plüddemann, 2013:190). 
It follows that the majority of learners are negatively affected by the change of 
Curriculum 2005 (C2005) (DoE, 1997c) to RNCS (DBE, 2002) because of a lack of 
vocabulary and substandard reading and writing abilities (Woolman & Fleisch, 
2014:138). For this reason, CAPS introduced a mandatory FAL policy for all public 
schools. In the majority of cases, quintile 1 to 3 schools would choose English as an 
FAL, which implied that learners would now be learning English (any FAL) in an oral, 
reading and writing fashion from Grade 1(DBE, 2011a, 2011b). However, this is 
problematic Woolman and Fleisch (2014:138) explain that learners in Grades 1 to 3 
are taught in their mother tongue, but as from Grade 4 they take the exit route, i.e. 
English LoLT. Most schools in South Africa tend to teach their learners in their HL from 
Grade 1 to 3, and there are formerly disadvantaged schools (usually school between 
quintile 1 and 3) that introduce English as the LoLT in Grade 4 (Woolman & Fleisch, 
2014:138).   
Reviews on education policy by the DBE shows recurring problems with repetitive 
remedies. Heugh (2013:230) uses Dada et al. (2009:41) to illustrate that the “Review 
of the Implementation of the National Curriculum Statement” understands additive 
bilingualism wrongly through essentialising mother-tongue education as the only 
medium to learn educational concepts. According to the DBE (2011c) and Heugh 
(1998, cited in Heugh, 2013:230), this review was followed by a series of other reviews 
that repeated their recommendations for the implementation of existing policies in 
1998, i.e. the multilingual policy models. Since 2010, language-in-education policy has 
been further revised to expand on the notion of multilingualism and introduce African 
languages into the curriculum. This policy is called The Incremental Introduction of 
African Languages in South African Schools (IIAL) (DBE, 2013), and its purpose is 
inter alia to introduce the following incrementally: 
1. promote and strengthen the use of African languages by all learners in 
the school system by introducing learners incrementally to learning an 
African language from Grade 1 to 12 to ensure that all non-African home 




2. improve proficiency in and utility of African languages at Home 
Language level, so that learners are able to use their home language 
proficiently.  
3. increase access to languages by all learners, beyond English and 
Afrikaans, by requiring all non-African Home Language speakers to 
learn an African language; and  
4. promote social cohesion and economic empowerment and expand 
opportunities for the development of African languages as a significant 
way of preserving heritage and cultures.  
 
As noted above, the policy seems valorous and seeks to do well, but it makes a lot of 
demands. The implementation of this policy entails another compulsory FAL language 
subject, an African language, which is to be added to the curriculum (DBE, 2013:9). 
According to the policy, an African language is introduced in Grade one at FAL or 
second language level (DBE, 2013:10). This implies that the African language will 
receive the same time allocation and status as the first FAL language, viz. five hours 
a week for Grades 1 to 3; five hours a week for Grades 4 to 6; four hours a week for 
Grades 7 to 9; and 4.5 hours a week for Grades 10 to 12 (DBE, 2013:11-12).  
Furthermore, the document states that the implementation of the policy will commence 
in Grade 1 by 2015, and progress incrementally to Grade 12 by 2026. The IIAL has 
two streams: for learners who have an indigenous language as a mother tongue, the 
policy lends itself to a position in which the learner may have his mother tongue as a 
language subject (DBE, 2013:9). The second stream enables learners who do not 
have an indigenous language as a mother tongue to take an indigenous language as 
a first additional language subject (DBE, 2013:9). The theoretical imperative of this 
policy enables all learners to have their mother tongue as a HL language subject at 
school.  
Since 2014, the IIAL has been in a starting phase for some pilot schools, which implies 
that it has not been implemented in the mainstream curriculum (Plüddemann, 
2013:191). The first draft IIAL policy emphasised the use of African languages as an 
LoLT and not just a study in terms of a HL (Plüddemann, 2013:191). The first draft of 
the IIAL also promoted the use of African languages as an LoLT outside the scope of 
the foundation phase, following major studies within a multilingual and educational 
context (Plüddemann, 2013:191). This shows the ambiguous attitude of the DBE 
towards the promotion of African languages as an LoLT.   
Only a few previously disadvantaged rural schools are still using African languages as 
their LoLT. The majority of quintile 1 to 3 schools are black schools. The problem is 
that learners do not have the language skills and vocabulary to accompany this shift, 
which means they do not benefit from the education they receive. It is for this reason 
that mother-tongue education is of cardinal importance. South Africa, in theory, has 
democratic language policies with reference to its past and current language policy 




Incremental Introduction of African Languages in South African Schools (IIAL) (DBE, 
2013) will not promote mother-tongue education in African languages, and therefore 
undermines the promotion of democratic virtues. The problem with policies like these 
is that they do not give African languages “market value”, which in turn means that the 
African languages are not part of the production process and do not get used in formal 
social and economic settings (Alexander, 2004:13). 
As mentioned, the IIAL was implemented in some schools in 2014, while other 
attempts were made to implement the policy in 2018 and 2019. According to Herman 
(2017), the DBE has plans to implement the IIAL from Grade 1 in the schools that have 
not yet adopted this policy. This is for the remaining of 3558 target schools (Herman, 
2017). The implementation date for the remaining schools was moved up forward 2020 
to 2018. According to Herman (2017), IIAL will be implemented in Grades 4 to 6 by 
2021-2023, Grades 7 to 9 by 2024-2026, and Grades 10 to 12 by 2027-2029. 
However, it seems that DBE is amending this policy by implementing SAL policies 
from Grade 1 (second additional language, i.e. third language), rather than the FAL 
policy as stated in the document. The time allocation for African language SAL as part 
of the IIAL (DBE, 2013) is one hour a week. This section has provided a glimpse of 
language-in-education policy initiatives in South African public schools, from which it 
is clear that the LiEP of South Africa (DoE, 1997a:1) are in contrast with language 
initiatives within curriculum development. As argued in Chapter 2, section 6(2) of 
SASA (RSA, 1996a:11) permits the SGB to formulate language policy in public 
schools, but language policy formulation must still be seen as a larger project of the 
functionality of the SGB. The next section looks at language formulation as a 
function/power of the SGB.   
 
3.8 Language policy formulation as a function/power of a SGB  
 
Developing policy for a school with a homogenous culture cannot present many 
difficulties, but within a society like South Africa, policy, i.e. language, admission and 
religious policy, cannot be formulated without complexity (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 
2011:308). Given that language-in-education policies (which include curriculum 
policies) in South Africa offer many challenges to teaching and learning, SGBs have 
a difficult responsibility to formulate the school language policy and must take many 
policies into account when formulating it. As mentioned in Chapter 2, section 6(2) of 
SASA (RSA, 1996a:11) gives the SGB the power/function to formulate language 
policy. I used Malherbe (2010:614-616) to argue that there is a distinction between 
“language policy formulation as a function of a SGB” or “language policy as a power 
of the SGB”. Malherbe (2010:614) argues that language policy formulation forms part 
of the “competencies” of an SGB, which means that an SGB will have the rule of law 
on their side, at least academically and theoretically, that language policy formulation 




2010). Does this mean that an HOD could not revoke “competencies” by using 
sections 22 and 25 of SASA? (RSA, 1996a). The Constitutional Court (Head of 
Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo 
and Another, 2009) did not provide any information on the functions of the SGB.  
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) (Minister of Education (Western Cape) 
v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005) argued that, although the SGB is 
entrusted with the power to formulate a school’s language policy, it does not mean 
that it is not their function. This would mean that the SCA treats a “function” the same 
as a “power” of an SGB, which is not even distinguished by the Constitution (RSA, 
1996b) when defining an ‘organ of state’. According to this, the SGB would be an 
‘organ of state’, but it was proclaimed by the SCA (Minister of Education (Western 
Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005) that an SGB is not an organ of 
state because it is not under national or provincial executive control. What does 
‘executive control’ mean? If an SGB is not an ‘organ of state’ fulfilling its task of 
formulating language policy, would it be separate from government and stand 
independent (almost as a company) from any government structures? This would 
mean that the HOD cannot withdraw any function or power of the SGB. And, if 
language policy formulation by schools is a power, may the HOD still withdraw that 
power because SASA states that the HOD may only withdraw a function and not a 
power? (RSA, 1996a).  
One policy that gives the SGB an elementary guideline to formulate language policy 
is the Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy Published in Terms of 
Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act (DBE, 1997b:2). It states the following: 
Subject to any law dealing with language in education and the 
Constitutional rights of learners, in determining the language policy of the 
school, the governing body must stipulate how the school will promote 
multilingualism through using more than one language of learning and 
teaching, and/or by offering additional languages as fully-fledged subjects, 
and/or applying special immersion or language maintenance programmes, 
or through other means approved by the head of the provincial education 
department. 
It is clear that the Norms and Standards give a guideline for the SGB to formulate 
language policy. This is an essentialist notion because an SGB needs, in all 
practicality, to indicate how it will promote multilingualism through language 
maintenance programmes and what language subjects it will teach. The policy 
presumes that the SGB will formulate policy and therefore promote democratic school 
governance. Because the norms and standards are part of the research findings in 
Chapter 5, I will discuss the document in Chapters 5 and 6.  
According to Woolman and Fleisch (2009, cited in Smit, 2011: 405), the power to 
formulate and determine language policy in public schools ultimately rests with the 




(2010, in Smit, 2011:405) argue that the power to set language policy rests with the 
SGB. Smit (2011) however argues for both sides: he says that although a SGB has 
the power to set language policy, it may by virtue thereof contest the reasonableness 
of the HOD, but the HOD has to responsibility to ensure that no learner is excluded 
due to the language policy of a school. Smit (2011: 432; Head of Department: 
Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 
2009) continues, if the Constitutional Court  took all the facts and factors at hand, it 
would have shown that the HOD was unreasonable and unconstitutional  There is 
merit in both arguments.  
Colditz and Deacon (2010:138) argue that the HOD and therefore the state (DBE) 
does not have the power within statute to formulate language policy; according to 
SASA, only the SGB has the power to formulate language policy. The authors maintain 
that the HOD does not have the statutory power to change a single-medium school to 
a double-medium of parallel-medium school (Colditz & Deacon, 2010:138). The 
question here concerns sustainability: it would have severe financial implications if a 
school decides to move to parallel medium because it would need to appoint more 
staff and buy more text books (Colditz & Deacon, 2010:137). Therefore, schools need 
to first assess the physical infrastructure before they change their language status 
(Colditz & Deacon, 2010:137). Furthermore, Colditz and Deacon (2010:138) argue 
that parents need to be consulted and involved in the decision-making of the SGB 
regarding language policy formulation. For practical reasons, the SGB must follow the 
Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) and sections 28(2) and 29(2) of the Constitution 
(RSA, 1996b). Colditz and Deacon (2010) also mention that the responsibility to supply 
schools with different languages is part of the responsibilities of the state and 
therefore, learners could not argue that a single medium school’s language policy does 
not correspond with their mother-tongue, forcing the SGB to change their language 
policy  because it does not fit every learner’s their preferred language of choice. I will 
elaborate on this argument raised by the SCA in the second Mikro-case (Minister of 
Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005) 
Woolman and Fleisch (2009:80) argue, however, that under certain circumstances, 
the HOD may withdraw the function of the SGB to formulate policy. They use the 
following example: If an Afrikaans single-medium school decides to have an exclusive 
Afrikaans language policy that keeps out learners who do not have ready access to 
adequate education in their preferred language of instruction, keeping these learners 
out will be based on linguistic and maybe racial discrimination – not even an SGB and 
a principal may keep these learners out (Woolman & Fleisch, 2009:80). This is where 
the HOD will intervene and withdraw the function of the SGB to formulate the language 
policy of a public school. Woolman and Fleisch (2009:80) argue further that the SCA 
in the second Mikro-case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary 
School Governing Body, 2005) shows that the space for exclusion on the basis of 
language and culture is very small, and that an SGB can “with some force” argue that 




school convert to a parallel-medium or double-medium school (Woolman & Fleisch, 
2009:80).             
Firstly, SGBs in the known case law have only argued in court for legality (rule of law 
through upholding legislation) or a procedurally fairness, where they rather need to 
focus on the reasonable actions of the HOD and the reasonableness of the language 
policy for quality education (Smit, 2011:405). There is another problem that surfaced 
here: have the HOD’s actions in the past been democratic? And against what 
backdrop can one measure the democratic nature of the HOD’s action to intervene in 
school governance and language policy formulation? SGBs are a seedbed for 
democratic participation, hence withdrawing the parents’ power to govern, they (and 
other SGB members) will be disenfranchised, which usually leads to an unmotivated 
and unsupportive school community (Smit, 2011:406). Secondly, if language policy is 
a power or competency, as suggested by Malherbe (2010), then would it be correct to 
argue that the HOD may not withdraw that ‘power’ because the HOD can only withdraw 
a ‘function’?     
Lastly, Smit and Oostehuizen (2011:69) argue that a way to improve school 
governance is, inter alia, through the rule of law. These authors suggest that the 
“democratic principle of the rule of law” can resolve the anarchical conditions in 
dysfunctional schools (Smit & Oostehuizen, 2011:69). By contrast, the law and courts 
cannot solve deep-lying issues of culture and virtues. However, law and the courts 
could force co-operation: force is the opposite of openness and mutual respect, and 
does not fit with deliberative democracy and the virtues thereof. Smit and Oostehuizen 
(2011:69) supplement this view with the introduction of deliberation and participation: 
parties need to deliberate, otherwise co-operative governance cannot be achieved. I 
agree with the solution they have proposed here, but their reading of deliberation is 
too narrow: consensus does not need to be reached for a decision to be made (Smit 
& Oostehuizen, 2011:69). Rather, parties must strive for common values and a 
common value system to solve a common problem. 
Research done by Serfontein and De Waal (2013:62) shows that legal remedies 
(courts and the law) are “effective” to solve the tensions between the HOD and the 
SGB with regard to language policy. Their research shows that participants thought 
the courts acted with the necessary seriousness in each school’s case (Serfontein & 
De Waal, 2011:62). The participants had confidence in the rule of law and the courts 
and trusted the legal system (Serfontein & De Waal, 2011:62). I agree with these 
authors that legal remedies are a solution in the short run: these tensions calls for 
remedies that foster “loyalty towards the school” (Serfontein & De Waal, 2011:62).  
An SGB has the potential to further the democracy of South Africa through fulfilling all 
its functions according to the Constitution (RSA, 1996b), NEPA (RSA, 1996c), SASA 
(RSA, 1996a) and other provincial legislation and policies. South Africa is a 
constitutional democracy, which means that the rule of law is extremely important to 
promote democratic citizenship and social cohesion. By upholding constitutional 




their potential as a “fourth sphere of government” (Woolman & Fleisch, 2008:55). Due 
to this institutional arrangement of school governance, each function falls within a 
bigger and more complex context. Language policy formulation as a function of an 
SGB in South Africa does not fall outside of the political, ideological, societal and 
historical contexts of the country.  
New legislation, like the Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill of 2017 (DBE, 2017a) 
seeks to impugn democratic school governance and alter the power of the SGB to 
formulate language policy by first submitting it to the HOD for approval. The HOD may 
approve a language policy formulated by the SGB, or may send it back with 
recommendations. The HOD must take certain aspects into consideration when the 
formulation of the language policy is co-signed; the SGB must also review this 
language policy every three years. More importantly, the Amendment Bill grants the 
HOD the power to direct the SGB to adopt more than one LoLT. Furthermore, the 
Amendment Bill states the following (DBEa, 2017:5): 
(7) The Head of Department when consider the language policy or any 
amendment thereof for approval, must be satisfied that the policy or the 
amendment thereof takes into account the language needs, in general, of 
the broader community in which the public school is located, and must take 
into account the following factors, but not limited to: 
(a) the best interests of the child, with emphasis on equality, as provided 
for in section 9 of the Constitution, and equity; the dwindling number of 
learners who speak the language of learning and teaching at the public 
school;  
(b) the need for effective utilisation of resources; and the language needs, 
in general, of the broader community in which the public school is located. 
The Head of Department must inform the governing body of his or her 
decision and must make his or her decision known to the community in a 
suitable manner. 
(c) the need for effective use of classroom space and resources of the 
public school. 
… 
(9) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) the Head of 
Department may direct a public school to adopt more than one language of 
instruction, where it is practicable to do so. 
The Amendment Bill (DBE, 2017b:3) lastly attempts as a legalistic method to rectify 
the verdicts of the following cases, like: 
1. Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga 




2. Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and Another v Minister of Education, 
Western Cape and Others, 2005 (3) SA 504 (C) 
3. Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body 
(140/2005) [2005] ZASCA 66 
4. High School Ermelo and Another v Head of Department Mpumalanga 
Department of Education and Others (3062/2007) [2007] ZAGPHC 232 (17 
October 2007) 
5. Head of Department : Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v 
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another (CCT40/09) [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 
(CC) ; 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (14 October 2009) 
6. Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga and Others (219/2008) [2009] ZASCA 22; 2009 (3) SA 422 (SCA) 
; [2009] 3 All SA 386 (SCA) (27 March 2009) 
7. Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education 
Gauteng Province 2018 JDR 0005 (GP) 
The Amendment Bill thus seeks (DBE, 2017b: 3):  
This amendment is necessitated by, amongst others, the need for fair and 
equitable administrative processes as provided for in the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of 2000), and the need for 
effective utilisation of classroom space and resources. 
In pursuing administrative justice, the HOD will do the following (DBE, 2017a:5-6):  
The Head of Department must inform the governing body of the public 
school of his or her intention so to act and his or her reasons therefor, grant 
the governing body a reasonable opportunity to make representations, 
conduct a public hearing to enable the community to make representations, 
and give due consideration to the representations received. 
One therefore can conclude that the Amendment Bill seeks to enhance the power of 
the HOD and diminish the power of the SGB with regard to language policy formulation 
as a power of democratic school governance. The Amendment Bill (DBE, 2017a) also 
seeks to prevent court cases finding in the favour of an SGB through promoting 
administrative justice. This is an attempt by the DBE to ensure power in school 
governance and to override the democratic nature on which SASA was initially built. It 
will also cause a power imbalance due to the fact that school governance is vested in 
an SGB, and language policy formulation is a power of an SGB. Lastly, it will affect the 
relationship between the SGB and the HOD and lead to conflict, which is not beneficial 
for the teaching and learning situation and will affect the quality of education. 
The Amendment Draft Bill (DBE, 2017a) made headlines in the media. According to 
Mabuza (2017), the DBE is looking to decrease the power of parents in governing a 
public school. FEDSAS has put pressure on the potential implementation of the Bill, 
and argue that the bill will inherently break down important decision-making within the 




learners by returning the power to set language policy to the hands of the HOD. Ntuli 
(2017) says most schools do not have functioning SGBs, which led to the formulation 
of this amendment draft bill, but all stakeholders need to work together to find the best 
way to solve school governance issues. Deacon, the deputy CEO of FEDSAS, says 
this bill moves education away from the public sector to state education (Mabuza, 
2017).  
According to Ntuli (2017), some parents believe that the bill will not pass in its current 
form. With regard to language policy, Vee Gani, a parent in the Kwa-Zulu Natal 
province of South Africa, argued that to offer education in two languages that are the 
language subjects of the school will place pressure on the school, because some texts 
are not available in certain languages (Ntuli, 2017). The amendment draft bill is the 
result of deep-lying tension between the SGB and the HOD or DBE, which even led 
teacher unions to appose the draft bill (Ntuli, 2017). Therona Moodley of the National 
Professional Teachers’ Organisation of South Africa (Naptosa) argues that the draft 
bill is “dictatorial and undemocratic”, and that the DBE has not found creative ways to 
address the underlying tension between the HOD and SGB (Ntuli, 2017). According 
to Deacon, the DBE did not make use of the correct and decent deliberative channels 
to propose the draft bill (Johannes, 2018). There also was no direct input and face-to-
face meetings to discuss the draft bill, but rather just reactions to the proposed 
amendments (Johannes, 2018). The draft bill also goes against the bona fide 
relationship that exist between the state, learners, parents and educators (Johannes, 
2018). The focus of this section was to provide a discussion of language policy 
formulation as a power of the SGB. The next section focuses on case law and the 
verdict of courts with regard to school governance and language policy formulation in 
public schools. 
 
3.9 The interplay between language policy formulation and governance in 
public schools in South Africa 
 
The following passages contains a discussion of relevant case law, as indicated earlier 
in the Chapter. The reading of the case law does not serve the purpose of a summary 
of what happened, but it is a reading of the sources that discuss school governance 
and language policy formulation. The situations in these cases foster the need for a 
less aggressive way of settling cases regarding language policy formulation by the 
SGB. The case law that I discuss shows the difference between ideological positions 
and the court’s perspective on language policy (Ngcobo, 2012:185).     
In Matukane and others v Laerskool Potgietersrus (1996) 1 All SA 468 (T), the High 
Court (HC) found that the school’s language policy racially discriminated against some 
learners because they refused to admit black learners for the “protection of the 
Afrikaans culture”, which was a smokescreen for racial segregation (Matukane and 




“protection of the Afrikaans-culture” is a smokescreen for racial segregation (Matukane 
and others v Laerskool Potgietersrus,1996: 225). The Interim Constitution in section 
247(2) stated that the state will not interfere with an SGB’s powers and functions, 
unless  there is an agreement resulting from a negotiation has been reached in good 
faith, with a SGB and reasonable notice of proposed alteration has been 
communicated (RSA, 1993). The regional director and circuit inspector intervened 
without prior consultation with the relevant parties (Matukane and others v Laerskool 
Potgietersrus,1996:226). Woolman and Fleisch (2008) argue that, had the formal 
Constitution been fully implemented, the outcome would have been the same. 
On the one hand, Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga 
Department van Onderwys en andere (2002) 4 All SA 745 (T) underscores the 
fundamental right of section 28(2) of the Constitution to outweigh the right of a SGB to 
set its own language policy, and the unfair administrative practices of the HOD and 
MEC actions (Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga 
Department van Onderwys en andere, 2002:173). The court determined that the 
school’s language policy was strictly according to SASA section 6(1) (Laerskool 
Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van Onderwys 
en andere, 2002:161). However, the Mpumalanga DoE still withdrew this power of the 
SGB. The court found that the HOD did not, in its administrative capacity, have the 
power to change the language status (medium of instruction) of the school (Laerskool 
Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van Onderwys 
en andere, 2002:171, 172 and 176). According to the HOD, section 6(1) of SASA is 
the only legally binding policy that could open a new language track at the school 
(Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van 
Onderwys en andere, 2002:171, 172 and 176). 
 
In Governing Body of Mikro Primary School and Another v Western Cape Minister of 
Education and Others (332/05) [2005] ZAWCHC 14; 2005 (3) SA 504 (C) [2005] 2 All 
SA 37 (C) (18 February 2005), the court stressed the unlawfulness of the HOD’s 
directive that was sent to the principal with a sanction of disciplinary action if English-
speaking learners would not be admitted to an Afrikaans single-medium school. 
Justice Thring set aside the abovementioned directive (Governing Body of Mikro 
Primary School and Another v Western Cape Minister of Education and Others, 
2005:528) because, according to him, the directive was unlawful and based on an 
“error of law” in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (Act 3 of 2000 
section 6(2)(d)) (RSA, 2000:7) – for three reasons. Firstly, the directive impugns the 
professional management of the principal; WCED officials cannot override the power 
of the principal’s orders during a school day (RSA, 1996a:23 Governing Body of Mikro 
Primary School and Another v Western Cape Minister of Education and Others, 
2005:523). Secondly, the directive was “procedurally unfair” because it did not allow 
the applicants to submit any further information with regard to the appeal against the 
directive (Governing Body of Mikro Primary School and Another v Western Cape 




that the principal of Mikro Primary School must act counter to the school’s language 
policy, which had been properly constructed according to section 6(2) of SASA 
(Governing Body of Mikro Primary School and Another v Western Cape Minister of 
Education and Others, 2005:506). The correct remedy of the HOD would have been 
to follow section 22 of SASA (RSA, 1996a:30).  
 
In Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body 
(140/2005) [2005] ZASCA 66, the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s 
order of Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and Another v Minister of Education, 
Western Cape and Others, the Supreme Court rejected the findings in Laerskool 
Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van Onderwys 
en andere (2002) 4 All SA 745 (T), which stated that the Norms and Standards for 
language policy in South African public schools are the only legitimate source for 
changing a school’s language status (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 33). It does not follow that the 
setting of the norms and standards gives the HOD the right to influence a public 
school’s language policy (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary 
School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 33). Section 6(1) does not empower the 
HOD or any other party to set the language policy of a school (Minister of Education 
(Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 33). 
According to section 6(2), only the SGB of a public school has the sole authority to set 
a language policy (RSA, 1996a:11; Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 33). This, however, must in all 
cases comply with section 29(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court of Appeal 
made particularly interesting findings that are discussed accordingly. According to the 
SCA, section 29(2) of the Constitution does not imply that everybody has a right to be 
instructed “at each and every educational institution” in the language of his/her choice 
where it is reasonable practicable, but rather that everybody has the right to education 
in his/her language of choice where it is reasonable practicable (Minister of Education 
(Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 31 and 34). 
It follows that the learners did not have the constitutional right to receive education in 
English at Mikro Primary School (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 31 and 34). This, according to the 
court, was “a right against the state” (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 31 and 34). The state was asked if 
it had scrutinised every “reasonable educational alternative including single-medium 
schools” (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing 
Body, 2005: paragraph 31). The onus fell on the State’s capacity to supply more 
educational alternatives.  
In Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education Northern Cape and Others 
(2) (77/04/01) [2005] ZANCHC 6; 2006 (4) BCLR 542 (NC), the MEC instructed that 
Seodin Primary School, along with a few other schools, amend their language policy 




Education Northern Cape and Others, 2005: paragraph 8(c) of Annexure JCT 11). The 
MEC gave the SGBs time to make representations according to section 22(2)(b) of 
SASA (Republic of South Africa, 1996a:31; Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC 
of Education Northern Cape and Others, 2005: paragraph 12). Therefore, the SGB of 
Seodin Primary was informed a reasonable number of months prior to the admission 
of 200 learners from another school (Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of 
Education Northern Cape and Others, 2005: Annexure JCT 18 paragraph 12.1). What 
compromises the applicants’ arguments is that the Northern Cape School Education 
Act, section 16(1), permits the SGB to set the language policy of a public school “after 
consultation” with the DoE, subject to the Constitution, SASA and the approval of the 
MEC (Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education Northern Cape and 
Others, 2005: paragraph 28). Bearing the abovementioned in mind, the court argued 
that none of the applicant schools and their SGBs had an approved language policy 
(Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education Northern Cape and Others, 
2005: paragraph 29). There also was no evidence that the MEC had in possession 
any proposed or purported language policy of any of the applicant schools and/or their 
SGB (Seodin Primary School and Others v MEC of Education Northern Cape and 
Others, 2005: paragraph 29). This case shows that the MEC was reasonable with 
regard to section 22(2) – and had given enough time to make representations. The 
verdict of the case was in line with the Middelburg case (Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n 
ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga Department van Onderwys en andere, 2002), 
which argued that a school-based policy like the language policy of the school must 
take the best interests of the learners into consideration, and that the learners that 
were admitted there had the right to receive education in their language of choice. 
In High School Ermelo and Another v Head of Department Mpumalanga Department 
of Education and Others (3062/2007) [2007] ZAGPHC 232 (17 October 2007), the 
court upheld the HOD’s decision to withdraw the function to set a language policy 
without prior consultation (High School Ermelo and Another v Head of Department 
Mpumalanga Department of Education and Others, 2007: paragraph 37). As this was 
a case of urgency, the DoE and the HOD did not need to consult and converse with 
the SGBs according to section 22(3) (High School Ermelo and Another v Head of 
Department Mpumalanga Department of Education and Others, 2007: paragraph 37). 
Concerning the validity of the interim committee, the court found that their appointment 
could only be set aside if given the same circumstances any reasonable parties of 
people would come to different actions (High School Ermelo and Another v Head of 
Department Mpumalanga Department of Education and Others, 2007: paragraph 46). 
In Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga 
and Others (219/2008) [2009] ZASCA 22; 2009 (3) SA 422 (SCA); [2009] 3 All SA 386 
(SCA) (27 March 2009), the SCA noted that this case was not about language policy 
in schools, but more in the line of “principle of legality and the proper use of 
administrative power” (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of 
Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 3). The SCA found that the 




was not considered (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of 
Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 20). For the SCA, section 22 of 
SASA followed after section 21 of SASA – section 21 of SASA deals with allocated 
functions that could otherwise be undertaken by the DoE (Hoërskool Ermelo and 
Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: 
paragraph 22). On the same note, because section 22 of SASA follows directly after 
section 21, it logically meant that section 22 is only applicable to section 21 functions 
(Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and 
Others, 2009: paragraph 22). If the section 21 functions are withdrawn, they fall on the 
DBE and not, as section 25 stipulates, on an appointed committee (Hoërskool Ermelo 
and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: 
paragraph 25). The SCA set aside the finding in the second Mikro case (Minister of 
Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005), that the 
directive issued by the DoE to change the language policy so that learners could 
receive education in a different language was unlawful, which meant, following the 
unlawfulness, that the HOD has no way of remedying a situation in this line (Hoërskool 
Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 
2009: paragraph 23). 
The facts of the case do not support the instalment of a committee to take over the 
functions of the SGB (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of 
Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 26). The correct reading of this, 
firstly, would be that the SGB ceased to fulfil its function in the worst case; secondly, 
to withdraw the function; and then thirdly, to appoint an interim committee to fulfil the 
withdrawn function. Therefore, it would be first section 22 of SASA, followed by section 
25, and not the other way around (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of 
Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 27). The SGB 
did not cease to fulfil its function, because this is a function that did not take place 
daily, monthly or even yearly, but it is a once-off function until it is amended by the 
SGB (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 28). In this case, the SGB did not fail to 
fulfil its function to set language policy (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of 
Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 28). The SCA 
furthermore criticised reading sections 22 and 25 together, as it boils down to a fallacy: 
section 25 of ambiguous in the sense that, according to subsection (3), the HOD must 
see that a governing body is elected after the maximum period of one year; they could 
change the language policy again. Secondly, section 25 strips away the opportunity to 
consult and represent an altered version of a language policy according to section 22 
(3-5) (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 29).   
Lastly, die SCA found that the HOD appointed the interim committee before he had 
revoked the SGB function and power to set the language policy of the school 
(Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and 




seemed that the interim committee did not evaluate all the information before making 
an “urgent” decision (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of 
Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 2009: paragraph 31). The withdrawal of the 
SGB’s function was unlawful; the appointment of the interim committee was unlawful; 
and therefore the decision of the interim committee also was unlawful (Hoërskool 
Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: Mpumalanga and Others, 
2009: paragraph 33). It is for these reasons that the SCA set aside the judgement of 
the HC. 
In Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v 
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another (CCT40/09) [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC) ; 
2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (14 October 2009), DJC Moseneke held that SASA gives the 
HOD the power to withdraw the function of the school governing body to determine a 
school’s language policy on reasonable grounds (Head of Department: Mpumalanga 
Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 2009: 
paragraph 63). Once the function is withdrawn, the onus rest upon the HOD to suggest 
a “specified remedial purpose” (Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 2009: paragraph 88). The 
court also held that it finds it unnecessary to determine whether or not the HOD’s 
actions were reasonable, because his use of power according to section 22 of SASA 
was contaminated by the appointment of an interim committee (section 25 of SASA) 
(Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool 
Ermelo and Another, 2009: paragraph 83). The unwillingness of the Constitutional 
Court to give judgement on the withdrawal of section 6(2) means that the power to 
determine language policy is returned to the SGB and the SCA judgement on this 
matter is still valid.  
The Constitutional Court found that the SGB of Ermelo did in fact not cease to perform 
its functions according to SASA, or fail to perform one function (Head of Department: 
Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 
2009: paragraph 86). This meant that, in this specific case, the functions of the SGB 
could not be withdrawn in terms of section 22 because the SGB was competent to 
perform its functions duly (Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 2009: paragraph 86). Hence, 
the HOD disregarded the principle of legality, and the language policy drawn up by the 
interim committee was also not valid (Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department 
of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 2009: paragraph 87). The 
examples of Middelburg, Mikro and Ermelo led Malherbe (2006:197) to argue that 
Afrikaans-only medium schools are targeted as if they are the biggest obstacle to a 
transformation agenda which is directly contrasted with constitutional language rights. 
To challenge this language policy, according to Malherbe (2006:197), is against 
mother-tongue education.   
In Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng 




the constitutional principle of legality and therefore, regardless of the status of the 
capacity of school, acted unlawfully and the school’s language and admission policy 
was not set aside under review (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of 
Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:48). The court therefore set aside 
the instruction of the MEC and Head of Department (Governing Body, Hoërskool 
Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:48). Broadly, 
Judge Prinsloo’s judgement elaborated on the parameters of capacity and language 
policy and legality. I now turn to a discussion of language policy and legality.  
The SGB of Hoërskool Overvaal submitted its language policy duly, as compelled to 
by section 18(A)(2) of the Gauteng Education Act (Governing Body, Hoërskool 
Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:35). The MEC 
and the Head of Department, however, did not comply with the provisions of section 
18(A)(2), which states that, when there is non-compliance regarding the language 
policy of a school, consultation with the SGB is deemed so that compliance can follow 
(Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng 
Province, 2018:35). No consultation with the SGB took place. The MEC and the Head 
of Department therefore failed to comply with the basic provisions of SASA 6(2). Judge 
Prinsloo added that the respondent’s’ actions were in contrast with the basic principle 
of legality (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education 
Gauteng Province, 2018:35). Section 18A did not even give the District Director the 
power to override a school’s language policy (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v 
Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:35). The Gauteng DoE 
cannot undo a school’s language policy by instructing the principal to change the 
school’s status to a parallel-medium school (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v 
Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:35). 
 
3.9 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter, I looked at ‘language’ as a concept and expanded on the theory of 
language planning and policy. I highlighted language issues from colonialism and 
Apartheid, and how they acted as linguistic imperialism (Alexander, 2004, 2007). 
Furthermore, I showed that South Africa has 11 official languages, but that this does 
not guarantee the acknowledgement of all the official languages. Linguistic imperialism 
and issues of language can come over as so perverse that they strip away the identity 
of the speaker. In the light of this, South Africa’s language policy initiatives nationally 
and in education have certain implementation problems. The Constitution’s provision 
for 11 official languages does not necessarily mean that all the languages are on an 
equal footing. I provided an in-depth analysis of language-in-education policies, 
starting from the LiEP (DoE, 1997a:1) to curriculum policies. I also highlighted 
challenges in this regard. I further emphasised the point of language policy as a 




connects with school governance and language policy formulation in public schools. 











This chapter presents the research paradigm, design, methodology and methods, 
which sought to address the following main research question: 
Do governance and language policy in South African public schools provide an 
opportunity for deliberative democracy? 
From the main research question, the following sub-research questions were drawn: 
1. Why should parents, as members of the SGB, and other members of the SGB 
have the right to determine a school’s language policy? 
2. How do democratic school governance and language policy formulation in 
public schools in South Africa intersect? 
3. What are the inherent tensions arising from the role of parents and SGBs in 
relation to determining the language policy? 
4. On what basis does the HOD contest the language policy of the school, as 
adopted by the SGB? 
5. How can deliberative democracy assist in mediating the tension between the 
state (HOD) and the SGB in terms of its language policy? 
 
Moreover, the chapter provides insights into the research context and sampling 
technique, as well as the ethical clearance process followed, and issues of 
trustworthiness, reliability and validity. 
 
4.2 Research paradigm  
 
Different views exist about what exactly is meant by the term paradigm or at least 
research paradigm as a concept (Kuhn, 1962; Durrheim and TerreBlanche, 1999). The 
term paradigm refers to a research culture with its own set of beliefs, values, and 
assumptions that are consistent with a range of researchers when approaching 
research (Kuhn, 1977). A paradigm therefore refers to a general worldview that is 
interdependent with a certain way of thinking (Olsen, Lodwick and Dunlop, 1992: 16). 
Gephart (1999) classifies research paradigms into three distinct philosophical 
frameworks, namely positivism, interpretivism and postmodernism. 
The paradigm for this particular study, especially because it is based on the polite 




belief that reality consists only of subjective experiences and where researchers reveal 
intersubjective epistemology and ontology which in turn gives rise to the creation of a 
reality that is also socially constructed (Gephart, 1999). Interpretivism is closely 
intertwined with observation and interpretation: any type of observation is used to 
gather information, while interpretations project meaning on certain phenomena and 
attempt to make sense of it through the application of certain abstract concepts (Deetz, 
1996: 191 - 207 ). The interpretive paradigm consists of numerous philosophical 
perspectives, viz. phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979).  
A phenomenological inquiry forms part of the interpretive paradigm. The core of the 
interpretive paradigm is to understand the subjective reality of human experience as 
the topic of research (Guba & Lincoln, 1989; Langdridge 2007:4). Given the nature of 
interpretation, the interpretive paradigm believes that reality is socially constructed 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 1998). Collis and Hussey (2009:56-57) argue that the goal of 
interpretivist research is to understand and to interpret mundane and everyday events 
(ideas) that are embedded in social experiences and systems, as well as the meaning 
that people project onto the phenomena. Schwandt (2007:314-317) states that 
meaning could be discovered through language, and not only through quantitative 
research methods. The research paradigm used for this study is interpretive due to 
the fact that the researcher wants to understand how participants view “school 
governance” and “language policy”. The policy analysis employed in this thesis also 
formed part of the interpretive research paradigm which would be illuminated in the 
following sections.   
 
4.3 Research methodology  
 
Harding (1987:2) notes that research methodology refers to the theory of epistemology 
or the framework of interpretation that systematically directs and guides research. 
Similarly, Schwandt (2007:195) says that research methodology is a theoretical 
framework and a guideline for how an inquiry should commence. On the same note, 
research methodology is a process that follows procedural and strategic steps to 
gather and analyse data in a research project (Polit & Hungler, 1999:648). 
Methodology also includes the underlying frameworks or theories and guidelines that 
direct the chosen methods of the research (Holloway, 2005:293). 
For this study I decided to adopt phenomenological inquiry in order to address the 
main and sub-research questions. Phenomenology is the study of human 
consciousness: how conscious and intentional understandings and interpretations of 
phenomena create an essential truth (Smith, 2016). Phenomenology is therefore 
interwoven with the subjective nature of reality: it deals with the views, convictions and 
values of people (Smith, 2016). As a research methodology, phenomenology 




thereof, i.e. “lived experiences” (Creswell, 1998:51; Langdridge, 2007:4). The human 
belief system does not only direct our thinking and actions, but also how the world is 
researched and how knowledge systems are created (Blumberg et al., 2011:18). 
A phenomenological methodology entails understanding and interpreting beings and 
phenomena, while phenomenological hermeneutics is rather based upon the notion of 
interpreting the human condition or the individual being in the world (Laverty, 2003:24). 
On a basic level, the distinction between these methodologies is rooted in a different 
mode of analysis or, put differently, a different exploration of the lived experience 
(Laverty, 2003:24). Although hermeneutical philosophy argues that fore-structures are 
an important part of the human condition, I rather chose phenomenology as part of an 
interpretive research methodology, because I am less interested in these fore-
structures of interpretation, i.e. predisposition to interpretation, but rather am rather 
interested in interpretations and understandings of phenomena. I do not say that these 
fore-structures are unimportant; I am merely stating that these fore-structures will not 
be the essence of the research analysis. 
 
I am particularly interested in the lived experience or interpretations of social 
phenomena, such as the “language policy’ and “school governance” of participants 
who are serving as members on the SGB. Each view would therefore display a unique 
interpretation of the phenomena “school governance” and “language policy”. This also 
corresponds with the overarching idea of the phenomenological “epoche” (Van 
Niekerk & Rossouw, 2006:12). According to Van Niekerk and Rossouw (2006:12), 
Husserl argued that, in the phenomenological “epoche”, one takes a distance from the 
validity of the natural world (physical world) and “brackets” a certain aspect that lies 
beyond human consciousness, to be left with consciousness alone. In this case, I 
bracket the “governance” and “language policy” of a school as the phenomena, and 
what is left are the conscious meaningful acts that constitute the participant’s views of 
each school’s governance and language policy.           
  
Even though these phenomena are socially and humanly produced, they enrich the 
process of interpretation. Furthermore, in a phenomenological inquiry, the researcher 
sets aside prior knowledge to grasp the essential meaning of beings and lived 
experiences; this implies the researcher must “cleanse” himself/herself of any 
preconscious actions and personal biases to accurately describe the participants’ 
interpretations of phenomena (Natanson, 1973). This is functional and strategic for the 
current research study because language and language policy in South Africa in 
general, and in South African schools in particular, are sensitive subjects. Of course, 
I also recognise that it is not always possible for a researcher to be wholly detached 
or neutral in relation to research. The mere fact that I have decided to conduct this 
research study confirms that I have an interest in the subject matter. A 
phenomenological inquiry, however, allows the researcher to present the data as each 
participant views the phenomena, and not from the point of view of the researcher 




newly constructed perspectives (Finlay, 2009). Phenomenology is basically rooted in 
the description, analysis and interpretation of lived experience (McIntosh & Wright, 
2019:8). The following section analyses the research methods and shows that these 
methods interlock with an interpretive paradigm, i.e. phenomenological inquiry. 
 
4.4 Research design  
 
Building on the interpretivist paradigm and phenomenological methodology, it is clear 
that the research design would be embedded in qualitative research strategy. 
Preliminary thoughts on qualitative research is to understand participants and their 
views (Merriam, 2009:3). In the same light, Creswell (2003) argues that the qualitative 
research approach is used for knowledge generation with regard to the multi facet 
meanings of individual’s views or the meanings that is socially and historically created.  
Furthermore, qualitative research is research that cannot be accessed through 
statistics (Labaree, 2009). It primarily seeks to capture participants' perspectives and 
experiences of a certain subjective reality: participants interpret their own experience 
of the world and the world (Labaree, 2009). Qualitative research, in its simplest form, 
deals with the “qualities” of those being researched (Thomas, 2010: 302). Qualitative 
research is naturalistic: it aims to study the everyday life of people, groups and 
communities within their natural space (Thomas, 2010: 302). According to Thomas, it 
is useful to tackle this type of research within an educational system (Thomas, 2010). 
It is precisely on the above explanation that qualitative research is used for this study. 
The research methods that flow out of an interpretive paradigm, phenomenological 
methodology and qualitative research design, is e-mail interviews and policy analysis. 
At its core, e-mail interviews are a form of these frameworks because they capture 
what the participant views. One can easily dismiss policy analysis as a 
phenomenological endeavour, but as I will argue in the following subsections, the 
policy analysis employed in this thesis could easily be reconciled with 
phenomenological methodology. The reason therefore is, it captures how participants 
view a certain policy construct    
 
4.5 Research methods 
 
The previous section provided the leading principle that guided this research study. 
The following section deals with how data is constructed and collected in a 
phenomenological inquiry. A research method or technique refers to the methods used 
by the researcher in research operation, i.e. through what means data is captured 
(Kothari, 2004:7-8). Methods vary in terms of their functions, i.e. for collection, 
statistical endeavours and means to evaluate the research obtained (Kothari, 2004:8). 




foundation for deeper qualitative methods of data analysis. Following qualitative 
research methods, I chose e-mail interviews and policy analysis. I discuss both these 
research methods and indicate my intention for the choice.    
 
4.5.1 E-mail interviews 
 
Bevan (2014:137) shows that a phenomenological inquiry fits well with other 
qualitative methods, such as interviews. According to Giorgi (1997:24, cited in Bevan, 
2014:137), interviews will lead to questions that are generally broad and open ended 
so that the participant has enough time and opportunity to express his/her views. 
According to Redlich-Amirav and Higginbottom (2014:1), new qualitative research 
technologies have evolved over the past few decades and have given rise to new 
technologies within communication, e.g. e-mail interviews. E-mail interviews are a 
growing type of qualitative interviews. The requirement for the qualitative nature of e-
mail interviews depends on whether data is elicited and managed according to the 
tenets of the chosen qualitative methodology (Fritz & Vandermause, 2018:1648).  
Interviewing is one of the most frequently used method in qualitative studies (May, 
1991). The value of interviews is the fact that interviewees can speak in their own 
voice and provide their own perceptions and feelings (Berg, 2007:96). However, e-
mail interviews differ from face-to-face interviews in that they are a form of written 
communication and not oral communication (Hamilton & Bowers, 2006:829). E-mail 
interviews are not simply yes-no answers to questions or even short-type answers 
(Hamilton & Bowers, 2006:831). Asynchronous, in-depth interviewing conducted 
online via e-mail is semi-structured in nature, involves multiple e-mail exchanges over 
an extended period of time, and cannot be confused with e-mail surveys, which 
happen once off (Meho, 2006:1284). Therefore, e-mail interviews share the same 
characteristics as semi-structured interviews and also have distinct advantages. 
Semi-structured interviews have the advantages of structured and unstructured 
interviews (Thomas, 2010:315). A semi-structured interview is more flexible, and it 
allows depth to be achieved “by providing the opportunity on the part of the interviewer 
to probe and expand the interviewee’s responses (Rubin & Rubin, 2005:88). There 
are numerous advantages of semi-structured e-mail interviews, which range from 
convenience, cost-effectiveness, longer physical distance between participants, 
saying things that could not be said face-to-face and working with a set of interviews 
at the same time, to overcoming interviewer effects, clear, concise rich data, depth of 
responses increase due to participant’s ability to respond at a later time, when 
thoughts are well formed and high quality discriminative data which emerges when 
participants have time to carefully craft responses (Fritz & Vandermause, 2018:1642; 
Hunt & McHale, 2007:1416-1417; Meho, 2006). However, there also are 
disadvantages, that range from ethical issues, time of interview, loss of focus and 




2007:1416-1417). Conducting a semi-structured e-mail interview for this purpose is 
unique: it can be difficult to balance research content and casual life conversation from 
participants (Fritz & Vandermause, 2018:1644).   
Phenomenology directs these type of questions that are asked in an interview, and 
these characteristics are unchangeable when the format of the interview is e-mail 
(Hamilton & Bowers, 2006:827). These questions have cues like “how do you view?” 
This provides a possible indication that e-mail interviews are compatible with 
phenomenology and therefore with qualitative methods of data construction. 
Participants still had the opportunity to revise their responses; however, this would be 
time consuming, whereas participants could immediately change their view in a 
physical semi-structured interview. It seemed that participants were determined with 
there first response though. Although participants had the opportunity to change their 
view, they did not alter their responses.     
I used this framework to conduct nine e-mail interviews with an educator, parent and 
principal of each school. The e-mail interviews were all semi-structured in nature. The 
interviews had predetermined questions that were exchanged via e-mail. These e-mail 
interviews functioned exactly like semi-structured interviews, except that they were 
online. E-mail interviews fit the research methodology, i.e. the interpretive paradigm, 
because I was interested in the interpretations of selected members of the SGBs.  
I chose e-mail interviews because, in the light of the current state of affairs 
(2018/2019/2020), school governance and language policy in public schools are 
sensitive issues in South Africa – especially language and language policy. I had to 
state clearly that the interview did not seek to gather information about their 
perspectives and sentiments on language per se. In e-mail interviews, participants 
have a degree of distance and the researcher does not have the opportunity to 
influence a subject as sensitive as language policy in South African public schools. 
For this reason, e-mail interviews gave the participants the necessary confidence to 
answer the questions I posed.  
 
4.5.2 Policy analysis  
 
Brooks (1989:16) indicates that the term “policy” denotes the identification of a 
problem or situation and what policy actors can or cannot do in reaction to the problem. 
For Bates and Eldredge (1980:12), on the other hand, policy is a statement that guides 
the process of decision-making, which the responsible policy actors need to consider 
before acting. What we could take from these definitions is that the term “policy” 
denotes the isolation of a problem, which goes together with a possible solution to that 
problem. This means that “policy” does not always refer to a “document” as such, but 




In the light of the definition of the term “policy”, the phenomenon of “policy analysis” 
refers to the nature, intentions and effects of social problems and how to solve these 
social problems on an institutional level (Nagel, 1995:181). This definition makes it 
possible to evaluate policy systematically on the basis that it reassesses the intention 
of policy inputs and outcomes. Policy analysis is a complex endeavour, and an 
evaluation of the specific stages of policymaking is necessary when it is used as a 
research method. Policy analysis is an analysis of the following stages of 
policymaking: agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation and policy 
evaluation (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).   
I chose to evaluate how participants experience the formulation of their school’s 
language policy against the backdrop of the Norms and Standards Regarding 
Language Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act 
(DoE, 1997b:2). A policy analysis, such as an evaluation, calls for a subject of analysis. 
The different instantiations of the abovementioned norms were the subject of analysis. 
Each view is a unique and individual response to these norms. Because 
phenomenology is a study of phenomena to arrive at the essence of a phenomenon, 
I argue that these norms are the blueprint or the essence of every school’s language 
policy. These norms seek to guide SGBs to formulate language policy through the 
following (DoE, 1997b:2): 
Subject to any law dealing with language in education and the 
Constitutional rights of learners, in determining the language policy of the 
school, the governing body must stipulate how the school will promote 
multilingualism through using more than one language of learning and 
teaching, and/or by offering additional languages as fully-fledged subjects, 
and/or applying special immersion or language maintenance programmes, 
or through other means approved by the head of the provincial education 
department. 
I “bracket” these Norms as they are originally written in the policy document (DoE, 
1997b:2) to arrive at each participant’s view or perspective on/of how their schools’ 
language policy manifests the Norms, i.e. the essence of their experience of the Norms 
in relationship with their schools’ language policy formulation. Because I argue that 
this would be the essence of language policy formulation in the participant schools, I 
seek to evaluate parents, educators and principals experiences, as members of an 
SGB, with regard to how the Norms manifests, in their experience of their schools’ 
language policy formulation. Therefore, I will not look at each school’s language policy, 
but rather at each participant’s unique view and manifestation of the Norms in their 
experience of their schools’ language policy formulation. According to Van Niekerk, 
Van der Waldt and Jonker (2001:98), policy evaluation can be viewed as a continuing 
process and assessment of outcomes. It is also important, however, that the 
evaluation of a policy introduces and adopts a new policy which does not always 
happen at the end of policy timeline (Bouser, McGregor & Oster, 1996:51). Gerston 




effectiveness of a policy with regard to its intentions and results. Rossi, Freeman and 
Lipsey (1998, cited in Khan & Rahman, 2017:175) identify five stages of policy 
evaluation. For the sake of this thesis, I choose “assessment of program theory”, which 
is the same as evaluation of policy formulation (Rossi, Freeman and Lipsey, 1998, 
cited in Khan & Rahman, 2017:175). Policy evaluation with regard to policy formulation 
is therefore based on an analysis of the intention of the policy and the possible 
implementation paths of that intention. 
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, cited in Khan & Rahman, 2017:175) argue that this 
type of policy evaluation does not necessarily look at faulty logic, but at logic as such, 
that lies at the core of the policy. The failure of policy formulation stems from 
“inadequate focus” and “unrealistic assumptions”: assumptions and expectations are 
the guiding principal of policy implementation in order to achieve policy goals and 
objectives and, in turn, facilitate evaluation (Khan & Rahman, 2017:175). Therefore, 
evaluating the formulation of language-in-education policies is to analyse the design 
or the underlying framework of a specific policy. I will elaborate on this by referring to 
two traditions in education policy analysis, viz. the positivist Westphalian tradition and 
the critical Westphalian tradition. The positivist Westphalian tradition is a policy 
analysis doctrine that refers to the study of policy intention and implementation 
(Regmi, 2017:5). The critical Westphalian tradition of policy analysis is the study of 
policy with regard to the input of the state, in this case the provincial DoE, which is the 
main body to impose a certain policy ideology on the masses (Regmi, 2017:6).  
I was interested in how the participants thought their school promoted multilingualism 
through more than one LoLT, their school’s language subjects and language 
maintenance programmes. Every public school should have a language policy. 
However, a school language policy does not contain individual members’ views of 
these aspects and is fixed within a document. In this thesis, the term language is used 
to reflect a discourse that forms around something that it speaks of, which then shows 
a dynamic and meaning-making process which influences policy formulation. 
Bernstein (1976:167-169, cited in Dryzek, 1982:322) to argue that the interpretive 
research methodology, i.e. phenomenology, rather reconstructs life situations and 
describes situations rather than evaluate them. However, Fischer (1980:141, cited in 
Dryzek, 1982:322) goes further to draw an overlap between interpretive research 
methodology and policy analysis inasmuch as an interpretive research plays an 
“ancillary” (necessary support) role in policy research by providing an understanding 
of what the social reality looks like to the people who are affected by the policy. This 
could create a possibility from which evaluation could stem. Lester and Stewart (2000, 
cited in Khan & Rahman, 2017:174) argue that the central notion of policy evaluation 
rests on the activities and how they influence society.  
Dryzek (1982:322) adds that interpretive methodologies of policy analysis could 
provide a description of the feasibility of a certain policy situation. Describing a specific 
policy situation, one is already in a mode of analysis or evaluation: you are evaluating 




described. Tierney and Clemens (2011) provide evidence that policy could be 
analysed in a qualitative fashion. Neale (2016, cited in McIntosh and Wright, 2019: 4) 
and Wright (2016, cited in McIntosh and Wright, 2019: 4) confirm that the term “lived 
experience” has been used in social policy to encapsulate subjective experiences of 
empirical inquiry. McIntosh and Wright (2019:6) argue that a social policy can be 
enriched by including the notion of “lived experience”. “Lived experiences” could 
methodologically be associated with a degree of empathy that fosters a deep 
involvement in individuals’ lives and concerns that are affected by policy formulations 
and implementations (McIntosh & Wright, 2019:20). A policy process that is built upon 
“lived experiences” will include a variety of policy actors, like policymakers, 
empowered groups and oppressed groups (McIntosh & Wright, 2019:20).  
Language policy analysis of any sort has to interconnect with the main paradigm of 
language planning and policy (LPP) (Cooper, 1989; Fishman, 1972), which will reflect 
a different view of a socio-political problem, e.g. the promotion of multilingualism. This 
could be seen as a socio-political problem in as far as South Africa constitutionally 
acknowledge 11 official languages, but in practice does not deliver on this ideal. I do 
not focus on what is written in the language policy, but investigate what transcends 
these phenomena as they manifest as a socio-political issue (as stated above) and 
the experience thereof. Policies are implemented in contexts that create problems and 
which in its turn can only be solved within that context (Ball, 1993:13). However, Ball 
(1993:12) adds that policies are textual interventions in practice, which implies that 
policies can change practice. We cannot predict the outcome of a policy by analysing 
the stakeholders. However, this study uses the perceptions of some policy actors, 
namely parents, educators and principals. Policies do not tell you what to do, but open 
opportunities by narrowing and changing the options or responses available (Ball, 
1993:12). Textual interventions like policies change contexts dramatically, but this 
does not mean that one must ignore the things that stay the same, nor the way change 
is different in different settings, and the policy authors’ intensions when policies are 
formulated  (Ball, 1993:13).    
Naidoo (2005:28) offers the following example in this regard. Espoused theories with 
regard to school governance are the intentions and functions of the policy documents 
or what actors assert are the objectives of a policy. In this light, an objective of a policy 
could completely ignore the actual policy practices. The practical example Naidoo 
(2005:128) uses is that it is often cited that the intention with the creation of SGBs was 
to promote democratic participation, but in practice they are designed to support the 
healthy functioning of school organisation. In the realm of politics, policies shift and 
change their meaning (Ball, 1993:11). However, the state’s agenda and problems 
change with each new government, which leads to different policy initiatives (Ball, 
1993:11). Policies have their own momentum in the state, which means they are 
reworked and reinterpreted over time (Ball, 1993:11). Policies enter into power 
relations rather than changing them: the impact of policies is rather determined by the 
substance of “social disputes and conflicts” through which the individuals are 




encoded in a certain way and decoded in a different way (Ball, 1993:11). A policy is 
always in a state of flux or in a state of becoming, which indicates an ad hoc negotiation 
within the policy formulation process (Ball, 1993:11). Policies have interpretational and 
representational history: each policy creates a different context for individuals (Ball, 
1993:13). This section has highlighted the research methods that were used to 
construct the data. The following section will place more focus on the nature of the 
sample that was chosen for the study. 
 
4.6 Sampling techniques and selection 
 
This section focuses on the nature of the sampling techniques employed during the 
sample collection. Polit and Hungler (1999:37) describe a population as the total 
subjects, objects and participants with the same specifications and characteristics. 
The size of a population is expressed by the symbol N. The sample also is the smallest 
unit of analysis that is chosen from the population (Frey et al., 2000:125). The sample 
of a research study is used to gain specific information from a specific population (Frey, 
et al., 2000:125). When qualitative research is conducted, as in interviews, a sample 
is “drawn” from a given population (Latham, 2007:1). Any unit of analysis that forms a 
part of the sample must represent a characteristic of that population (Latham, 2007:1). 
A sample is expressed with the symbol n (Latham, 2007:1).  
The underlying sample theory leads to effective sampling, and attempts to reach a 
degree of accuracy (Latham, 2007:2). The sampling technique of this study was non-
probability, purposive (judgemental) sampling. Non-probability sampling refers to the 
probability that all the characteristics of the participants are unknown (McMillan, 
1996:91). All known characteristic of the sample would be that they are all school 
governors, i.e. they are educators, parents or a principal; the only known correlation 
between participants in the sample is that they are all members of an SGB. The 
perceptions of the participants, which I focused on, were totally unknown before the 
interviews and policy analysis. It is common that the sample and the population have 
a characteristic in common, but there is no need to generalise the findings (McMillan, 
1996:91). With purposive sampling, the researcher chooses specific elements from 
the population that suits the research subject the best (McMillan, 1996:92). The 
researcher makes a judgement that is based on his/her knowledge of the population 
and what aspects of the sample will be used for research purposes (McMillan, 
1996:92). McMillan (1996:93) states that qualitative research is often correlated with 
purposive sampling. I chose purposive sampling because I decided to look only at the 
perceptions of educators, parents and the principal, and not those of non-teaching 
staff members of an SGB. 
This study used nine participants from three SGBs of the chosen schools, which 
means that three participants are representative of each school. The population for 




are members of the SGB, i.e. N = 26. As mentioned earlier, I conducted e-mail 
interviews with three members of each governing body, which is effectively one 
educator, one parent and the principal of each school. This means my sample size is 
n = 9. If my projections are correct, my sample would be 35% of the population. The 
size of my sample jeopardises the ability to generalise, as stated earlier. However, it 
is difficult to generalise qualitative data and perceptions, i.e. the value of my study 
does not depend on the sample size measured against the population or the 
generalisability.  
Purposive sampling indicates that there is a reason or goal behind the choice of 
sample. Also, in purposive sampling, argues Merriam (2009), one must indicate what 
the selection criteria are essential to choose the school and the members of the SGB. 
In criterion-based selection, the researcher considers certain attributes which is 
essential to his/her study and then find a unit matching the list (Merriam, 2009: 77). 
The following criterion was used to determine the selection for the sample: 
1. Province in South Africa 
The school had to be situated public school in the Western Cape of South Africa 
(WCED) which had an SGB according to SASA (RSA, 1996a). The provincial location 
for the schools in the sample were due to the researchers preference and    
2. Language-of-teaching-and-learning (LoLT) 
The public schools in the Western Cape needed to be Afrikaans-medium for the 
sample selection. This was because I took what Malherbe (2006:197) argued as a 
determining factor. Malherbe (2006:197) argued that Afrikaans-medium schools are 
targeted by the DBE (and therefore HOD) as the greatest obstacle towards achieving 
social transformation. Second, Afrikaans is the language that is most spoken in the 
Western Cape which would render this criterium in agreement with the status quo 
(Statistics South Africa, 2011). 
3. Specific members of the SGB 
I have chosen a parent, teacher and principal of each school to portray a diversity of 
insights into language policy formulation and school governance. As I highlighted in 
Chapter 2, the views of parents are important because they represent the learner. The 
choice of a teacher is important because they have subject specific knowledge about 
language policy formulation. Last, principals are seen has the head of the SMT and 
represents the HOD in an SGB meeting (RSA, 1996a).     
 
4.7 Research context 
 
For this study I chose three public primary schools in the Western Cape in South 




LoLT, which is Afrikaans: Afrikaans is the most spoken language in the Western Cape, 
with almost 2.5 million speakers (Statistics South Africa, 2011). School A and School 
B fall in the same quintile, but School C is one quintile below Schools A and B. The 
quintile system in South Africa is the funding system that governs the amount of 
spending per learner in each quintile. A quintile is a standard and provides a 
predetermined formula to secure spending per learner, and is a pro-poor mechanism 
that determines the amount of funding for an individual school (South Africa, 1998a, 
cited in Ndhlovu, 2012: 61). Public schools in South Africa are divided into five quintiles 
(Ndhlovu, 2012). The sample schools were not chosen due to the quintile or education 
district. The sample schools rather share a province and also provide a snapshot of 
the linguistic reality in the Western Cape as a whole: as I mentioned, Afrikaans is the 
most spoken language in the Western Cape and forms of Afrikaans dialects. These 
three schools serve different groups of Afrikaans-speaking people.  
Quintile 1 is a group of schools that cater for the poorest 20% (RSA, 1998). Quintile 2 
is the next 20% (RSA, 1998). This goes on until one reaches quintiles 4 and 5, which 
cater for the least poor learners in the country. Furthermore, to indicate at what level 
the Western Cape functions with regard to the allocation of fees:  31.7% of all schools 
in the Western Cape are quintile 5 schools followed by 28% of all Western Cape 
schools which are quintile 4 (WCED, 2013; RSA, 2020). The Western Cape also has: 
8.6% quintile 1 and 13.3% quintile 2 schools (WCED, 2013).  Quintile 1, 2 and 3 
schools in South Africa are no-fee schools (60% of the learners form public schools 
nationally) (RSA, 2020), whilst quintile 4 and 5 schools are fee-paying schools (WCED, 
2013; RSA, 2020). The difference between the spending per learner from the DBE for 
quintiles 1 to 5 for 2020 is: The DoE pays R1 466 per learner for quintile 1 to 3, R735 
for quintile 4 and R254 for quintile 5 (which the National Government contests, 
suggesting that R174 per learner is adequate in a quintile 5 school) (WCED, 2013; 
RSA, 2020).  
It was difficult to find quintile 1 and 2 schools that were willing to participate in this 
research study because of poor parental involvement in the SGB, which, in turn, has 
a direct impact on the functionality of the SGB. According to Ndhlovu (2012:66), 
quintile 1 schools receive 30% of overall funding, whilst quantile 5 schools receive 5% 
of the funding from the Gross Domestic Product (RSA, 1998, cited in Ndhlovu, 2012: 
66). It may be so that the Western Cape has few poor schools in comparison with 
other provinces, but this does not detract from the fact that the differences between a 
quintile 1 and quantile 5 primary school are immense. Differences in this case would 
also include disparities in relation to parental involvement and infrastructure. The 















School A 4 2 37 985 5 R 12 650 
per annum 
11 
School B 4 2 52 983 5 R 177 226 
per annum 
33 
School C 1 1 17 500 4 R 600 per 
annum 
3 
    
School A had a learner-teacher ratio of 1:27, which means it was well under the 
required WCED ratio of 37:1 for primary schools (Gina, 2018). It is a historically 
advantaged school. Although the school has the most learners, the learner-teacher 
and learner-classroom ratios did not reveal any potential problems. This school has 
34 classrooms, which adds up to 29 learners in a classroom. I observed the facilities 
of the school, and could deduce that it was a safe environment where teaching and 
learning could be effective. It was a Section 21 school with a functioning SGB. The 
SGB consisted of nine people, with five parents, two educators, the principal and a 
member of the non-teaching staff. The school is set in a middle-class income area and 
the town itself has a decent infrastructure. The school is also set in the Northern 
Suburbs of Cape Town, which means it forms part of an interconnected infrastructure 
and metropole. The reason for the choice of School A is that it sketches an image of 
an urban school that has its own language and language policy situation.  
School B is located in Stellenbosch in the Western Cape of South Africa and is a 
historically advantaged school. The learner-teacher ratio for this primary school is 
18:1, which is ideal. It is a historically advantaged school. This school was also the 
most expensive. The school has 37 classrooms, which means that the learner-
classroom ratio is 27:1. This school is also a Section 21 school with an SGB of fifteen 
governors. The school is set in an upper middle-class area with expanded facilities, 
such as specialist classrooms, computer labs and a library. School B enjoys high 
levels of parental involvement. The reason for the choice of School B is due to the fact 
that it is suburban.  
School C is located in what would have been known as a “Coloured Area” in 
Stellenbosch in the Western Cape in the Apartheid era, and is a historically 
disadvantaged school. This school is set in a community in which the housing is dense 
and houses are close to each other. As I will discuss later, one teacher of this school 
noted that parental involvement was absent. Although the learner-teacher ratio was 
29:1, which is under the WCED norm, this does not reflect the status quo at this school. 
Educator C said that the school had asked the WCED if it could change to quantile 1, 
but they were still in the process. This means that they received minimal funds from 
the WCED and their school fees are R 600 a year. School C has 29 classrooms, which 




mean that the learners receive quality education. Houses in the area are dilapidated, 
which means that it seems as if people live in poverty.  
4.8 Research participants  
 
To protect each participant’s and school’s identity, I gave them a code which made 
naming possible. This code protects the participants’ identity. The code was chosen 
randomly to eliminate the danger of the participant’s identity being exposed (Burgess, 
1989:6; Ramrathan, Le Grange & Shawa et al., 2016:444-445). For example, there 
were three schools: School A, B and C; three parent-governors: Parent A, B and C; 
and three educator-governors: Educator A, B and C. Lastly, there were three 
principals: Principal A, B and C. The following table gives more information about how 
many years each participant had served on the SGB: 
 
Participants Years served on the SGB 
Parent A 2 
Educator A 8 
Principal A 4 
Parent B 3 
Educator B 6 
Principal B 22 
Parent C 2 
Educator C 6 
Principal C 6 months (new principal) 
 
Parent A is an operational manager and the SGB used this parent as a strategic 
planner. Strategic planning for a school is important for determining the future of the 
school. This parent works in the formal sector and has financial and other skills to help 
govern the school. Parent B works closely with farmers and distributers in the wine 
industry, which indicates he has trade knowledge and human connections in his 
everyday work. His portfolio in the SGB is to foster involvement between parents and 
educators. His capabilities and skills could be used to benefit the SGB’s functionality. 
Parent C works in financing and could use his professional skills as a treasurer in the 
SGB.  
Educator A has been at School A since 1993, which meant that she had been at the 
school for 26 years. Educator A is also currently a deputy principal. Educator B is also 
a deputy principal and has been a teacher at School B since 1998, hence 21 years – 
14 years of which he has been a department head and six years as deputy principal. 
Educator C has been at School C since 2009 and had served on the SGB from 2013. 




principal at School B for 22 years, while Principal C was newly elected and had only 
been at the schools for six months.       
At this stage, it is necessary for me to share a number of the challenges that I 
experienced in relation to establishing a research sample. These challenges provide 
insight into the sensitivities surrounding both SGBs and language policy. I sent 
approximately 200 e-mails to prospective schools and their principals. The reason for 
these e-mails was twofold: I sent an e-mail to all the principals (firstly to their 
secretaries) to ask permission to conduct research at the school and, if they agreed, I 
sent e-mails to the principals and all the parents and educators to find people willing 
to be interviewed. The initial e-mails contained an endorsement letter from my 
supervisor, the approval letter from the WCED, an approval letter from the Research 
Ethics Committee of Stellenbosch University, as well as a few questions that I planned 
to ask them during the e-mail interviews. I also included a brief description of my study. 
In the end, only ten schools replied, of which only three schools agreed to participate. 
The choice of schools was influenced mainly by the following two aspects. Firstly, there 
were no school that gave me a transparent reason why they did not want to participate 
in the research. This left me with some core assumptions, but nothing substantive. 
Secondly, as time moved on, I did not have the luxury of choosing schools and had to 
use the schools that were willing to participate. In the end, I managed to construct a 
reasonable sample, which partly depicted the educational reality of South Africa. 
On the other hand, due to the sensitivity of my research subject, I understood the 
reluctance of schools to participate. This was confirmed by the principal of a quintile 5 
school, who indicated that the SGB did not want to participate because of the 
sensitivity of language, and also did not want to spoil the relationship with the provincial 
HOD. This was because the school had in the past been implicated in the media. A 
principal of another quintile 5 school also stated in an e-mail that he did not want to 
put the members of the SGB in harm’s way, and that he would be willing to answer the 
questions, but not the members of the SGB. 
 
4.9 Data analysis   
 
Data analysis can be seen as the creation of meaning of data that was gathered by 
the researcher through employing the research methods according to Thomas et al. 
(2005, cited in Perry, 2010:49). According to Patton (2002), qualitative research is 
based on three phases. This thesis had also used these phases to analyse the 
compiled data using a phenomenological methodology (interpretative paradigm) and 
qualitative research design. Data was compiled and protected, and the researcher had 
also become acquainted with the data: this phase is called the preparatory phase 
(2002). E-mail interviews were conducted according to a “question-answer” method 




about policies that concerned the phenomena of “school governance” and “Language 
policy were compiled. Thereafter, I transcribed their views directly onto the laptop in 
which I saved it in a confidential folder. I got acquainted with the data as I transcribed 
the e-mail interviews.  
After this phase, the researcher engaged into the descriptive phase (Patton, 2002). 
According to Patton (2002: 50) this phase involved the classification and coding of 
data. During this phase themes are allocated to the aggregated data for further study 
(Gibson & Brown, 2009:127, cited in Perry, 2010:52). A policy construct such as, The 
Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) were chosen as a theme to capture the 
participants view of language policy formulation that is based on The Norms and 
Standards (DoE, 1997b:2).  The search for themes was done through a close and in-
depth reading of the data. Commonalities started to stand out which were sectioned 
off through a thematic approach as indicated above. These actions paved the way for 
the interpretation phase. The following phase, the interpretative phase, was entered 
through the merging of data in a holistic way. The interpretive phase is characterized 
by the interpretation of the selected themes. Interpretation was based on using each 
participant’s view of “school governance”, “language policy” and the chosen policy 
construct. Using each participant’s view of the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1996b: 2), 
I returned to their own views. To put it differently, participants views were used and 
reused to analysed their views.    
These three phases together form what Maykut and Morehouse (1994: 134) call the 
constant comparative method: it is an inductive categorical coding that is accompanied 
by a comparison of units of meaning. Units of meaning refer to the smallest piece of 
information that comes within the framework of qualitative research (Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994: 134). As the process of data analysis deepens, new units of 
meanings are found and compared, effectively leading to the creation of new 
categories or overarching themes (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 134). If there are no 
similar units of meaning, a new category or theme is formed (Maykut and Morehouse, 
1994: 134). Categories and themes are subject to constant change and change: 
predetermined themes can change as guidance changes the data or units of meaning. 
The researcher develops a relative intuition as the analysis deepens and changes: the 
premonition is the criterion that contributes to the categorization of units of meaning 
into a theme (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 134). The preceding intuition will 
necessarily lead to rules of inclusion: it is an outlined “reason” why certain units of 
meaning fit into a certain theme (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994: 135). Data analysis is 
not a linear process; it can be seen as a collaborative process whereby data collection, 
data verification and data analysis are placed within a continuum. Data is reinterpreted 
and re-categorized and mutually and interchangeably influenced. 
The data analysis of this study is embedded in the constant comparative method. The 
transcribed e-mail interviews and policy analysis are divided into meaningful units and 




grouped together and categorized (in this study) into themes. Thereafter, each theme 
receives a specific heading. Certain units of meaning were initially categorized into 
“different” themes: therefore, the categorization of units of meaning changes on an 
ongoing basis until rules for inclusion are developed. In this data analysis, information 
will be constantly compared to ensure that the "constant" that results from this process 
forms the new research. Building on the aforementioned, the following themes were 
identified during the e-mail interviews: 
5. Parental involvement in language policy 
6. Democratic school governance and language policy   
7. Role of and intervention by the HOD 
8. School governance and deliberative democracy 
 
4.10 Trustworthiness, validity and reliability  
 
Trustworthiness in qualitative research is summarised as the self-confidence a 
researcher has in his/her findings and conclusions (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994:145). 
The trustworthiness of a research project or method is interwoven with the 
transparency of the study: an increase in the transparency of a study broadly implies 
that more people will understand the study (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994:145). 
Trustworthiness is also closely related to triangulation: the more research instruments 
are used, the more accurate the conclusions of the study will be (Bush, 2002:68). To 
ensure trustworthiness, I used two research methods. To ensure transparency, I 
introduce my research findings and discuss the findings before I analyse the data. This 
will provide the reader with the full extent of my data.    
Reliability, for Bell (2002, cited in Bush, 2002:60), refers to getting “similar results 
under constant conditions on all occasions”. Fowler (2002, cited in Bush, 2002:61) 
explains that, for reliable interviews, “all interviewees are asked the same question in 
the same way”. Reliability goes hand in hand with structured instruments, therefore 
reliability will be ensured by semi-structured interviews (Bush, 2002:62). The e-mail 
interviews can be regarded as reliable because I asked each participant the same 
question. With regard to policy analysis, the choice of a framework to analyse policy 
will increase the reliability of the research method because the framework is a 
constant. 
The validity of a research method depends on how accurately the method describes 
the phenomenon that is being researched (Bush, 2002:65). There are two types of 
validity: internal and external validity (Bush, 2002:66-67). Internal validity “relates to 
the extent that research findings accurately represent the phenomenon under 
investigation” (Bush, 2002:66). E-mail interviews helped me to understand the SGB 




framework of Ball (1993) and Regmi (2017) gave me the means to understand 
language policies in the chosen schools relative to the given framework. External 
validity denotes the process of generalising the research findings to the population 
(Bush, 2002:67). It would be difficult to generalise the findings in absolute terms 
because each participant viewed the language policy and governance of the public 
schools differently. It would be difficult to establish the same results when analysing 
different schools’ language policies, because every school has a unique language 
policy.       
4.11 Ethical considerations 
 
Educational research has its own set of ethical considerations based on the social 
sciences. Ethical issues that usually arise when conducting qualitative interviews are: 
research and power relations, informed consent and issues with data dissemination 
(Burgess, 1989:5-6; Ramrathan et al., 2016:444-445). 
Since I conducted e-mail interviews, there were no visible manifestations of a 
relationship between the researcher (interviewer) and the interviewee. I had no prior 
contact with these schools and the participants, which means there was no 
relationship whatsoever between the researcher and the participant. There also were 
no instances of principals or chairpersons who used their office to skew the research 
enterprise. Collaboration led to successful interviews (Burgess, 1989:6). Participants 
could amend their first responses by logical and rational explanation (Mero-Jaffe, 
2011:237). In e-mail interviews it is easy to amend what has been typed before it is 
sent to the recipient. Informed consent implies that the participants voluntarily agree 
to participate in the interview, i.e. the researcher does not influence the potential 
participant to participate (Burgess, 1989:6). Participants could withdraw at any stage 
of the interview. Ethical clearance states clearly that the researcher did change any of 
the participants’ views and responses (Mero-Jaffe, 2011:238).  
I had to receive permission from different parties to start with this research project. To 
start with, I sent an e-mail to the principal, as discussed earlier. In this e-mail I asked 
him/her for written consent to conduct research at the school. Secondly, I applied for 
permission to the WCED (Addendum B) to conduct research at the schools. Once I 
received permission from the WCED (Addendum B), I applied to the Stellenbosch 
University Research Ethics Committee (Addendum A), which gave approval. I then 
sent a consent form to all the participants in the sample saying that their participation 
was voluntary and they would remain anonymous. 
4.12 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter described the research methodology, methods and sampling technique. 
I explained why I decided to adopt a phenomenological inquiry, and to use e-mail 




contexts and the research participants. I shared some of the key similarities and 
differences between the three schools. I also introduced the research participants by 
providing some biographical data. Chapter 4 served as the introduction to how I 






RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As explained previously, the primary interest of this research was to understand how 
selective members of an SGB interpret the phenomena of governance and language 
policy in public schools. In this chapter, I present the findings that were constructed 
from these research methods – that is, I used e-mail interviews and the perspectives 
of the participants to gain more insight into how they think the SGB formulates their 
school’s language policy according to the Norms and Standards Regarding Language 
Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act (DoE, 
1997b:2). In addressing the primary research question, attention was also paid to the 
following sub-questions:  
1. Why should parents, as members of the SGB, have the right to determine a 
school’s language policy? 
2. What is democratic school governance with regard to language policy 
formulation? 
3. Why should the HOD intervene in the democratic governance of schools with 
regard to language policy? 
4. On what basis does the HOD contest the language policy, as adopted by the 
SGB? 
5. How can deliberative democracy assist in mediating the tension between the 
state (HOD) and the SGB in terms of its language policy? 
 
In answering these sub-questions, the following themes were identified: 
1. Parental involvement in language policy 
2. Democratic school governance and language policy   
3. Role of and intervention by the HOD 
4. School governance and deliberative democracy 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, data was constructed via e-mail interviews and a policy 
analysis based on an evaluation of the formulation of school language policy. 
Specifically, as is shown next, I conducted e-mail interviews with one parent on the 
SGB, one educator and the principal at the three sample schools. To reiterate, all 
these schools and participants are kept strictly anonymous and confidential. As such, 
the schools and the participants are identified as follows: School A, B and C, Parent 
A, B and C, Educator A, B and C, and Principal A, B and C. I captured the data in 
terms of themes, which are based on the aforementioned sub-research questions, 





5.2. Parental involvement in language policy 
 
Parents, educators and principals were asked why they thought parents should be 
included in the language policy formulation process of the schools. Parent A noted 
that  
the parents serving on the SGB are active members of the school entity 
and has a direct stake in the education of their children and the community 
which also are a part of. The SGB is chosen by the parent community and 
must therefore be included in the process. 
Parent A also mentioned that parents must express their dissatisfaction through 
written notices that contain their wishes and must affiliate themselves with groups that 
specialise in these issues. Parent B stated that parents are an important link in the 
‘heartbeat” of the school. They are involved, support fundraising projects and 
understand the dynamics in which the school operates. Similarly, Parent C noted that 
“parents represent the best interest of the children”. 
From these responses, it becomes evident that the parents view their involvement as 
both necessary and important. They also see themselves as best placed to understand 
the ethos and dynamics of their respective schools and, as such, should be involved 
in the operations of the school. Parent C commented that the parents have knowledge 
about the community of which the school forms part. It came to my attention that 
Parent A, B and C viewed their own role or the parents’ role in language policy 
formulation as active participation in the education of their children by supporting the 
school. Parent C and Parent B also emphasised the grass-root knowledge of the 
dynamics that parents have when governing with regard to language policy 
formulation. In the same light, Parent C highlighted that parents carried the best 
interests of the learners at heart when formulating the language policy. 
Likewise, educators were asked why they thought they should be including parents in 
the language policy formulation process of the schools. Educator A argued that the 
parents have power because their “children are at that school who can choose the 
medium of instruction.” Also, “the SGB are a group of parents that represent the rest 
of the school’s parents and formulate the school’s language policy on behalf of all the 
parents of the school community”. 
Educator B commented that the “SGB is parents of the school”. Accordingly, “they 
need to be aware of all the aspects that need to be covered.” Educator C, on the other 
hand, replied that parents and therefore the SGB cannot be the only parties that 
formulate language policies in schools. There must be co-operation between each 
member of the SGB, the HOD and the parents so that no party abuses its power. The 
educators argued that the reason for this is because parents are not sufficiently 




In response to the same question, Principals A, B and C said that parents can help 
solve the tension between the SGB and the HOD with regard to language policy 
through discussion and deliberation. Principal A responded that the SGB is a 
democratically chosen entity that “represents all of the parents of the school”. Principal 
A continued that an SGB is a juristic person that holds the power to formulate the 
language policy of the school. Furthermore, he argued that the SGB ought to consist 
of expert people who represent the total interests of the school community and want 
the best possible education for their children. 
According to Principal B, parents are in a partnership with the staff with regard to the 
education of the learners. The school’s leadership will therefore formulate the school’s 
language policy, which is approved before it is used. Principal C argued that:  
It is important that the role players [parents inter alia] of the school should 
give input to the language policy and that can eliminate many potential 
problems because learners have the right to receive education in their 
mother tongue, but the language policy also has to provide elements of 
diversity and inclusion for other language groups rather than excluding 
other groups. 
5.3  Democratic school governance and language policy   
 
The parents were asked how they viewed democratic school governance with regard 
to language policy. Parents A, B and C connected democratic school governance with 
the SGB. Parent A wrote that democratic school governance with regard to language 
policy is “a system where decisions are made by school management, SGB and 
parents through active participation”. Parent B mentioned that democratic school 
governance such as language policy formulation is “the process whereby parents of 
the school vote for the leaders of the school and where these leaders manage the 
voice of the community where the school finds itself“.  
Parent C stated that democratic school governance with regard to language policy 
formulation is “when the SGB has the same power as the department”. On this note, 
Parents A and C mentioned that school governance had to be embedded in a system 
of institutional arrangements like laws and frameworks. Parent A noted that school 
governance with regard to language policy needs to be embedded in “frameworks and 
the SASA”. Parent C also noted that management and governance with regard to 
language policy need to be “according to the law of the country within the framework 
of the department”. School governance in terms of language policy formulation must, 
as Parent A stated, “take into account minority groups, which is carried by the voice of 
the community”. Parent B mentioned that school governance with regard to language 
policy needs to “benefit the child’s education”. 
In turn, Educator A shared that democratic school governance with regard to language 




SGB (parents), educators and the department will co-operate to govern a school”. 
Educator B commented that the “school is managed by die principal, SGB, SMT and 
educators”. Educator B gave democratic governance another dimension by stating 
that “everybody that governs has the opportunity to take ownership for their decisions 
and provisions”. In response to the previous question, on why parents should be 
involved in the formulation of a school’s language policy, Educator C said governance 
needs to be a co-operative endeavour and that everybody involved must be included 
in the decision-making process concerning language policy. Furthermore, Educator C 
argued that democratic school governance implied that decision-making takes place 
through a process of “compartmentation”, meaning that every party, such as the SGB 
and the greater community, is included in decision-making. 
Principals were asked what democratic school governance is with regard to language 
policy. Principal A replied that it is the power of the SGB to govern according to 
democratic principles, which permit the SGB under law to govern the school. Principal 
B argued that democratic school governance with regard to language policy is when 
the different role players make a decision together that is carried out by the principal. 
For Principal C, democratic school governance with regard to language policy 
happens when all the interested groups inside the SGB claim their right to govern a 
school. These rights include participation in meetings, decision-making, etcetera. 
 
5.4 Role of and intervention by the HOD 
 
The third question centred on what the nature of the role of the provincial head of the 
department (HOD) of education (in this case, the Western Cape) should be – 
specifically, whether the HOD should intervene in the democratic governance of 
schools with regard to language policy. This question has been included in the light of 
the ongoing legal contestation between SGBs and HODs on the issue of language, 
not only in the Western Cape, but also in other provinces in South Africa. It was 
therefore important to get a clear idea of how SGBs, parents, educators and principals 
view the role and potential intervention of the HOD.    
Parents A and B agreed that the intervention by the HOD in democratic school 
governance with regard to language policy is wrong for substantive reasons. Parent A 
stated that “the HOD does not always know the context and uses a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach when problems are beyond their capabilities or power”. Parent B had the 
opinion that the HOD must not “scratch where it does not itch”, meaning that the HOD 
does not need to intervene where there is no problem. This also means that the 
intervention by the Department of Basic Education (DBE) could be justified only in 
times of a crisis, and implies that the DBE must intervene when there is malpractice 
or malgovernance, i.e. language policy that excludes learners in terms of race. Parent 
B maintained that intervention by the HOD concerning language policy is not 




community are happy”, the HOD does not need to intervene. The “department must 
first find out what and how things are at every school before they intervene”. However, 
Parent C commented that “the HOD must always be in control”. Parent C argued that 
SGB members are chosen every third year and this renewal of members offer limited 
tension. 
In response to the same question, Educator A stated that the WCED (provincial DBE) 
has a supervisory capacity towards public schools. Additionally, if a school is 
mismanaged, then the Provincial Department of Basic Education, under the leadership 
of the HOD, may intervene. Furthermore, Educator A added that an HOD has overall 
responsibility for the admission to schools to run fair and justly.  
Educator B reasoned that, if irregularities take place, the WCED must act and 
intervene. Educator C continued with this notion and said that the HOD needs to 
intervene in school governance with regard to language policy. The same educator 
reasoned that the HOD makes sure that everybody is empowered, which would not 
be so otherwise, as they would be disempowered because they are illiterate. Educator 
C also believed that, when language policy is used to exclude parties, the HOD may 
intervene in the governance of the school with regard to language policy. Unlike the 
views expressed by the educators, Principals A, B and C agreed that the intervention 
by the HOD in democratic school governance with regard to language policy could not 
be justified. Principal A thought the HOD should not intervene because SASA and the 
Constitution provide the SGB with certain powers to govern the school so as to assist 
the principal with management endeavours. Lastly, the “SGB serves the broader 
community and ought to act in the best interest of the school community”.  
Principal C commented that the contribution of the HOD is minimal because he/she 
does not have prior knowledge of the school management structures:  
No, under no circumstances, unless it is contrary to the democratic rights 
of interest groups or individuals. When school policy is in conflict with 
legislation and regulations and is contrary to the rights of groups or 
individuals, it is the duty of the head of education to interfere in order to stop 
and rectify this disadvantage. A language policy is one of the policies where 
discrimination can be applied in a subtle way in order to keep other groups 
outside … If a school’s language policy states, for example, that the 
language of instruction is Afrikaans and then applied to keeping black 
learners (who can speak Afrikaans) outside is a violation of the rights of 
black learners and the situation must be addressed by the education 
department. 
As an extension of the previous question regarding the role of the HOD in relation to 
a school’s language policy, the research participants were asked on which basis they 
thought the HOD would contest the language policy as adopted by the SGB. In 
response, Parent A stated that tension arose when “the ruling party changed their 




governance with regard to language policy if the school’s total learners decrease and 
there exists then a mismatch of medium of instruction.”. Parent B stated that the 
tension that arose from parents’ roles in language policy formulation were “when the 
school acted unfair and unreasonable if they did not consider the mother tongue of the 
community when choosing the medium of instruction”. This means that the “feeder 
zone” of a school must be a key determinant when language policy is formulated. 
Parent C commented that tension could arise when “a language policy influences a 
child negatively”.  
From the abovementioned one possibly could argue that tension arises when the 
language policy is perceived to be unfair and unreasonable. Parent B stated the latter 
directly. Parent A, on the other hand, stated that the tension arose when policies and 
laws contradicted the choice of medium of instruction, i.e. the total number of learners 
of the school decreases when there is a mismatch between the language policy and 
the language practices of the school. Parent C additionally stated that tensions arose 
when children were negatively influenced by a certain language policy. For Parent C, 
tension also arises when parents are not fully informed, therefore “workshops” need 
to be held to educate parents. If every new SGB member changes the language policy 
every three years, “it will impact the child negatively”. Educator A reasoned that the 
Department of Education wanted to exert power over the formulation of the language 
policy of public schools, at all costs. This is because there are a surplus of learners 
that still need to be accommodated in schools. However, the same educator added 
that it was “well within the powers of the SGB to choose [a language policy] when a 
mandate is received from the parents”. Educator A argued that if the language policy 
of a school is formulated according to the Constitution, then the department needs to 
“settle”. 
Educator B reasoned that the language policy must comply with the standards 
constructed by the WCED, and listed the CAPS document as a minimum requisite for 
language policy in public schools. Therefore, Educator B thought that the language 
policy needs to comply with the standard of the CAPS document, otherwise the HOD 
will intervene in democratic school governance with regard to language policy. 
Educator B also mentioned that an SGB has the right to a formulate language policy 
according to SASA and to teach in this language. According to the same educator, 
there would not be any intervention if the language policy was according to the 
Constitution. Educator C argued that the HOD would intervene if “the community does 
not want to change the language policy even if the number of learners with a different 
mother tongue increased”.   
Echoing the views of the parents and educators, Principal A replied that the HOD of 
the provincial Department of Basic Education may only intervene in democratic school 
governance with regard to language policy by placing pressure on an SGB. According 
to him, the “nearest school principle” will entail this kind of pressure, which implies that 
the HOD may allocate or place a learner in the school nearest to his primary home, 




from his/her basic human right of education, even though the school had a different 
language policy. Similarly, Principal B argued that, if “the school has not reached full 
capacity and there is a need for English learners when these learners were not placed 
at another school”, the HOD may intervene in the school with regard to language 
policy. Principal C commented that the intervention in democratic school governance 
with regard to language policy could only be justified when the language policy was in 
contrast with the Constitution and SASA and other applicable laws and regulations. 
 
5.5 School governance and deliberative democracy 
Parents were asked if deliberative democracy could possibly assist to mediate the 
tension between the HOD and the SGB. Parents A, B and C confirmed that a form of 
deliberation was necessary to bridge the tension with the HOD. Parent A commented 
that a possibility for deliberation to mediate tension between the HOD and the SGB is 
“possible” and that “dialogue have always been used to solve problems”. Furthermore, 
Parent A argued that deliberative democracy will lead to “positive outcomes if there 
are clear guidelines and processes to better the outcomes”. 
Parent B argued that “open communication” and respect for both parties’ views are of 
the utmost importance. The actions of the SGB and HOD need to be “fair and just”. 
With “good relationships, transparency, honesty, mutual respect and inclusive 
participation”, a “mean” could be reached. Furthermore, any problems and issues 
must, according to Parent B, be discussed and solved, otherwise they become “a 
stone in the shoe”. Parent C also argued that deliberation was a good solution. It 
followed that every person should respect the other’s views and opinions. Parent C 
maintained that there must be an equal chance for everybody to raise an opinion and 
state their point of view.  
Educators A, B and C agreed that deliberative democracy could lead to mediate the 
SGB’s relationship with the HOD. Therefore, deliberation was important for the SGB 
to “persuade the department it has sufficient reasons to prove its decision in terms of 
the mandate it received from the parents”. Educator A agreed that deliberative 
democracy has a mediational purpose, as it will not be necessary for the SGB and 
HOD to deliberate if the language policy of the school is according to the Constitution 
and carries the parents’ mandate. Educator A replied that the SGB could communicate 
and argue with the Department if the SGB needed to change the language policy of 
the school. Lastly, Educator A commented that democratic deliberation would lead to 
all parties being informed, which would lead to better decision-making. Educator B 
said that deliberative democracy was always a way to mediate the tension between 
the HOD and the SGB with regard to language policy. Every party can voice their 
opinion. The same educator also mentioned that a mediator could be hired to act as a 
neutral intermediary.   
Educator C reasoned that deliberative democracy and deliberation will lead to a 




educator, “a court case does not benefit education and then a spectacle occurs”. 
Furthermore, education authorities are not always informed of the community’s needs, 
which could lead to power imbalances and ill-representation of an SGB’s voice. 
Deliberative democracy will lead to the empowerment of the parent community. The 
same educator reasoned that the education department needs more information about 
the community, and they can only get this information through communication and 
deliberative democracy. 
In response to the same question regarding deliberative democracy, principals were 
asked if deliberative democracy could possibly assist in mediating the tension between 
the HOD and the SGB. Principals A, B and C replied that deliberation or a form of 
discussion was the best way to mediate this tension with regard to language policy. 
Principal A argued that conflict on this level needed to be resolved through 
“transparent and reasonable discussion”, and added that there must be a degree of 
mutual respect for each other’s roles and responsibilities. According to the same 
principal, there must be a “cooperation arrangement in terms of what is the best 
interest of the child”. Learners must not be used as a “political instrument”. This 
principal added: “deliberation can only work up to a point, then law must play a 
determinative role to prevent tension or conflict.” Therefore, “if the concerned parties 
have the same goal, i.e. quality education for the child, then a deliberative democracy 
would be successful”.  
Principal B argued that healthy arguments and regular communication with the 
Department of Basic Education are necessary. Both of these parties must bind 
themselves to the rules and regulations. Furthermore, both these parties need to co-
operate to find resolutions to ensure decisions are not one sided. Tension is usually 
caused when a school feels threatened, which could lead to harming the children of 
the school. A school that appears in the media could be stigmatised, along with its 
learners. It would be in the best interests of the learner to settle tension out of court. 
Both parties must attempt to understand the other’s point of view and must use the 
opportunity to deliberate. When one understands how a party arrived at his/her point 
of view, one can attempt to convince him/her about one’s point of view. Lastly, one 
must arrive at a “win-win situation”, and no information must be withheld from any 
party, which means that all the parties must be honest. 
Principal C argued that the best way to resolve the conflict between the SGB and the 
HOD with regard to language policy is discussion and willingness to be open to the 
views and ideas of the other. The same principal replied that a healthy solution to the 
tension between the SGB and HOD would be to “give-and-take which is a win-win 
situation”. The current education environment necessitated parties to accommodate 
other parties without harming the rights of any party. Sometimes it is necessary to 
amend certain policies to resolve such conflict, but the problem lies with the parties 
involved to manage these changes.  
Principal C further commented that the reasons why deliberation and deliberative can 




and consultations are a more cost-effective way to resolve education problems. Lastly, 
Principal C commented that any democracy needs to protect minority rights. This is 
part of the reason why the South African democracy fails. According to Principal C, no 
language can be threatened by other language users. “We create tension ourselves 
because we struggle to find resolutions for situations with minority groups like the 
language in education or medium of instruction.”  
 
5.6 Summary of interview data 
 
The parents understood that they had an active role to play in the language policy 
process, because they had been elected by the community, have specialised 
knowledge about the governing of schools in terms of language policy formulation, 
and represent the best interests of the learners. The parents argued that the SGB 
must govern the school with regard to language policy, as outlined by laws such as 
SASA. The interviews showed that the majority of the parents thought that, in principle, 
the HOD should not intervene in school governance with regard to language. They 
further maintained that the HOD’s intervention could only be justified when there was 
evidence of unfair practices or attempts at learner exclusion. All the parents expressed 
the view that deliberative democracy could assist in mediating the tension between 
the HOD and an SGB with regard to language policy in public schools.  
Educators A and B agreed that the parent component of the SGB represents the whole 
parent community and must be aware of problems in the school. However, Educator 
C indicated that parties other than parents need to be included in the language policy 
formulation of a school. All the educators in the sample agreed that democratic school 
governance with regard to language policy is an inclusive process in which all parties 
need to be included. The educators agreed that the intervention of the HOD in 
democratic school governance with regard to language policy formulation can only be 
justified if there are signs of mismanagement. The educators believed that deliberative 
democracy could assist in mediating the SGB’s relationship with the HOD. Principals 
A, B and C argued that parents can help solve the tension between the SGB and the 
HOD with regard to the language policy and that they are key to co-operative school 
governance. Principals A, B and C commented that democratic school governance is 
vested in an SGB. They also believed that the intervention of the HOD in school 
governance with regard to language policy could not be justified if their governance 
was according to SASA. Principals A, B and C had different arguments on the grounds 
for the intervention of the HOD in democratic school governance with regard to 
language policy. They said that deliberation and deliberative democracy would assist 






5.7 Policy analysis  
 
As stated in Chapter 4, the policy analysis employed in this study focuses on an 
evaluation of the intention of language policy formulation. I will attempt to map the 
intentions of the SGB language policy through the participants’ experiences of how the 
SGB formulates language policy according to the following extract from the Norms and 
Standards (DoE, 1997b:2). This extract is important because it states how an SGB will 
protect a learner’s language and constitutional rights through the promotion of 
multilingualism:   
Subject to any law dealing with language in education and the 
Constitutional rights of learners, in determining the language policy of the 
school, the governing body must stipulate how the school will promote 
multilingualism through using more than one language of learning and 
teaching, and/or by offering additional languages as fully-fledged subjects, 
and/or applying special immersion or language maintenance programmes, 
or through other means approved by the head of the provincial education 
department.  
 
The Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) is a compulsory and national guideline for 
SGBs to formulate their language policy. This then forms the essence of school 
language policy formulation in South Africa. I am not solely interested in how SGBs 
formulate their language policy. I am interested in how the participants think SGBs 
plan to formulate their language policy through promoting multilingualism, setting 
language programmes and choosing their language subjects. To iterate, I did not use 
any sample school’s language policy as such because I was not interested in the 
content of the policy itself. This means the policy analysis used in this thesis is 
informed by a phenomenological inquiry, because I wanted to understand the 
participants’ experience (“lived experience”) of language policy formulation by their 
school and what they thought their SGB does to promote multilingualism, language 
programmes and language subjects in their language policy.  
 
Before I engage in the responses to these elements, it is important to mention that the 
participants’ different perspectives are seen as part of the policy analysis, which forms 
an evaluation or interpretation of how the SGB formulates the respective school-based 
language policies based on the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) It is therefore 
clear that these perspectives of the participants do not necessarily yield the school’s 
language policy as such, as it is written in the document itself. It merely yields how the 
participants think their SGB formulates language policy based on the Norms and 






The Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) contain traces of national language policy 
(even though they were written much later) and legislation such as SASA section 6, 
but in particular section 6 (1-2) (RSA, 1996a:11). As section 6(1) of SASA states: 
 
Subject to the Constitution and this Act, the Minister may, by notice in the 
Government Gazette, after consultation with the Council of Education 
Ministers, determine norms and standards for language policy in public 
schools. 
 
It is therefore embedded in law that the national Minister of Education may formulate 
norms for language policy for public schools, and it is compulsory for schools to use 
these norms as a guideline for their language policy. I derived three questions that I 
asked each participant to gain information about how these participants viewed their 
school’s language policy as a instantiation of the Norms and Standards Regarding 
Language Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act 
(DoE, 1997b:2). These three questions are the following: 
 
1. What are the guiding principles of the language policy in your school? 
2. How do you (SGB) seek to enhance multilingualism, if at all the case? 
3. What language subjects do you offer at your school? 
 
The responses to the three questions above would give me access to information 
about the participants’ perspectives on the instantiation of the norms in their unique 
language policy circumstance, which could then be analysed against the backdrop of 
a phenomenological framework. As stated in Chapter 4, I looked at the underlying 
framework or logic of each participant’s response. The following data contains 
participant’s views/thoughts of the Norms and Standards as it forms their perception 
of their respective language policy (DoE, 1997b:2), which could then be analysed 
according to the policy analysis framework I discussed in Chapter 4.    
 
School A is an Afrikaans medium primary school and caters to a large Afrikaans 
community. Principal A stated that, while there are single cases where English mother-
tongue learners are admitted, in each case the learner’s parents chose for their child 
to be taught in Afrikaans. Given that it is compulsory for a school to have language 
subjects, the Home Language subject at this school is Afrikaans and the Second 
Additional Language (second language) is English. One of the ways in which School 
A seeks to promote multilingualism is through the appointment of an additional 
teacher, who teaches English at a Home Language level for those children who take 
this option. Another way is through additional isiXhosa classes for grades 4 to 7 (this 
is not a compulsory language subject). According to the IIAL (DBE, 2013), isiXhosa, 
or any other African language for that matter, currently is a compulsory language 





Furthermore, the participants from this school were asked what they thought the 
principles of their language policy were and how the SGB sought to promote 
multilingualism. Parent A believed that the school’s language policy formulation “must 
be a process where parents, school management and an SGB works together. The 
language policy must also be aligned with the country’s Constitution”. For Parent A, 
collaboration and co-operation were key principles of their language policy formulation. 
If role players co-operate to find a compromise between language differences, it could 
promote language diversity and multilingualism.   
 
Educator A mentioned that their language policy is “according to the Constitution”, and 
quoted that according to the Constitution, “every individual has the right to be educated 
in the language he/she chooses”. It is therefore “the parents and the learner’s right to 
give the SGB a mandate with the language of their choice to be inscribed in the 
language policy of the school”. The same educator added that the demographics of 
learners played a big role when the language policy was formulated. Educator A 
emphasised that, according to her, the principles of the language policy embraced the 
notion of individual rights as set out in the Constitution. Because the Constitution 
protects multilingualism by acknowledging 11 official languages, the faith in and 
implementation in terms of the Constitution would lead to promotion of multilingualism. 
Reasonable practice will therefore be integral.  
 
Principal A from School A replied that the language policy of the school embraced the 
language composition of the learner corps of the school. Therefore, Principal A 
reasoned that, if the majority of learners have Afrikaans as mother tongue, the school 
will be classified as an Afrikaans-medium school. Principal A emphasised that the 
“SGB of a school has the power to formulate [the] language policy of that school”. If 
the language composition of the school community changes, then an inquiry can be 
done to change the language policy in consultation with the provincial DBE. Principal 
A focused more on language policy as a function/power of the SGB and the 
adaptability of the SGB when the language composition of the learner corps of the 
school changes. Principal A added that a learner must respect the values, traditions, 
culture and conventions at this Afrikaans-medium institution, and what this Afrikaans-
medium institution has to offer. He also stated that the LoLT for this school is Afrikaans, 
except when language subjects such as English and isiXhosa are being taught.   
 
According to Principal B, the school has 30 learners who are not mother-tongue 
Afrikaans speakers. The school is set in an Afrikaans community which is very close 
to a bilingual university. School B does not teach English as a Home Language and, 
besides the compulsory isiXhosa that is taught in Grades 1 to 3, the school does not 
teach isiXhosa in Grades 4 to 7. Principal B replied that the school previously offered 
these subjects, but stopped doing so due to a lack of interest. School B also had 
language subjects (HL, FAL and SAL) as stipulated in the LiEP (DoE, 1997a), CAPS 




was their LoLT and their Home Language subject, whereas English was their First 
Additional Language subject and isiXhosa their Grade 1 to 3 SAL. In addition, Parent 
B, Educator B and Principal B had the following to say about the language policy at 
School B. 
 
Parent B categorised School B as a quintile 5 school with a middle-class income base 
parent corps, which noticed that language policy needs to be formulated along the 
lines of the community’s language preferences.   
 
Majority of the children in the school and in the feeder zone must receive 
preference. But despite of the medium of instruction, i.e. Afrikaans and 
English, there must be an additional African language which is spoken in 
the nearby environment, i.e. isiXhosa. And vice versa if possible.  
 
Parent B also emphasised the community’s language use and preferences as a 
determinant to formulate language policy. It is also noteworthy that Parent B viewed 
the inclusion of an African language as part of the language policy. Lastly, Parent B 
stated that the language policy needs to hinge on the importance of communication 
with each other, and rests on the firm belief that communication between the learner 
and the teacher is of great importance for a productive learning and teaching 
environment. It is not in the best interest of the learner to be taught in a language in 
which he/she does not understand the concepts that go with that language. Learners 
who are more fluent in the LoLT of School B will not be adversely affected by the 
implementation of the language policy, and vice versa. The principle of the language 
policy must not only be based on reasonable practice and the learner’s right to receive 
education in the language of his or her choice, but also should not discriminate against 
any learner on the basis of their language aptitude. For Educator B, the language 
policy of the school needs to “correspond with what the WCED and the National 
Education Department expects from them”. The language policy formulation process 
in public schools needs to happen with “cooperation with the subjects heads, SMT and 
the SGB”. According to Educator B, the language policy of the school furthers the 
notion that School B is equipped to meet the needs of an Afrikaans-speaking learner. 
Therefore, the needs assessment for language in education is based on this notion. 
According to this language policy, Principal B needs to keep record of any request to 
receive tuition in another language than the LoLT.  
 
Principal B commented that “95% of the learners in School B are Afrikaans”. It then 
logically follows that the language policy is formulated according to the learners’ 
mother tongue. The language policy of School B therefore indicates that the school 
operates in Afrikaans. Principal B also admitted that the language policy of School B 
was “according to FEDSAS, but the final product is their own”. According Principal B, 
FEDSAS helped them to construct a language policy. The speech community of 
School B is mainly Afrikaans, which justifies an Afrikaans-only language policy. There 




this study, been under any pressure from the HOD to change its language policy. 
Principal B said that each prospective learner has the right to education in his/her 
language of choice, but will also be co-dependent on the reasonable practicality of that 
language as the LoLT. Parents are the legal guardians and have the right to choose 
the language in which their child will be educated. The language policy of School B is, 
as mentioned, dedicated to teaching English as a language subject to promote 
multilingualism. School B and its SGB will go as far as possible to promote isiXhosa 
as another language subject that will provide the learners with basic use of the 
language. Lastly, School B will also go as far as possible to buy textbooks in English 
and isiXhosa to promote the use of these languages. 
 
School C has Mandarin as a third language or SAL, but this is optional and is provided 
as an extramural subject. The speech community of School C is mainly Afrikaans and 
there are a lack of schools with an English-only or dual-medium language policy. 
School C also has language subjects as required by the LiEP (DoE, 1997a), CAPS 
(DBE 2011a, 2011b) and IIAL (DBE, 2013). This means that Afrikaans was their LoLT 
and their Home Language subject, whereas English was their First Additional 
Language and isiXhosa their Grade 1 to 3 SAL. Therefore, School C promotes 
multilingualism through English as an FAL and Mandarin as an SAL.     
 
According to Educator C, the HOD had proposed a shift to a dual-medium language 
policy due to the inflow of black learners. School C rather decided to keep its current 
LoLT. Parent C also emphasised the community participation as a principal of their 
language policy. For parent C, the formulation of the language policy needs to be 
associated with the uniqueness of the respective school community. Educator C 
reasoned that “the problem with language policy formulation originates with the SGB”. 
However, Educator C added that “if this power is used according to the SASA and 
Constitution there would be no problem”. The medium of instruction must also 
“correspond with the language use in the community”. Principal C argued that the 
language policy of a public school must be formulated according to the Constitution, 
SASA, the Western Cape Schools Act and other regulations. Accordingly, the SGB is 
responsible for the medium of instruction and thus for the formulation and the revision 
of the school’s language policy. For Principal C, the policy needs to be communicated 
to the school community (learners, parents and staff) and inputs need to be gathered 









5.8 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter I presented the core research finding of this study. E-mail interviews 
with parents, educators and principals were undertaken to capture their views on the 
phenomena of language policy and governance in public schools. The two research 
methods sought to capture the perspectives of the two phenomena. How participants 
view the language policy in public schools does not necessarily mean that this is their 
SGB’s policy stance. However, this also does not mean their written language policy 
is nullified. It only indicates that a language policy has more elements to analyse. In 
the next chapter I will analyse these findings using the existing literature captured in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Multilingualism is promoted by the Constitution through the 
acknowledgement of 11 official languages (RSA, 1996b:4) and needs to be 
incorporated in language school’s language policies (DoE, 1997b:2). This logically 
necessitates that any school language policy, or other policy for that matter, must 



























This chapter presents the reader with an analysis of the findings that were introduced 
in Chapter 5. This analysis is guided by the central focus of the study, which is the 
interpretation of language policy and governance at three primary schools in the 
Western Cape. The findings will furthermore be analysed in accordance with the 
research methodology (Chapter 4) and in relation to the literature study (Chapters 2 
and 3). In analysing the data, attention will be focused on the following primary themes, 
as captured in the main and sub-research questions:  
1. Parental involvement and language policy formulation   
2. Democratic school governance and language policy  
3. The intervention of the HOD 
4. The assistance of deliberative democracy to mediate the tension between the 
HOD and the SGB. 
 
In this chapter, I draw upon a phenomenological paradigm in order to analyse the data 
in relation to the literature review (as discussed in Chapter 2), and the language policy 
(as discussed in Chapter 3). Thereafter, I pay due attention to the main research 
question, namely: Does governance and language policy in South African public 
schools provide an opportunity for deliberative democracy? 
 
6.2 Parental involvement in language policy formulation 
In Chapter 2, I highlighted the central importance of parents in relation to school 
governance, and their role in advancing a democratic agenda. One of these roles, 
which is the focus of this research, is the design and implementation of a school’s 
language policy. The particular significance of employing a phenomenological inquiry 
in this study highlights how parents, educators and principals interpret and 
conceptualise parental involvement in language policy formulation and implementation 
in public schools. Phenomenology allows the researcher to tap into the essence of 
parents’, educators’ and principals’ experience of parental involvement with regard to 
language policy formulation in the three sample schools.  
As mentioned in Chapter 4, School A and B are HAS, which continue to have the 
financial resources to employ additional staff and expand resources. It was also 
evident that these two schools enjoyed support from local businesses, which allowed 




Schools A and B had post-matric qualifications, and are employed in the formal sector. 
This allows them to bring a particular skills set to their function and role in the SGB. 
School C, however, is historically disadvantaged and continues to carry the burden of 
economic inequity, with many parents not having the capacity to contribute to their 
children’s learning, or to participate in the governance of the school. All the parents on 
the SGB had e-mail addresses, although I found that they did not respond to my initial 
e-mail in which I introduced my research.   
Educator C reported that there was a lack of involvement by parents, which made it 
difficult to get a real sense of the parents’ understanding and experience of the school, 
specifically in relation to the issue of language. Educator C confirmed that School C 
faced poverty and parents were less likely to participate in language policy formulation 
as a power of democratic school governance. While the three SGBs were required to 
implement the SA Schools Act (no. 84 of 1996) in the same way, and bring the same 
levels of expertise and competence to the functioning of the SGB, it was clear from 
the outset that the SGBs were not on an equal footing. The levels of knowledge and 
expertise in the SGBs of Schools A and B were different to those of School C. Hence, 
the experiences of these SGBs in terms of governance, and in terms of language 
policy formulation, were also different.  
SGB parents had to make sense of their own views of their involvement in formulating 
language policy according to the Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy 
Published in Terms of Section 6(1) of the South African Schools Act (DoE, 1997b:2) 
and the implementation thereof. The following stood out. Firstly, parents on the SGB 
indicated that their involvement in language formulation as an element of the larger 
project of school governance was important and necessary. This means that it is 
important and necessary to be an active member of the school entity, and any entity 
in South Africa for that matter. In this light, parent A said being an active member was 
meaningless if it did not contribute to the larger context of democratic participation. In 
other words, it would be counterproductive if active participation was not embedded in 
the democratic practices of are larger South African democracy. The inclusion of 
parents in decision-making and governance, as highlighted in Chapter 2, shows that 
they fulfil their functions better (Harber, 2004; Moggach, 2006:17, cited in Mncube, 
2009). In the above statement, fulfilling their functions “better” would mean that they 
will govern a school according to the provisions of SASA.  
However, if parents do not have the knowledge and skills to govern a school, or are 
uneducated overall, it is difficult for the SGB to fulfil its function. A new SGB had been 
elected at School C and it was the first time for some parents to govern a school. The 
interviews revealed uncertainties about their roles and functions, which, in turn, added 
to the role of the principal. Parent C stated that the parents in the SGB represented 
the best interest of the learners, but this was unattainable if parent-governors were 
unprepared to provide for this best interest. With the issue of language policy, the role 




learners and communities are, and what their language needs are, the SGB cannot 
serve the best interest of learners.    
Secondly, parents concentrated on the best interest of the learners when language 
policy was formulated and implemented, as experienced by Parent C. The emphasis 
on the best interest of the learner, argue Mncube et al. (2011:216), is that the 
involvement of parents could lead to better educational attainment, meaning that the 
parents of learners who are involved attain better results in their school life. This will 
directly lead to the benefit of the learner. The best interest of the child or learner can 
be traced back to section 28(2) as a constitutional provision in the Constitution (RSA, 
1996b:11), which, of course, raises important questions about what can be considered 
as the best interest of learners. One could thus ask: What is the best interest of the 
learners at Schools A, B and C, and of learners in general? How far does the concept 
of the “best interest” of a learner in terms of language policy reach? Every learner in 
general has different language needs, and this is not just limited to the learners of that 
particular school. The best interest of the learners with regard to their language needs 
articulates that learners deserve mother-tongue education. Governors, therefore, 
need to work together to ensure that this right is untarnished by not discriminating 
against certain racial and minority groups, as is prohibited by section 6(3) of SASA 
(RSA, 1996a:11), which states that the language policy of public schools must not 
discriminate racially.  
The Middelburg (Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departmentshoof: Mpumalanga 
Department van Onderwys en andere, 2002) and Seodin cases (Seodin Primary 
School and Others v MEC of Education Northern Cape and Others, 2005) showed us 
how important section 28(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:11) is when evaluating 
school governance in terms of language policy formulation. These two cases also 
highlighted that, when an SGB formulates its language policy according to the Norms 
and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) and SASA (RSA, 1996a:11), every learner’s language 
needs must be taken into consideration, and not only the learners in the school. What 
is meant by this is that the language policy formulation and implementation cannot be 
used to exclude learners who are not in the school. It became clear that parents 
serving on these SGBs are in a perfect position to tap into the school and community’s 
language needs.  
Following the above, Parents A, B and C maintained that they had the required 
knowledge and experience of their respective communities to make informed 
decisions about the language policy of their respective schools. They contended that 
the language policy of their respective schools mets the language needs of their 
communities and reflected the developing interests of their community. One cannot 
err the parents in their understanding of their role and functioning in relation to 
language policy formulation. They understand their mandate only as it relates to their 
specific schools – which is what SASA (RSA, 1996a) advocates. However, problems 
arise when their particular interpretations of the language policy are in fact not 




example, indicated that there was a general apathy among parents, which made it 
difficult for the SGB to have a real sense of the various language needs of the 
communities within the school. Likewise, Parents A and B had particular communities 
(and not all) in mind when they formulated the school’s language policy. It is important 
therefore to consider these experiences against the backdrop of language diversity in 
South Africa. Specifically, do SGBs take into account the language diversity that exists 
in their schools? Do they have a sense of promoting multilingualism, or are they only 
interested in serving the immediate needs of a specific community? The issue 
surrounding parental involvement in language policy formulation relates to their ability 
to help (aid) language policy formulation and, in doing so, reflects the basic interests 
of their community. It thus became clear that parents see their own involvement as a 
bottom-up approach to language policy and planning, which now includes a variety of 
stakeholders. When a policy process is as inclusive as this, an SGB is one step closer 
to matching their language policy with the multilingual South Africa.   
The formulation and implementation of a language policy requires specific expertise. 
None of the SGB parents interviewed revealed a clear sense of understanding 
language policy formulation, and certainly not in relation to a diverse and multilingual 
society. Parents, such as those on the SGBs of Schools A and B, might have particular 
skills and knowledge to govern a school, but they lack the expert skills to conceive and 
implement what the language policy requires. Because the education of parents on 
the SGB is insufficient (Mabasa & Themane, 2002; Van Wyk, 2004; Xaba, 2011), their 
is a possibility that parents could make use of the expertise of other parents. It is for 
this reason that Principal A thinks that the SGB ought to consist of expert people who 
have the total interest of the school community at heart and who represents the best 
possible education for their children.   
Research shows that the education of parents on the SGB is directly proportional to 
the output of school governance (Mabasa & Themane, 2002; Van Wyk, 2004; Xaba, 
2011), which shows that the SGBs of Schools A and B have an unfair advantage in 
school governance. The intention of this theme was partly to gain more information on 
how parental involvement could influence the act of language policy formulation and 
implementation. The lack of parent education in school governance could have an 
adverse effect on language policy formulation and implementation. The education of 
parents is not the only factor that influences school language policy formulation and 
implementation. The nature of the representation of parents will also have an effect on 
language policy formulation and implementation. In other words, if the language policy 
takes into account the needs or best interest of all its learners and communities, then 
the SGB has to engage with all of these speech communities.      
It is important, therefore, to pose the following questions: do parents on the SGB 
represent all parents of the school community, or do they only represent the dominant 
culture and a certain parent corps? This precipitates directly to the meaning of a 
“school community”. It seems as if the system created by SASA – a system in which 




social capital. In this system, an SGB represents the entire school community; 
however, this is not achievable in practice. In this sense, “school community” does not 
include all parents and learners, but only includes those who are directly represented 
by the parents. Therefore, what is not clear from Parents A, B or C, however, is 
whether there is any sense of more than one community within their respective 
schools. So, while their experience might be that they are indeed acting in the best 
interest of the learners by virtue of taking into account the needs of their community, 
there does not seem to be a sense or recognition of the possibilities of other 
communities that, in fact, might have a different view the school’s language policy. 
Parents with different agendas could lead to factions within the SGB, which could lead 
to parents only representing a fraction of the school community. Parent-governors can 
only formulate language policy in terms of their own children’s interests as opposed to 
those interests of every learner in the school or the wider school community. The 
implication is that there is always a party that is excluded when language policy is 
formulated, and it is mostly at the expense of the learners.   
Thirdly, another key finding with regard to parental involvement in relation to language 
policy formulation and implementation, as highlighted by Educator A, is that freedom 
of choice, and the power to live out one’s rights within the school context and the 
broader context of language policy-making, is important. Following the Constitution 
(RSA, 1996b), as well as the SA Schools Act (RSA, 1996a), parents have the right 
and freedom to insert their own perspective when the SGB is formulating language 
policy, as well as in their overall task of governing a school. Educator B prominently 
experienced that an SGB is a group of parents who seek to represent the entirety of 
the parent corps of the school. Educator B based his view on the ambitious SASA, 
which seeks to promote and represent every learner and parent of the school. 
Yet this does not always happen as planned: not all parents are represented by the 
SGB, as I showed in the second point above. In many instances, parents who 
represent the dominant group in a school are the ones, who serve on SGBs. Section 
23(9) of SASA (RSA, 1996b:32) states that the number of parent members of the SGB 
must be one more than the combined total of all the other members who are non-
parent members. This is a legal commitment to parent representation in the SGB. 
SASA binds itself institutionally to promote parent representation on the logic that 
parent members of the SGB represent the entire parent corps. But increasing the 
number of parents on the SGB does not correlate directly with representativeness of 
the entire parent corps.  
In other words, if an SGB consist of 12 people for a school of 1 200 learners – the 
principal, two educators, two non-teaching staff and six parents – it is highly unlikely 
that six parents will represent all of the approximately 2 000 parent voices. Moreover, 
the nomination and election process is such that, unless parents desire to see changes 
in a school – whether these pertain to language, or becoming more diverse – the same 
people, with the same interests will be elected onto SGBs. Minority groups, for obvious 




they so desire. This means that, while some parents, and hence some SGBs, are able 
to exercise their freedom and their choice in terms of language, other parents do not 
have this privilege. As a result, some parents have more freedom and choice than 
others.  
Fourthly, the institutional arrangements for the involvement of parents in school 
governance are found in the First (DoE, 1995), and Second (DoE, 1996) White Papers 
on Education, as well as SASA (RSA, 1996a). In the light of these policies, certain 
parents understood their involvement in formulating the language policy as a form of 
co-operative governance, viz. SASA’s “cooperative design” (Joubert & Van Rooyen, 
2011:302) and the partnership governance of State and SGB (RSA, 1996a:1). The 
parents interpret these policies as a form of co-operation among parents, and the 
school, and between the school and the state.   
Participation, as pointed out by Diamond and Morlino (2004), is of course a key factor 
in the creation of a democratic environment. Partnership and co-operation can lead to 
parents discussing their language policy interests with each other in an environment 
based on good faith. It is not clear whether every parent-governor is educated about 
language policy matters, and parents could be led emotionally when they must 
formulate a language policy. Partnership government is also an important key to the 
task of language policy formulation in public schools. The involvement of parents in 
the language formulation process could be strengthened through this possibility, 
because parties will work together to achieve a common goal or offer different and 
creative solutions to a common problem.  
 
6.3 Democratic school governance and language policy  
 
In Chapter 2, I showed that language policy formulation and implementation in public 
schools is not only a function, but also places the SGB in a position of power. In the 
ensuing section, a phenomenological inquiry aided me to understand if parents, 
educators and principals view language policy formulation and implementation as a 
function/power of democratic school governance, and also if they understand their role 
in this specific kind of school governance as it is stipulated in SASA. 
In this regard, and firstly, Parent C commented that language policy formulation and 
implementation as power/function of democratic school governance, is when the SGB 
has the same power as the WCED or any other provincial DBE. This response 
problematises language policy as a function/power of the SGB. Although Parent C 
was the only participant who responded in this manner, it still raises questions about 
the stance of the SGB and DBE towards language policy in public schools, and who 
the stakeholders are who should formulate language policy. This comment suggests 
that the SGB and DBE need to have the same power when formulating language 




what is meant by “power”, but one can discern that the power to govern a school and 
formulate language policy must be a collaborative effort.  
SASA states in section 16(1) and 6(2) (RSA, 1996a:11-32) that the governing of a 
school is solely vested in an SGB, and that the SGB may formulate language policy 
respectively. These two subsections of SASA never mention that the power to govern 
a school and to formulate language policy must be shared or distributed equally 
between government and the SGB. In Chapter 2, I mentioned that SASA decentralises 
school governance and seeks to create governance based on citizen participation, 
partnerships with the state, parents, learners and school staff, and community, and to 
devolve power to the individual school (Naidoo, 2005:29). It then follows that SGBs 
are democratic bodies due to the fact that members are elected, consist of a diversity 
of members, and comprise small-scale community participation. If the SGBs are 
naturally democratic entities, it also follows that any attempt to limit or equal their 
power to a second party could be labelled as undemocratic behaviour. In the light of 
the responses, it became clear that the participants valued democratic school 
governance and language policy formulation as a power/function of the SGB. There 
are certainly cases in which some members of the SGBs do not govern democratically 
and the HOD and other government parties have to take over that function or power. 
However, in Schools A, B and C, it seems from the reposes of the participants that 
these members have insight into school governance and language policy formulation 
that correspond with the Constitution (RSA, 1996b) and SASA (RSA, 1996a).   
To bind the notion of power to language policy formulation indicates, at least in theory, 
that an HOD and therefore the DBE cannot withdraw a power of an SGB, but only a 
function. In Chapter 2, I distinguished what could be seen as “powers” or “functions” 
of the SGB. To define language policy formulation as a power does not mean it is not 
a function, but to define language policy formulation in public schools as a function 
does not necessary mean it is a power. It has been argued by Malherbe (2010) that 
the reason why language policy formulation is a power and not a function is the 
provision made in section 6 of SASA, and that it does not fall under the functions in 
section 20 or 21. However, in the second Mikro case (Minister of Education (Western 
Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005), the SCA argued that, although 
language policy formulation does not fall under section 21 and, for that matter, under 
section 20 functions: 
That [there is] no basis for construing ‘function’ as restricted to functions 
allocated to the governing body in terms of s 21 was to be found in the Act. 
The word ‘function’ in s 22(1) referred to any of the functions allocated to a 
governing body in terms of the Act. It followed that any such function might, 
in terms of s 22, be withdrawn. There could be no doubt that governing 
bodies were entrusted with the power to determine a language and 
admission policy, but that did not detract from the fact that it was their 
function to determine these policies (Minister of Education (Western Cape) 




How is this then important for SGBs to fulfil their powers/functions democratically? 
One could easily ask: would democratic school governance be influenced by language 
policy being a power or a function? It is unclear from all the participants whether 
democratic school governance would be influenced if language policy formulation is 
seen as a power or a function. In addition, the participants’ views on democratic school 
governance and language policy formulation rather indicates that language policy 
formulation must be seen as part of the project of democratic school governance. 
Second, as Parent A pointed out, democratic school governance in terms of language 
policy formulation and implementation is a form of joint and active decision-making by 
many stakeholders. Diverse stakeholders, such as the SMT, SGB and parents on the 
SGB, can deliberate and make decisions that influence the school’s language policy. 
This brings us to the question of inclusivity. Who must be included in school 
governance in relation to language policy formulation? All stakeholders have to 
participate in order to democratise the education system along managerial lines (DoE, 
1995, 1996). Woolman and Fleisch (2008:50) argue that SGBs have an inclusive and 
participatory role, which fits into a larger project of participatory and direct democracy. 
But how can all parties participate, as commented by Educator A? Moreover, 
who/what decides which party or stakeholder must be part of school governance to 
formulate and implement language policy? The answer to these questions stems from 
section 23 of SASA (RSA, 1996b:29). This section explains who can be considered as 
members of the SGB.  
Are the members of the SGB the only stakeholders who may participate in 
policymaking and the implementation of language policy? If one takes the provisions 
in SASA (RSA, 1996a) into account, governance is only vested in the SGB, which 
means the members of the SGB as a collective unit. This concept of inclusion is not 
based on the inclusion of the entire parent community. Although Educator A 
commented that all parties need to be involved, in reality this does not happen. I could 
not detect any communication with the larger parent community at Schools A, B or C. 
School C reported having problems with parental involvement that has an effect on 
language policy formulation and implementation, as well as other policies. Decision-
making is seemingly limited to the members of the SGB, and not to the entire school 
community of the three schools. It is unclear how all parents can be involved in school 
governance and language policy formulation. The research participants did not 
indicate any collaboration with the rest of the parent community to formulate and 
implement language policy in these schools.   
Third, Parent B noted that democratic school governance hinges on the election of the 
SGB. This is noteworthy because every parent, educator and principal has the right 
and opportunity to participate in the election of members of an SGB. Therefore, the 
school community decides who the best candidate is to perform the functions of a 
member of the SGB. The entire school community except the learners can participate 
to elect the best possible representative. This representative stands in a relation of 




discussed in the previous theme, parents are required to have a particular skills set by 
virtue of the roles and responsibilities of serving on the SGB. It is unclear on which 
basis parents are nominated – that is, whether the prerequisite knowledge is taken 
into account. In other words, it is unclear whether parents are adequately aware of 
what is required of them on the SGB, and the enormous responsibility and power that 
the SGB has in terms of policy formulation. It is also unclear whether notions of 
inclusive responsibility are taken into account so that all communities of learners are 
represented on the SGB.  
Fourth, democratic school governance stems from provisions made in SASA and other 
applicable laws and policies, as mentioned by Parents A and C. In this case, I refer to 
how laws and other policies are set up. The policies and laws I am about to mention 
guide language policy formulation and implementation in public schools. These 
documents are the Constitution (RSA, 1996b), SASA (RSA, 1996a), NEPA (RSA, 
1996c), LiEP (DoE, 1997a), C2005 (DoE, 1997c), Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b) 
and NCS (DBE, 2002) and CAPS (DBE, 2011a, 2011b). It was clear that Parents A, B 
and C had knowledge of the Constitution and SASA. It was for this reason that they 
believed that school governance could only be democratic when this governance was 
according to these policies, but specifically SASA section 6(2) (RSA, 1996a:11), and 
then of course according to the Constitution, section 29(2) (RSA, 1996b:11). In 
Chapter 2 and 3 I discussed these policies and laws with regard to language policy in 
public schools.     
 
6.4 Role and intervention of the HOD 
 
In Chapter 2, I discussed that democratic school governance is vested in an SGB, 
which has certain functions and powers. One of these powers in public schools is 
language policy formulation. I also referred to what the powers of a provincial HOD 
are, and what his/her role is towards school policies. It is unlikely, however, that any 
of the participants would have had any direct contact with the HOD. HODs do not 
engage with schools in a direct fashion. Instead, communication and engagement (in 
terms of leadership, management and governance) occur via hierarchical structures 
of district-based circuit managers, who are situation within the pillars of institution, 
management and governance (IMG). Principals, therefore, engage with circuit 
managers, who engage with the head of IMG, who reports to the director of the District 
Office, who, in turn, reports to the respective provincial HOD. Given the numerous 
legal cases that have thus far centred on language policy issues in South African public 
schools – for e.g.: 
1. Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga 




2. Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and Another v Minister of Education, 
Western Cape and Others, 2005 (3) SA 504 (C) 
3. Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body 
(140/2005) [2005] ZASCA 66 
4. High School Ermelo and Another v Head of Department Mpumalanga 
Department of Education and Others (3062/2007) [2007] ZAGPHC 232 (17 
October 2007) 
5. Head of Department : Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v 
Hoërskool Ermelo and Another (CCT40/09) [2009] ZACC 32; 2010 (2) SA 415 
(CC) ; 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC) (14 October 2009) 
6. Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga and Others (219/2008) [2009] ZASCA 22; 2009 (3) SA 422 (SCA) 
; [2009] 3 All SA 386 (SCA) (27 March 2009) 
7. Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education 
Gauteng Province 2018 JDR 0005 (GP) 
 
I was, however, interested in gaining insights into how the research participants 
understood the role and responsibility of the HOD in relation to the stipulations of 
SASA, with a specific focus on the design and implementation of a school’s language 
policy. In Chapter 2, I stated that the HOD has a role with regard to school governance 
and language policy formulation. According to SASA section 2(2) (RSA, 1996a:6), the 
powers of the HOD and MEC are the following: 
… A Member of the Executive Council and a Head of Department must 
exercise any power conferred upon them by or under this Act, after taking 
full account of the applicable policy determined in terms of the National 
Education Policy Act, 1996 (Act No. 27 of 1996). 
As a starting point, the power of the HOD (or State) is limited by this section of SASA, 
while an SGB is empowered by SASA sections 20, 21, 6, 8, 9 (RSA, 1996a). This 
statement is corroborated by the wording of section 2(2), which explicitly mentions that 
an HOD must take into account the policy of the school that the SGB has formulated 
before making decisions: it is for this reason that section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 
1996a:23) empowers the SGB to govern a school and formulate school policies such 
as the language policy, admission policy and religious policy (RSA, 1996a). This 
applies if the SGB has the capacity to govern a school and fulfilling its 
functions/powers/responsibilities as it is stipulated in SASA (RSA, 1996a). As I 
mentioned in Chapter 2, there are many challenges that cause an SGB to be 
dysfunctional, viz. parental education (Mabasa & Themane, 2002:112; Van Wyk, 
2004:53; Xaba, 2011: 201) and the power relations of stakeholders (Heystek, 
2004:309). One cannot say which party has the most power; according to Joubert and 
Van Rooyen (2011:302), SASA is designed co-operatively, embodying a 
“compromise” between a “centralized and decentralized system”. Smit (2011:403) 




governance. The concept of in “partnership with the State” occurs in the preamble to 
SASA (RSA, 1996a:1). It is now clear that there is no monopoly of power in school 
governance with regard to language policy.     
As stated in Chapter 2, the intervention envisioned by the HOD may only take place 
according to sections 22 and 25 of SASA (RSA, 1996a:31-35). It is important to note 
that these two sections limit the power of the HOD because he/she is not supposed to 
intervene outside these sections. Broadly speaking, section 22 states that an HOD 
may withdraw any function of the SGB under certain circumstances, with necessary 
and prior communication (RSA, 1996a:31). Section 25 states that, when an SGB has 
failed to fulfil any function that is delegated to it by SASA, the HOD may appoint 
sufficient persons to fulfil such functions for no longer than three months (RSA, 
1996a:35). However, past actions, such as those implemented by the HOD against 
schools, such as the Middelburg case (Laerskool Middelburg en ‘n ander v 
Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van Onderwys en andere, 2002:171, 
172 and 176), the second Mikro case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 66) and Overvaal (Governing Body, 
Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018:48), 
show how the provincial DBE has acted outside of the parameters of SASA. I further 
look at the perspectives of research participants to illuminate the role of the HOD with 
regard to language policy formulation.   
Parents A and B are in agreement that precautions can avoid the intervention of the 
HOD in school governance and language policy formulation. Firstly, according to 
Parent A, because an HOD is in an administrative and political post, he/she does not 
have the necessary contextual knowledge to formulate language policy. Contextual 
knowledge is necessary to formulate a language policy that best suits the learners and 
school community. This specific form of knowledge includes the language needs of 
the learners, the teaching and learning space, parents education and preferences, as 
well as the skill level of the educators. An SGB is better positioned socially to formulate 
language policy than the HOD. One therefore can infer that an SGB has particular 
knowledge of, and insights into, its school community, which the HOD would not 
necessarily have. In this regard, Parent B argued that the HOD must do a situation 
analysis before he/she could even think of intervening in school governance and 
language policy formulation. This situation analysis would supply the District Office 
with information about the context of a potential problem, on which they could then 
report back to the HOD. 
Parent B emphasised that, if an SGB “runs smoothly”, there is no reason for the HOD 
to intervene. He added that, if stakeholders are “happy”, the HOD need not intervene. 
In this case it is difficult to determine what is meant by “smoothly” or “happy”, as these 
are subjective notions. It is also unclear if one could interpret this as an SGB fulfilling 
its functions according to SASA (RSA, 1996a). However, the word “smoothly” with 
regard to the mechanics of an SGB and language policy formulation could denote a 




that the current functionality of the SGB entails behaviour that would not attract 
intervention by the HOD. This functionality would then refer to the SGB fulfilling its 
functions and responsibilities according to SASA (RSA, 1996a).       
Secondly, Parent B, on the other hand, focused on the role of the HOD. According to 
him, the HOD may only intervene in times of crisis, which means that there have to be 
significant and physical signs of ill-governance. Participants identified “time of crises” 
with regard to language policy and school governance as language policy that 
discriminates against learners, an admission policy that excludes learners in terms of 
language and race, the disempowerment of learners and members of the SGB, 
mismanagement, irregularities (in terms of finance), democratic rights, disobeying law 
and policies. The role of the HOD will then be to follow sections 22 and 25 according 
to SASA (RSA, 1996a:1-35). In the light of the role and function of the HOD, Parent C 
from School C argued that the HOD should always be in control. Furthermore, if there 
are power imbalances between the SGB and the HOD, the notion of co-operative 
governance would not be furthered. I hereby argue the HOD could possibly serve as 
a leader for governance in South African schools. This could only happen if the two 
parties respect each other, which would form part of sound communication and 
deliberation. 
Co-operative governance implies that there is a sound relationship between the DBE 
and the SGB, in which the DBE respect the rights of the SGB as contained in SASA 
(RSA, 1996a), and vice versa. Respect does not mean that the HOD never intervenes 
per se: respect only refers to the way in which he/she intervenes. It rather means that 
the HOD has a set of functions and responsibilities that are applicable to all the schools 
and SGBs across the province, which in this case is the Western Cape. It is thus the 
responsibility of the HOD to intervene in the governance of public schools (i.e. 
withdraw a function) not if he/she sees it fit, but rather on “reasonable grounds”, and 
when the HOD has “informed” the SGB of his/her intention and reasons for the 
withdrawal (RSA, 1996a:31). To “inform” an SGB does not correspond with the notion 
of deliberative democracy, because there is no form of argumentation about the 
dispute, which indicates that deliberation ought to be from two sides and not only from 
the side of the HOD. Additionally, the fact that section 22 allows an SGB to make 
representations with reasonable opportunity cannot be a cornerstone of a deliberative 
democracy (RSA, 1996a: 1-35). Deliberation is a free and open act, and an SGB must 
be given the opportunity to freely deliberate and argue for its point of view during this 
process, and not afterwards. It seems as though the SGB must do something under 
enormous pressure, which will take wilfulness and consent out of consideration.  
The past shows us that the notion of respect is also too narrow to define the 
relationship between the SGB and the provincial HOB from the point of view of the 
SGB. This also brings into question the nature of the intervention by the provincial 
HOD and the role it plays in school governance. If we look at case law, and perhaps 
the second Mikro case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School 




Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van Onderwys en andere, 2002), 
Ermelo (Hoërskool Ermelo and Another v Head of Department of Education: 
Mpumalanga and Others, 2009) and Overvaal (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal 
v Head of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018) -cases, it seems as if 
the HOD uses section 29(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b) as a smokescreen for 
political influence. An HOD is appointed by a provincial government, which is ruled by 
a certain party: due to party affiliation, an HOD is expected to have certain virtues and 
act in a certain way, which could be in contrast to any law and statute and to the benefit 
of the political party. Political influence thus has the power to curb and destroy 
democratic school governance as it is vested in the SGB with regard to language 
policy.   
It is for the above reason that the rule of law is of the utmost importance when the role 
and function of the HOD within school governance is considered. It came to my 
attention that the participants valued the Constitution and SASA (RSA, 1996a), which 
could lead to mutual respect. However, the past has shown us that the relationship 
between the HOD and his/her team and the SGB may vary. On the one hand, the SGB 
has the right to govern a school. Although this is a right, it is limited by sections 22 and 
25 of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b). In the cases of Middelburg (Laerskool Middelburg 
en ‘n ander v Departementshoof, Mpumalanga Departement van Onderwys en 
andere, 2002), the first Mikro case (Governing Body, Mikro Primary School and 
Another v Minister of Education, Western Cape and Others, 2005), the second Mikro 
case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 
2005), second Ermelo case (Head of Department : Mpumalanga Department of 
Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 2009) and Overvaal case 
(Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head of Department of Education Gauteng 
Province, 2018), the HOD and his/her team abused his/her right to withdraw the 
function to formulate language policy and employed sufficient people to take over this 
function. This function could only be withdrawn if the SGB failed to fulfil the function, 
which in this case did not happen. It is thus too narrow to link respect to the intervention 
by the HOD. The HOD can respect the SGB and still intervene, because it is his/her 
right. Disrespect for the relationship, or just for the SGB in general, is rather something 
that comes forth when an HOD allows political influence to determine his/her course 
of action. Further disrespect would be that this influence could harm the functionality 
of the SGB with regard to language policy development. 
Thirdly, the number of years a member has served on the school’s SGB does not 
translate directly into better functionality of the SGB when its formulate a language 
policy. Language policy formulation with regard to the Norms and Standards (DoE, 
1997b:2) requires a deep and intense analysis of the language situation in a school. 
Language policy formulation is directly related to the “nearest school principle”, as 
noted by Principal A, which means that a language policy ought to answer to the 
language needs of the community. According to Principal A, the role of the HOD will 
be to allocate learners to schools despite the medium of instruction. Educator C 




Parent C, the child is influenced negatively. It is thus clear that Parent C thinks the 
HOD must have the best interest of the learners at heart, as in terms of section 28(2) 
of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:11). The principle of legality and the concept rule of 
law does not provide the full answer. Because an HOD does not deal with every school 
in his constituency or province, it is debateable how he/she regards the best interests 
of every learner in the province. However, as I showed in Chapter 3, the best interest 
of the learners with regard to language policy formulation could be a smokescreen for 
political influence, meaning that they could, possibly, use the wellbeing of the learners 
for personal gain. Therefore, when it comes to the empowerment of learners, the HOD 
ought to have the best interest of the learners at heart, but this is impossible. When 
the HOD promotes the interest of a school, there are always schools that are left 
behind. So an HOD should empower the learners by revoking the SGB’s function and 
employing people to fulfil that function if the SGB neglects the interest of the learner 
corps of the school. 
Fourthly, as Parent C noted, the HOD and the DBE must hold workshops to educate 
governors with regard to language policy formulation. The provincial DBE has 
induction training for newly elected members of the SGB. Furthermore, sporadic 
training sessions are provided during the year to which SGBs are invited. FEDSAS 
also supplies SGBs with training that has the potential to better the functionality of the 
SGB. FEDSAS is an active entity that wishes to promote quality school governance. 
It is unclear if the training received from it is enough to guide language policy 
formulation. Parent C noted that it is necessary for the provincial DBE to hold 
“workshops”. The reason why this is important is for communication and deliberation 
between the provincial DBE and SGBs. In these training sessions, the DBE could 
communicate and deliberate with the SGBs on what they expect from the SGBs, and 
vice versa.    
 
6.5 School governance and deliberative democracy 
 
Deliberative democracy is a direct form of democracy in which there is an emphasis 
on deliberation/argumentation, which has a profound impact on decision-making 
(Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). This theme emerged through asking participants how 
deliberative democracy could assist SGBs in mediating the tension between SGBs 
and the HOD office with regard to school governance and language policy formulation. 
Issues with school governance and language policy in schools refer to problems 
relating to the autonomy of SGBs and interference in democratic school governance. 
Participants started with what they defined as deliberative democracy. All the 
participants defined deliberative democracy as “communication”, which indicates a 
more inclusive act than deliberation. However, the participants differed on how they 
understood “communication”. To start with, I used Rostbøll’s (2001:166) definition of 




democracy and its legitimacy lies in public deliberation. To further deliberative 
democracy as a concept, I argued that deliberation is the rational justification of 
argumentation (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004:3; Smith, 2011). Young (2001) furthers 
this notion by arguing that communication rather than argumentation or deliberation 
needs to be at the core of deliberative democracy. The reason she gives is that 
argumentation could be mutually exclusive (Young, 2001:56). The responses of the 
participants showed an openness to dialogue in which one can talk freely about 
differences and exchange thoughts and insights about educational matters: in this 
case it would be language policy formulation. Language policy formulation could only 
be democratic if there were collaborative decision-making that sprouts from a form of 
deliberation. This is what SASA envisions to do (RSA, 1996a). In the light of this 
information it is too narrow to view language policy formulation as exclusively the 
responsibility of the SGB. It suggests that there must be co-operation and collaboration 
to formulate language policy in public schools. 
A communicative democracy is an expansion of the logic of a deliberative democracy 
(Young, 2001). Participants were able to identify communication as a free and equal 
act through which they can talk about their differences in an open fashion. Deliberation 
is sometimes seen as an exclusive form of interaction: in the communicative model, 
every voice is included because argumentation implies a certain form of interaction 
that could exclude those who do not want to argue about certain aspects. When one 
is communicating to solve conflict or tension, one asks the other why he/she holds a 
specific view. In the light of this, it seems that communication is unhindered because 
the other always asks why a person holds a certain point of view, and the process is 
reciprocal.  
Deliberation presumes something that is to be argued. If deliberative democracy is to 
solve language policy-formulation issues, deliberation as such must also be valued. 
Deliberation must be both constitutive and have a mediating ability leading to virtues 
actions. This, in essence, correlates with the distinction Rostbøll (2001:169) makes 
between procedural and substantive deliberative democracies. As Parent A noted, 
deliberation solves problems, and questions the moral foundation of communication 
or deliberation. Deliberative democracy therefore will lead to positive outcomes as a 
language policy is deliberated. For positive outcomes in language policy to be 
reached, parties need to have mutual respect. It is unclear what Parent B meant with 
mutual respect. Mutual respect, in this response, can imply that one listen to the other 
about two things, namely language inputs and how multilingualism needs to be 
promoted at the domestic and community level.  
Secondly, deliberation is used as a medium to transmit virtues like “good relationships, 
transparency, honesty, mutual respect and inclusive participation”, according to 
Parent B. Parent C also mentioned an equal opportunity to deliberate and 
communicate with each other. It is unclear if these parents implied a predestined 
consensus witch is in all honesty not necessary for deliberation but could benefit 




concept of consensus i.e. dissensus, which does not necessary imply the “best 
argument”. If parties argue from the same virtues, they would want the same or the 
best for a school and its learners. If there is a common problem such as who ought to 
set language policy in schools, the parties need to consider this problem from the 
common virtues, as argued by Parent B. If these virtues are respected, the parties 
would attempt to solve the common problem. Educator A argued that the Constitution 
(RSA, 1996b) must be the grounding principle for deliberation as a value-orientated 
endeavour. The Constitution (RSA, 1996b) focuses on the following virtues:  
 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded 
on the following values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. 
(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections 
and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness (RSA, 1996b:3).  
 
If these virtues are to be respected, one would not only mediate language policy 
problems easier, it would foster virtues that welcomes continues unconstrained 
deliberative action. This does not always have to mean that a problem is solved as 
such or decision is made, but to communicate and deliberate freely, in advance of a 
problem, could already imply a problem that is solved. Therefore, it came to the fore 
that virtues such as respect would lead to a better situation in which deliberate action 
could flourish. Thirdly, Educator C made an interesting point when he argued that 
deliberative democracy would aid SGBs and the office of the HOD to not view court 
proceedings as an option initially. It is true that a court could give a fresh and legitimate 
perspective to issues pertaining to language policy formulation and school 
governance. However, I agree with this educator that court cases in which schools are 
involved make a spectacle of the education sector. It could lead to a public that is ill-
informed and that thrives on sensation, and who do not share values that would 
increase the capability of a deliberative democracy. Deliberation and communication 
are then proposed by Educator C and other participants as means to transcend issues 
that arise in language policy formulation and school governance. To begin with issues 
of language policy formulation and school governance per se, would not even be a 
“problem” if there was a culture of deliberative action. In this case, like I mentioned 
before, deliberative democracy would lead to common virtues which does not 
necessarily lead to consensus i.e. where there is agreement, but could in all awe lead 
to dissensus which would promote debate and further deliberation.      
 
According to the aforementioned perspective, this tension was created by new 




to go to court before they were forced to do what the educational authorities wanted 
them to do (Clase et al., 2007:249). The Basic Education Laws Amendment Bill (DBE, 
2017) is new legislation that seeks to curb the power of SGBs. This could have adverse 
effects on the relationship between an HOD and an SGB and cause further tension. 
Another important factor highlighted by Le Roux and Coetzee (2001:42, cited in Clase 
et al., 2007:250), is the expectation that the DBE creates when it introduces a policy 
the actual implementation thereof. Karlsson (1998:45, cited in Clase et al., 2007:250) 
says that there are no formal mechanisms through which to build the relationships as 
SASA (RSA, 1996a) seeks to promote. 
Another benefit of deliberation rather than a court case, for example, is the cost-
effectiveness of deliberation. The absence of deliberative democracy will lead to a 
court case, which according to Educator B does not benefit education and causes a 
spectacle. The media could portray a false image of what happens in schools, or a 
false image of the relationship between an SGB and the HOD. The HOD of the 
provincial DoE does not have contextual knowledge about the school and could only 
receive more information if he/she participates in deliberation. Principal C also iterated 
that discussions and consultations may have fruitful outcomes if minority groups are 
included. The inclusion of minority groups will lead to a democratic situation.  
Using phenomenological inquiry, deliberation means that every participant comes to 
the discussion with his/her own language, beliefs and experience. This influences 
deliberation because everybody has a different value and virtue structure that guides 
their experiences and points of view. This means every participant experiences 
language and language policy differently. Each participant is embedded in a system 
of intentionality and a horizon of experience that is the context of their view (Van 
Niekerk & Rossouw, 2006:19). Context helps to understand why certain people have 
the views they have about language. It is in the light of the above discussion that I 
deduce that deliberation will bring these creative views about language policy together. 
Deliberative democracy cannot only assist the SGBs relationship with the HOD but 
can foster a deliberative culture where deliberation and debate is welcome. However, 
the scope of the research only allows me to report what the SGB and the participants 
can do from their side to improve their relationship with regard to language policy and 
school governance.   
During the interviews with the participants it became clear that they respected 
deliberative democracy as a solution to the tension that could possibly exist between 
the HOD and an SGB with regard to language policy. Participants interpreted 
deliberation as a form of communication. Communication refers to something more 
than rational argumentation of points of view. In the past, tension between the HOD 
and SGB usually occurred when a party felt threatened. This may lead to situations 
that could harm the learners and members of the SGB. The tension between SGBs 
and the HOD with regard to language policy is superficial, because it is created by 
individuals when they struggle to find common ground with minority groups. In this 




problem would imply that parties have the opportunity to work together to solve that 
problem. But parties need to have a willingness to solve conflict: they must be willing 
to set aside differences to be better off than an alternative (Warntjen, 2010:667). This 
is not to say that this one party will hold a “better argument” than the other, or the 
“better argument” would be the objective goal of all conflict.    
Bohman (1996, cited in Pellizzoni, 2001:75) asserts that deliberation could be a 
solution to deep-lying problems. Secondly, the participants believed that deliberation 
as a form of communication and discussion was healthy: healthy deliberation will then 
lead to a future where there are no hidden agendas, meaning they will always know 
where they “stand with each other”. Participants showed a commitment to deliberative 
democracy, even if there was no problem that needed to be resolved. In this regard, 
Principal B noted that regular communication with the HOD or provincial DoE is a form 
of a healthy relationship. So, too, Principal A made it clear that co-operation would 
necessarily lead to the best interests of the learner. Therefore, participants viewed 
communication (as a two-way street) as important to foster good relationship between 
the DoE (HOD) and an SGB. The participants’ responses articulated the inherent and 
bona fide nature of deliberative democracy: through their responses, the participants 
implied that, if they kept their word and accepted the responsibility, the bona fide 
nature of deliberative democracy would prevail. Because I used e-mail interviews, the 
participants had the opportunity to reassess their responses: this gave open 
responses that are practical examples of their commitment to deliberative democracy. 
One therefore could argue that the participants valued a shared and common virtue 
such as “openness”.  
The question led to the acknowledgement of the same problem, i.e. tension between 
an SGB and the HOD with regard to language policy. Responses showed that 
“openness”, “willingness” and “respect” to work towards a contextual agreement 
belonged to a deeper appreciation of an understanding and acceptance of multiple 
arguments. As Parent B stated, “open communication” and respect for each other’s 
views are important to reach an agreement with regard to language policy in public 
schools. In this regard, every school is in a unique situation and relationship with the 
provincial DoE and therefore HOD: a contextual agreement will then suffice (Pellizzoni, 
2001:80). The body of court cases with regard to language policy and school 
governance will only serve as a guideline to help the SGB in its pursuit of deliberative 
democracy in this sample. Deliberative democracy will aid SGBs to reach agreement, 
which will require common virtues to solve common problems with regard to school 
governance and language policy. Yet again, court cases in the past showed both the 
SGBs’ and HOD’ inability to consider common problems from a common value 
structure.       
Educator A mentioned that deliberation can lead to more informed and “better” 
decision-making. Deliberation is beneficial for various reasons, viz. it could be used as 
both a means to an end and an end in itself. This, as mentioned above, implies a 




framework of Chapter 2 revealed an analysis of the term “consensus”: it suggests a 
contextual agreement. For informed and “better” decision-making, Educator A 
suggests that one has to consider contextual reasons and justifications that would be 
would lead to a ‘relative’ consensus which support unique school-based contexts.   
“Reasonable discussion” will lead to fruitful insights regarding the relationship between 
the HOD and the SGB. Therefore, the participants view that deliberative democracy is 
a solution to this type of tension. Parent A emphasised that “dialogue” is a solution to 
tension: in this way, deliberation is a means to foster reciprocity. Deliberative 
democracy leads to shared virtues, such as respect, good relationships and 
transparency, honesty and inclusive participation, but it must be grounded in “rules 
and regulation”, i.e. the rules of engagement. Therefore, as Pellizzoni (2001:80) 
argues, deliberation is the transference of common values and virtues. Mutual goals 
could also lead to consensus. Deliberation will empower parents and the SGB to 
equalise power imbalances, where parents – as representatives of the SGB – will have 
the same bargaining power as the HOD. 
Educators collectively emphasised the “persuasion” of a party, which implies that the 
“better argument” will lead to better decision-making, as noted by Risse (2000, cited 
in Warntjen, 2010: 670). This persuasion works via an understanding of each other’s 
points of view, which creates a “win-win” situation. One can only convince another 
person once they understand your point of view. In this case, the HOD and the SGB 
need to deliberate if, as Educator A noted, virtues are to be upheld according to the 
Constitution (RSA,1996b). A third-party mediator could possibly be an answer to 
conflict, but as Educator C noted, deliberation will necessarily lead to a situation in 
which parties do not need to go to court, even though Gale (1999: 397, cited in 
Ncgobo, 2012:185) states that judges become co-writers and even produce new 
formulations of language policy through “inter-discursive struggle”.  
Principals A, B and C experienced parental involvement as a solution to tensions that 
may arise between an HOD and SGB by using deliberation and discussion. I will 
highlight the importance of deliberative democracy in the next few themes, but 
preliminary thoughts on deliberation provide an opportunity for growth in a relationship 
or partnership. The involvement of parents in the language formulation process could 
be strengthened with this possibility, because parties will work together to achieve a 
common goal or give different and creative solutions to a common problem. An 
example of a common problem could be the relationship between the HOD and the 
SGB, and a possible way to resolve that problem would be to create opportunities to 
deliberate and to discuss issues relating to language policy formulation in public 
schools. 
In this discussion it becomes clear that deliberative democracy is valued for the 
unrestrained debate it fosters. A tension between a HOD and an SGB are only evident 
because a deliberative culture is absent. This directly leads to respect. If these parties 
do not respect each other, it would be difficult to deliberate and debate in the fist place. 




could deliberate freely with mutual respect and other virtues. Participants mainly saw 
deliberative democracy as a “means” to resolve of “mediate” conflict which is 
problematic for the task of deliberation and deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy is inherently good i.e. it could lead to the good life. Therefore, deliberation 
can be seen “means” to resolve conflict or tension but is not limited to it. Parties must 
rather strive for active engagement with one another than to depend on their individual 
rights as an SGB and HOD as such, evoking legalistic action. Although, SASA 
provides a framework for the rights and responsibilities of an SGB and HOD in 
particular, this does not make them less equal within a debate. Every deliberative 
action rests on equality and involves active participation and engagement.  Parties 
could have different views which will inevitably lead to dissensus, but would cultivate 
further debate. Therefore, the term “consensus” is not the idea behind deliberative 
democracy. Rather, an SGB and the HOD must focus on active engagement and 
seeking to “find each other” on an agreement that is based on disagreement.   
 
6.6 Policy analysis 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, I use a phenomenological inquiry to understand 
“governance” and “language policy”, i.e. to bracket these phenomena and focus on 
the participants’ experiences of language policy in the three sample schools. Bernstein 
(1976, cited in Dryzek, 1982:322) argue that a phenomenological inquiry could be 
reconciled with a policy analysis by reconstructing lived spaces and describing 
phenomena. Neale (2016, cited in McIntosh & Wright, 2019:4) and Wright (2016, cited 
in McIntosh & Wright, 2019:4) confirm that the concept “lived experience” has been 
used in social policy to encapsulate subjective experiences in empirical inquiry. The 
intended policies I look at in this policy analysis starts with the Norms and Standards 
(DoE, 1997b:2), and then spills over to the use of section 6 of SASA (RSA, 1996a:11) 
and ultimately the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:4).  
I chose the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) as the policy to analyse because it 
is the only policy document that offers information on how an SGB must formulate 
language policy in schools. It mentions that, when SGBs formulate language policy, 
they first need to give adherence to the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:14-15), and then 
describe how they intend to promote multilingualism with the language policy, what 
language subjects they will have, and what language programmes they will be using 
(DoE, 1996b:2). I ventured further to ask how each participant views the Norms and 
Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) as an instantiation of the language policy of their own 
school. This includes the perspectives of the participants and how they think their 
school language policy will promote multilingualism. Each participant from the same 
school will have a different perspective, because this perspective is not localised within 
the actual language policy of the school. Therefore, I did not view the language policies 




policy would promote multilingualism. As articulated in Chapters 4 and 5, the Norms 
and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) provide an overarching horizon and principles on which 
each participant’s experience of their language policy rests. The Norms and Standards 
in relation to a school’s language policy aided me in capturing creative insights into 
how the participants perceive these norms.   
A description of phenomena already evaluates what it describes. When one is 
describing a phenomenon, one is already evaluating what the phenomenon appears 
to be within consciousness and what that phenomena are excludes when essential 
and positive meaning is created. Thus, when a phenomenological inquiry is employed, 
one is looking at how “language policy” and “school governance” manifest in policy 
practice – specifically as implemented by SGBs. Phenomenological inquiry can 
evaluate a policy by analysing the thought or consciousness behind that policy. This 
will then seek to find the thought and architecture behind a language policy, i.e. the 
policy intention.   
The intention of the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) is to provide an outline of 
what is expected nationally from SGBs with regard to language policy. In essentialist 
terms, the intention of this policy is based on the need for the SGB to provide sufficient 
proof of how it will promote multilingualism. To start with, South Africa has a 
Constitutional commitment towards multilingualism in education. This is proven by 
section 29(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:15). If every learner in this country has 
the right to be educated in his/her language of choice, and the LoLT of every public 
school in South Africa must be an official language, according to the LiEP (DoE, 
1997a:1), the expectation of members of society would be to receive this education. 
However, if one looks at case law regarding school governance and language policy 
in public schools, it seems as if this is not the case. Judging from the amount of case 
law that exists in South Africa with regard to language policy, it seems as if South 
Africa has a deeply divided society when it comes to the acknowledgement of official 
languages.  
The norms also suggest that SGBs must state how they intend to promote 
multilingualism in their language policy more clearly. The fact that the Norms and 
Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) only state that an SGB must indicate how it intends to 
promote multilingualism and does not provide methods to do it, is a problem. There 
are no visible guidelines on how SGBs must go about promoting multilingualism in 
their language policy. And even if it did, the policy also does not indicate what 
supplementary and advisory actors must be involved in formulating language policy in 
schools, e.g. PANSALB. One could definitely argue that an SGB does not necessarily 
have the same language skills and knowledge as a language advisory body. 
Therefore, SGBs are vulnerable in language policy formulation, and this creates 
opportunity for parties to misuse the governance of SGB with regard to language 
policy. It seems as if the norm is to settle disputes over issues of governance and 




The Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:3) seeks to endanger the democratic fibre of 
an SGB: 
(2) Where there are less than 40 requests in Grades 1 to 6, or less than 35 
requests in Grades 7 to 12 for instruction in a language in a given grade not 
already offered by a school in a particular school district, the head of the 
provincial department of education will determine how the needs of those 
learners will be met, taking into account [inter alia] – 
…(e) the advice of the governing bodies and principals of the public schools 
concerned. [My own emphasis] (DoE, 1997b: 4) 
This means that the DBE “will determine how [these] learners’ needs will be satisfied” 
and they will only “take into account” the mere “advice of the governing bodies”. This 
jeopardises the SGB’s right to set its own language policy (in terms of section 6(2) of 
SASA). Therefore, this extract poses a threat for the autonomy of the SGB to set 
language policy. 
Additionally, the Norms indicate collaboration between the SGB and the provincial 
HOD and DBE:  
the governing body of the school [in consultation] with the relevant 
provincial authority determines the language policy of the new school in 
accordance with the regulations promulgated in terms of section 6(1) of the 
South African Schools Act, 1996 (Own emphasis) (DoE, 1997b:5). 
According to section 6(2) of SASA, the SGB of a public school has the authority to set 
a public school’s language policy, subject to the Constitution and any other provincial 
law. Section 6(1) of SASA states that the Minister of Education may determine norms 
and standards for language policy in public schools. The understanding of this section 
is that the norms and LiEP (DoE, 1997a) must be dependent on section 6 of SASA. 
However, deliberative democracy might not only prevent parties from going to the 
courts, but could foster common virtues with regard to language policy formulation in 
the South African education sector. Common virtues will not only affect decision-
making, but also change the outcome of certain policy disputes. A constitutional 
commitment to language policy formulation in public schools is an institutional step 
towards deliberative democracy. Given that the Constitution hinges on principles like 
human dignity, equality, freedom, non-sexism/non-racism , rule of law, openness, 
accountability and responsiveness (RSA, 1996b:3), it is compulsory for other policies 
to contain the same logic. Deliberative democracy promotes the same virtues. 
Therefore, a policy that rests upon the Constitution opens a new opportunity for 
deliberative democracy. The likelihood of incorporating deliberative practices in 
language policy formulation in South African public schools hinges on an analysis of 
LPP (language policy and planning) practices.  
To promote multilingualism would then basically entail accommodating the language 




seems valorous, the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) and the LiEP (DoE, 1997a) 
falls into the same category. At face value, it seems that the participants interpreted 
policy actors (those so set up education policies such as the DBE) as a determinant 
to language policy formulation in public schools. Principal A stated, as proclaimed by 
SASA, that an SGB has the power to formulate language policy in public schools: this 
assertion is in line with SASA sections 6(2) and (3) (RSA, 1996a:11). And according 
to these two subsections, the SGB is the most vital actor in the formulation of language 
policy in public schools.  
One could reason that the SGB is then the most important actor in language policy 
formulation in a public school. Accordingly, Principal A clearly stated that the SGB has 
the “power” to formulate language policy: this is an introduction to the “language policy 
as a function vs. power” debate. The implication of his statement is as follows: if 
language policy is a power of the SGB (it is an original power, i.e. it receives its power 
to govern from SASA and it is not passed down form any other body or sphere of 
government), then by definition, and theoretically, the HOD cannot withdraw this power 
because sections 22 and 25 of SASA (RSA, 1996a: 30-33) state that the HOD can 
only withdraw a “function”. To summarise this point, if language policy formulation is 
an outflow of school governance, as is meant by section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 
1996a:22), then this is an original power and theoretically “absolute”. However, the 
words of the SCA in the second Mikro case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v 
Mikro Primary School Governing Body, 2005: paragraph 38 and 39) are integral: 
“There could be no doubt that governing bodies were entrusted with the power to 
determine a language and admission policy, but that did not detract from the fact that 
it was their function to determine these policies”. This extract then confirms that an 
SGB’s power to formulate language policy is indeed “relative” and not absolute. This 
also does not mean the HOD can withdraw this function/power without any reason or 
proof that an SGB has failed to perform that function/power, but if there is sufficient 
proof of an SGB that uses its language policy to exclude certain race groups, it is in 
the rights of the HOD to withdraw that function/power according to SASA (RSA, 
1996a). The HOD must also follow the right administrative process.     
Participants also stated that the community needed to be involved in language policy 
formulation, i.e. the parents had to be involved. Although Ball (1993:12) clearly states 
that an analysis of policy stakeholders does not predict policy outcomes, in this case 
it shows us the importance of democratic policy formulation by including parents in the 
process. If multiple actors participate in language planning and policy, it leads to 
democratisation, with special reference to the process of LPP after Apartheid. The call 
of the Department of Arts and Culture (2003a:13) to private enterprises to participate 
in the language policy endeavour to ensure equitable language practices is an 
example of asking for co-operation from various stakeholders. Similarly, policy 
arrangements need to be communicated to various stakeholders to foster equal and 




The same response came from Educator A, who stated that the learners and parents 
must be included in the process of language policy formulation in schools. Educator 
B, on the other hand, stated that co-operation by “subject-heads, the SMT and the 
SGB” is deemed necessary for the formulation of language policy in schools. It is also 
noteworthy that collaboration is an ideal of deliberative democracy (Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004). This educator (B) also noted that problems with language policy 
formulation start with the SGB, but if their power is exerted as stated in SASA section 
6(3), it would not lead to tension between parties (RSA, 1996a:11). What is interesting 
about this educator (B) is, she also argued that the language policy process in schools 
needs to yield what the DBE expects of them (the SGBs). Analysing this statement 
according to the research I have done, it seems to be controversial.  
The community, i.e. parents, interpret language policy formulation as an important 
factor of democratic participation. In the light of this, Parent A, Educator A and Principal 
C also mentioned that the language policy of a school must be according to the 
Constitution of South Africa (RSA, 1996a) and SASA. These participants, however, 
focused more on a language right paradigm (Hornberger & Vaish, 2008:312). Parent 
B highlighted the fact that the language policy needs to represent the language 
preferences of the majority of the school’s learners. This statement is important, 
because the reason why SGBs formulate their language policy according to their 
“feeder zone” is because it is a ‘reasonably practicable’ expectation for schools to 
educate the community in their mother tongue. Principal B also commented that 
mother-tongue education would be the reasonable choice when the majority of 
learners speak that language. Mother-tongue education has a series of advantages, 
which I stressed in Chapter 3.  
As Educator A noted, the demography and geography of the schools and their learners 
play an important role in the pursuit of mother-tongue education for learners. However, 
Currie (1996, cited in Ngcobo, 2007:11) says that all the official languages enjoy “parity 
of esteem”, which means that practicality is put aside to ensure that no language is 
dominated by another. Therefore, in absolute terms, the “reasonable” practice will 
include a language policy in which one language does not dominate another. In 
Chapter 5, I mentioned that Schools A, B and C has a written language policy. The 
participants indicated that language policy formulation is not a function/power that is 
exercised every day or during every meeting of the year. Language policy as a theme 
on the agenda is only discussed when problems arise or when the HOD questions it. 
Only School A published its language policy publicly. Here I reread the responses of 
the participants about how language policy is formulated at the respective schools and 
how it deviated from the interpretation of what language policy ought to be. 
Nonetheless, there were elements that were of importance during this phase: the 
school’s LoLT (determines the HL subject) and FAL, SAL (language subjects and the 
speech community (i.e. language practices of the school community). This gave me 




Schools A, B and C are Afrikaans-medium schools and are located in Afrikaans 
communities. It therefore is “reasonable” that Afrikaans is the LoLT. These policies are 
“textual interventions” (Ball, 1993:12) that create the context of which it speaks: the 
logical necessity would be that each school’s language policy attracts and includes 
Afrikaans-speaking learners, but also excludes English-speaking learners – at least in 
theory. Each school’s language policy promotes and requires a certain agency that 
creates a unique speech context. The language policy of each school is enforced by 
Afrikaans communities’ language practices, but the language practices also create the 
need for an Afrikaans LoLT. It is difficult to determine the degree of exclusion or even 
inclusion due to a certain language policy stance. A national road divides a township 
from the area in which School C is located. School C can easily experience an inflow 
of learners who do not speak Afrikaans.    
School A, as Principal A noted, had a few cases of learners whose mother tongue was 
English, but it is important to emphasise that the parents of these children decided that 
their children must be educated in Afrikaans at this specific institution. This could be 
for practical reasons, such as School A being nearer their home than other schools. 
Secondly, the possibility exists that alternative English schools do not supply 
education of the same quality as School A. It must be said that this is mere speculation: 
school choice is a value-driven enterprise and contains value judgements. But, as I 
stated, there nevertheless are English alternatives. The fact that School A offers 
isiXhosa as an additional subject from Grade 4 to 7, and not only in Grade 1 to 3, as 
proposed by government, could have two reasons (as indicated in the third point). 
Thirdly, the reality of South Africa has changed dramatically, and it is epistemologically 
wise to teach learners isiXhosa to open a new world to them, and which makes them 
accessible to the other.  
School B has a high school nearby that also has an Afrikaans-only LoLT. An analysis 
of the area indicates that there are only two high schools that cater for English-medium 
learners: a boys-only and girls-only school. One of these schools has already 
renovated the school building to admit more learners. This implies that the high school 
near School B might receive pressure from the HOD to change to a dual-medium 
LoLT. School C is based in an area where mostly Afrikaans-speaking coloured people 
reside (this is based on observation and a quick study of the immediate surroundings). 
According to Educator C, the provincial DoE (WCED) has recommended that School 
C change their language policy, although the SGB decided not to change their 
language policy. They also do not have many learners, viz. 500, which means this 
school is a small school. To change School C’s language policy to dual medium would 
imply that the school could experience a larger inflow of learners, which cannot be 
accommodated by the school buildings. Being a quintile 4 school, the school itself 
would probably have to pay for renovations, which would imply that school C needs to 
increase its school fees. Being in a poor area, people would not be able to pay more 
for school fees; Educator C stated that “there are some parents that does not even 




should current socio-economic circumstances prevail, a dual-medium language policy 
for School C would not be likely. 
The information above gave rise to the following line of argumentation. According to 
the participants, language policy is a power of the SGB, and the Minister may only 
determine norms and standards for language policy in public schools (RSA, 
1996a:11). Therefore, the State or any provincial DoE cannot legally design or 
formulate the language policy of public schools. The State affects language policy in 
school via national and provincial policies, which may not be in contrast with SASA 
section 6 (RSA, 1996a:11). The national language policies that dictate the LoLT and 
language subjects in schools are the following: LiEP (DoE, 1997a), Curriculum 2005 
(DoE, 1997c), NRCS (DBE, 2002) and CAPS (DBE, 2011) and IIAL (DBE, 2013). Each 
of these policies is a step towards improving the language situation of schools in South 
Africa. However, the agenda of the national DBE remains the same.  
Schools A, B and C took these language policies into consideration when 
implementing their own school language policy. It is important to note that a close 
reading of these policies unveils the national DBE ideology and agenda. From 
Apartheid until now (2020), the new South African government and all other state 
departments needed a language policy that promotes multilingualism in the form of 
bilingualism. One therefore can deduce that the agenda of the national DBE is: 
multilingualism and democratic transformation (DoE, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; DBE, 
2002, 2009, 2011). Democratic transformation is also highlighted in the preamble of 
SASA (RSA, 1996a). It is debatable if some schools’ language policy follow this 
pattern. Due to language diversity of learners in South Africa, there is often a mismatch 
between a school language policy and the speech community (Plüddemann, 2015). 
Therefore, Schools A, B, C would definitely be in sharp contrast with the 
abovementioned.   
Schools A, B and C made an effort to promote language diversity and multilingualism. 
Firstly, the participating schools had an HL subject that was also their LoLT, viz. 
Afrikaans. Secondly, all the participant schools had an FAL subject, which was 
English. Thirdly, each participant school had isiXhosa as an SAL subject from grade 
1 to 3. This is compulsory. Fourthly, all the participating schools made an extra effort 
to accommodate learners’ language needs. Even though School A was an Afrikaans-
medium primary school, it made arrangement to teach English as the HL level from 
Grades 4 to grade 7. It also had additional and non-compulsory isiXhosa classes for 
learners who were interested in learning an African language. School B also had 
isiXhosa as an extra subject but, due to a lack of interest, it had to drop the subject. 
School C offered Mandarin as an additional language subject. The importance of 






6.7 Chapter summary 
 
Through the discussion above, I have attempted to provide the reader with an analysis 
of what arose from the interviews and policy analysis. From the participants, it was 
clear that parental involvement in the language policy of a public school is necessary 
and important. The reasons for the need for parental involvement of school language 
policy ranged from the value that parents place on the best interest of the learner to 
the participation of parents in language policy formulation as a part of larger 
democratic school governance. However, School C struggled with overall parental 
involvement, and parental involvement in language policy formulation. Participants 
saw language policy as a function/power of democratic school governance. Largely, 
the participants saw the involvement and the intervention of the HOD in school 
governance as undemocratic. However, they deemed it necessary for the HOD to 
intervene when the SGB does not act within SASA and other policies like CAPS. 
Furthermore, the participants experienced deliberative democracy as a medium to 
solve the tension between the HOD and the SGB: they believed that open discussion 
would lead to better a understanding by both parties. 
Concerning policy analysis, it seems that the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) 
offer the SGB a sufficient indication of what has to be in their language policy: it gives 
the SGBs an indication of what to include when they formulate the school’s language 
policy. The two aspects of how the SGB should formulate their language policy are 
embedded in the way the seek to promote multilingualism and what FAL subjects they 
teach to promote multilingualism. I asked how each participant would promote 
language policy to scrutinise how they would formulate language policy at their school. 
This is a fruitful way of determining how the participants saw language policy 










SYNOPSIS, RECOMMOMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION  
7.1 Introduction  
 
This concluding chapter focuses on summarising the main findings and main 
discussion of the study – which were as follows: 
 
The main research question was: Do governance and language policy in South African 
public schools provide an opportunity for deliberative democracy? 
From the main research question, the following sub-research questions were derived: 
1. Why should parents, as members of the SGB, and other members of the SGB 
have the right to determine a school’s language policy? 
2. How do democratic school governance and language policy formulation in 
public schools in South Africa intersect? 
3. What are the inherent tensions arising from the role of parents and SGBs in 
relation to determining the language policy? 
4. On what basis does the HOD contest the language policy adopted by the SGB? 
5. How can deliberative democracy assist in mediating the tension between the 
state (HOD) and the SGB in terms of its language policy? 
 
As stated in Chapters 2 and 3, school governance and language policy in South Africa 
and South African schools do not necessarily yield exactly what SASA (RSA, 1996a) 
wants and prefers. Schools are not on the same level with regard to the functionality 
of their SGBs, which indicates that there are many challenges that face them and the 
school as a fluid organism. My research was conducted at three public primary schools 
in the Western Cape in South Africa. These schools were chosen because they were 
Afrikaans-medium schools. The reason for selecting only Afrikaans-medium only was 
because Afrikaans is the most spoken language in the Western Cape (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011). However, the schools differed in terms of geographical area, socio-
economic status and culture and race. It was therefore important to determine whether 
language policy and governance in public schools in South Africa would allow 
deliberative democracy for fruitful outcomes. The discussion that follows provides a 
synopsis of the main findings. Thereafter, the implications for SGBs and language 
policy with regard to the findings will be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for 









7.2 Synopsis of main findings 
 
To answer the main and sub-research questions, I conducted interviews and 
undertook a policy analysis. I found that language policy and governance in public 
schools allow for a deliberative democracy because for the following reasons. First, 
parent participants argued that their involvement is both necessary and important to 
the formulation of a school’s language policy. They also see themselves as best 
placed to understand the ethos and dynamics of their respective schools and, as such, 
should be involved in the operations of the school. In this regard, Parent C commented 
that the parents on the SGB have knowledge about the community that is represented 
by these members in the formulation of language policy. Their grassroots knowledge 
about the community allow them to provide creative and unique inputs during the 
formulation of the language policy. It came to my attention that Parents A, B and C 
viewed their own role or parents’ role in language policy formulation as active 
participation in the education of their children by supporting the school. Parent C 
correctly noticed that parents, as members of the SGB, have the opportunity to 
represent the best interest of the learners with regard to language policy formulation. 
Section 28(2) of the Constitution (RSA, 1996b:11) promotes the best interest of the 
child, which makes it imperative for the SGB to do the same. This view was shared by 
the educator, who submitted that parents must contribute to language policy 
formulation because they are the backbone of the SGB. 
Second, Parents A, B and C connected democratic school governance with the SGB. 
This includes the notion that co-operation is the main theme of SASA and needs to be 
respected. Parent A noted that language policy formulation as a function of democratic 
school governance must be embedded in policy, frameworks and laws. In the light of 
this, certain parents understood their involvement in formulating the language policy 
as a form of co-operative governance, viz. SASA’s “cooperative design” (Joubert & 
Van Rooyen, 2011:302), and the partnership governance of State and SGB (RSA, 
1996a:1). Language policy should always lead to better educational attainment, and 
take minority groups into consideration, as section 6(3) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:11) 
prohibits any form of discrimination against racial groups. Principals A and C 
mentioned that democratic principles or democratic values are integral to language 
policy formulation. This implies that the functionality of the SGB hinges on democratic 
principles and values, and that governance as language policy formulation includes 
such notions to foster the co-operation of all parties.  
Third, there was disagreement with regard to the role of the HOD in relation to the 
formulation and implementation of a school’s language policy. On the one hand, some 
believed that the HOD should not intervene because the HOD does not have any 
contextual knowledge of specific schools. In other words, the HOD does not have a 
clear understanding of the communities within a school, and therefore is not in a 
position to make decisions regarding language policy. The principals also argued that 




the other hand, Parent B viewed the HOD’s role in intervention as only necessary 
when there was a problem with governance and language policy in public schools. 
However, he did not elaborate on what he meant by a “problem”. It follows that, as 
Parent B maintained, an HOD must first get hold of more information before he/she 
acts by intervening. The nature of the intervention revolves around sections 22 and 25 
of SASA (see RSA, 1996a:31-35). From the perspectives of Educator B and Parent 
C, it is clear that the HOD may intervene when there are governance issues or conflict 
within the SGB.  
Fourth, in the same light, it becomes clear that tensions between the HOD and the 
SGB arise when the national DBE change, or could change, policies, such as the 
Norms and Standards Regarding Language Policy Published in Terms of Section 6(1) 
of the South African Schools Act (DoE, 1997b:2), the LiEP (DoE, 1997a), IIAL (DBE, 
2013) and CAPS (DBE, 2011), the Constitution (RSA, 1996b) and SASA (RSA, 
1996a), which will have a direct impact on the mother-tongue principle of education. 
This will effectively change how SGBs may formulate policy. If there is a mismatch 
between the mother tongue of the majority of learners of the school and the school’s 
language policy, it will result in tension between the HOD and the SGB. Therefore, as 
Parent B stated, tension between the HOD and the SGB will arise when language 
policies are unreasonable and discriminate linguistically or racially.  
Educator A noticed a power imbalance and decisions made in bad faith when it comes 
to language policy in public schools. He argued that, in terms of the HOD, the DBE 
wants power and will exert this power at the expense of the SGB and learners at that 
school. This power struggle leans towards pressure exerted by the HOD on the SGB. 
Principals A and B both said that the language policy of a school must correspond with 
that of their community, and with the “near-school principle”, which would lead to 
tension if it did not. The near-school principle mentioned by Principal A depends on 
the reasonableness of the language policy, and therefore the reasonableness of the 
HOD’s actions towards the SGB and language policy formulation.    
Fifth, participants argued that deliberative democracy is a thoughtful way to mediate 
tensions between the HOD and the SGB regarding language policy and school 
governance. Participants also indicated how deliberative democracy could be used as 
a method, and in itself, to foster bona fide virtues and solve deep laying conflict 
between the abovementioned two parties with regard to language policy and school 
governance. Parent B mentioned how important open communication and respect are 
for language policy endeavours and issues of governance. Parent B noted that “good 
relationships, transparency, honesty, mutual respect and inclusive participation” are 
important. Educators argued that it is important to “persuade the department it has 
sufficient reasons to prove its decision in terms of the mandate it received from the 
parents”. This persuasion will be in the format of a plan that would yield a process of 
inclusive democratic decision-making by the parent community. It is important to note 
that participants saw deliberative democracy for mediatory purposes. This is the 




deliberative democracies. Participants rather acknowledged how deliberation could be 
used as a process to mediate the relationship between the HOD and SGB. Educator 
C said that deliberation will lead to outcomes that will not provoke court cases or legal 
proceedings. A legal proceeding makes a spectacle of a school and of education in 
general. Deliberative democracy will lead to the empowerment of the parent 
community. The same educator reasoned that the education department needed more 
information about the community, and they can only get this information through 
communication and deliberative democracy. 
Sixth, the policy analysis hinges on the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2). This 
policy document in essence forms the language-in-education policy for South Africa 
and creates a guideline for the SGB to formulate language policy. This, along with 
SASA (1996a:11) section 6, guides SGBs in terms of what they must take into account 
when they formulating language policy. I asked: how will they use their language policy 
to promote multilingualism at the school, what will they need to do to formulate 
language programmes, what language subjects will they use in the school, and how 
does the Constitution guide language policy formulation? I wanted to know how 
parents, educators and principals used the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) to 
formulate their language policy. The language policy of the school does not 
necessarily show how every member view the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2). 
Parent A said collaboration and co-operation were key principles of their language 
policy formulation. If role players co-operate to find a compromise between language 
differences, it could promote language diversity and multilingualism. This parent also 
mentioned that their language policy was “according to the Constitution”, and said that, 
according to the Constitution, “every individual has the right to be educated in the 
language he/she chooses”. The same Educator A added that the demography of 
learners plays a big role when the language policy was formulated. Principal A from 
School A replied that the language policy of School A embraced the principle of the 
language composition of the learner corps of the school. Principal A reasoned that, if 
the majority of learners have Afrikaans as mother tongue, the school will be classified 
as an Afrikaans-medium school. If the language composition of the school community 
changes, then an inquiry can be made to change that language policy in consultation 
with the provincial DBE. Principal A focused more on language policy as a 
function/power of the SGB, and the adaptability of the SGB when the language 
composition of the learner corps changes. Principal A added that a learner must 
respect the values, traditions, culture and conventions at this Afrikaans-medium 
institution, and what this Afrikaans-medium institution has to offer. 
Principal B argued that the:  
majority of the children in the school and in the feeder zone must receive 
preference. But despite the medium of instruction i.e. Afrikaans and 
English, there must be an additional African language which is spoken in 




To promote multilingualism one must forward the notion of the “feeder zone” and that 
the language policy is formulated on this principle. Principal B also emphasised the 
importance of African languages in the school curriculum. Educator B said the 
language policy of the school needs to “correspond with what the WCED and the 
National Education Department expects from them”. It is important here to note that 
the HOD and his office needs to deliberate about the language policy of the school so 
that it yields a democratic practice. Principal B commented that “95% of the learner in 
School B is Afrikaans”. It then follows logically that the language policy is formulated 
according to the learners’ mother tongue. According to Principal B, FEDSAS helped 
them to construct a language policy. Principal B stated that each prospective learner 
has the right to education in his/her language of choice, but will also be co-dependent 
on the reasonable practicality of that language as the LoLT. Parents are the legal 
guardians and have the right to choose the language in which the learner is educated. 
As I mentioned, the language policy of School B is dedicated to teaching English as a 
language subject to promote multilingualism. School B and its SGB go as far as 
possible to promote isiXhosa as another language subject that will teach the learners 
the basic use of the language.  
Lastly, School B goes as far as possible to buy textbooks in English and isiXhosa to 
promote the use of these languages. Parent C emphasised community participation 
as a principle of their language policy. For Parent C, the language policy formulation 
needs to be associated with the uniqueness of the respective school community. 
Educator C reasoned that “the problem with language policy formulation originates 
with the SGB”. But Educator C added that “if this power is used according to the SASA 
and Constitution there would be no problem”. Principal C argued that the language 
policy of a public school must be formulated according to the Constitution, SASA, the 
Western Cape Schools Act and other regulations. Accordingly, the SGB is responsible 
for the medium of instruction and thus the formulation and revision of the school’s 
language policy. 
To conclude this section, the participants showed that the process of language policy 
formulation and governance could allow for deliberative democracy as a fruitful 
outcome. Firstly, deliberative democracy hinges on participation, as the findings show 
that parents need to be involved in policy discussion concerning language policy for it 
to be a democratic endeavour. Secondly, participants argued that the co-operation 
promoted by SASA and other language policy forms the basis of language policy 
formulation and school governance. This is the seedbed for deliberative democracy. 
Thirdly, the findings show that an HOD has a role to play in a deliberative democracy 
and has a specific function inside this sort of democracy. According to most of the 
participants, the HOD should not intervene in school governance and, if he/she does, 
the HOD must play a supervisory role and help the SGB, rather than try to oppose 
every decision of the SGB. This would ensure that deliberative democracy fosters a 
better understanding of the relationship between the SGB and HOD. Lastly, 
perceptions based on the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) showed that 




of the school. Some participants in the sample school argued that promoting 
multilingualism needs to correspond with the Constitution, which embraces certain 
values that correspond with ideals of a deliberative democracy.   
7.3 Implications for school governing bodies 
 
Bearing in mind the findings I have just summarised, it came to my attention that there 
are certain implications for SGBs and school governance that need to be considered. 
Parents bring unique and creative inputs into SGB decision-making, which could lead 
to better outcomes and a better future. Parents have their own skills sets and their 
own knowledge corpus that could be grafted upon their knowledge to govern of to 
make it easier for them to learn how to govern a school. When there are more inputs 
from parents, it does not necessarily lead to better school governance, but it will 
definitely enhance the probability of better governance. More creative input and 
intellectual and financial resources will lead to better governance. The number of 
members on the SGB would also not result in better school governance, but it could 
lead to more creative and knowledgeable input to pave the way for better school 
governance. SGBs are statutory bodies, but they are also creational bodies that use 
unique sources to produce certain outcomes.  
Even though apartheid ended, its legacy still remains in some schools. In schools like 
School C, parental involvement does not deliver a support structure and positive 
effects, in contrast to Schools A and B. In the former case, the morale of parents is 
low and it will be a difficult to foster willingness among parents to govern. Parents on 
the SGB at  School C have jobs in the formal sector, meaning that they have certain 
skills to offer but the skills of these parents does not correlate with all the parents at 
School C. As Educator C told me, there are only a small number of parents who work 
in the formal sector. This influences the functionality of the SGB and affects overall 
governance. The role that parents’ education plays will have an effect on the 
governance of the school and on the SGB. One therefore can deduce that not all SGBs 
have the same parent base and that they are different in terms of functionality. Even 
members at School A and B did not receive continued education and training from the 
DBE to understand what is expected of them.  
Democratic school governance implies that the SGB governs a school. However, this 
does not mean that the SGB may govern absolutely: the SGB has the original power 
to govern a school given by SASA section 16(1) (RSA, 1996a). However, this power 
could be taken away by the legislature. If an SGB fulfils its functions democratically, 
i.e. vote on every decision and deliberate on important matters (it is democratic), there 
is no need for the HOD to intervene in school governance with respect to language 
policy. SASA gives an SGB a list of functions/powers that they need to fulfil when they 
want to act according to the Act (RSA, 1996a) and the Constitution (RSA, 1996b). In 
terms of powers and functions of a SGB, an SGB is responsible for either, which must 




Co-operation is an important concept in school governance. The preamble to SASA 
states clearly that governance must be partnership governance with the State (RSA, 
1996a:1). Sound relationships are important for sound school governance and they 
need to be fostered by working together. The fact that the participants had no contact 
with the HOD makes the act of co-operative governance difficult. According to Joubert 
and Van Rooyen (2011:302) and Smit (2011), SASA has a co-operative design that 
points to an opportunity for the State and an SGB to work together. The participants 
indicated that an HOD is more likely to intervene when there is something wrong with 
governance, or in a time of crisis. It was unclear what “time of crisis” means. I can only 
think that this is when the SGB does not fulfil its functions and powers according to 
SASA sections 20, 21, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (RSA, 1996a). According to SASA, the HOD may 
withdraw this function section 22, and the HOD may announce a committee to take 
over that function (RSA, 1996a). This usually ends up in legal proceedings and court 
cases. 
However, an HOD rather has a supervisory role with regard to language policy 
formulation and school governance. An HOD is there to help, but judging from the past 
with regard to language policy in public schools and the role of the HOD, and with 
specific reference to the Mikro case (Minister of Education (Western Cape) v Mikro 
Primary School Governing Body, 2005), and Ermelo case (Head of Department: 
Mpumalanga Department of Education and Another v Hoërskool Ermelo and Another, 
2009), the HOD has a hidden agenda and does not follow the correct procedure. 
Participants were aware of their rights as members of the SGB as a collective, and 
were cognisant of SASA and the Constitution with regard to school governance. 
Following the Constitution and SASA, an SGB could avoid legal confrontation, which 
would lead to better understanding and, as Educator C reckoned, not to a spectacle 
in which citizens laugh at the education sector. 
According to the data, deliberative democracy is a logical way to solve the tension 
between an SGB and the HOD. This means that parties need to be informed so that 
they know “where they stand with each other”. Deliberative democracy will lead to a 
better and different understanding of both parties and will improve the HOD’s 
contextual knowledge. This is important because it leads to informed decision-making. 
To solve an “issue” about governance goes both ways. Participants deemed 
communication as an integral part of a relationship. However, a relationship is built by 
two parties. Friction usually occurs when there is a lack of communication and 
expectations. Deliberative democracy does not always have fruitful outcomes for 
relationships. Its importance lies in the transfer of values. In deliberative democracy, 
one value is not chosen over another, but the endeavour is to find a common value 
system: such values usually comes from mutual respect. It must always be clear that 
deliberative democracy can be valued essentially and instrumentally: it is inherently 
good to deliberate about point of views because it creates a culture that welcomes 
diversity of perspectives. This would then lead to better relationships and where 




communication and debate.. Yet, it can also be seen as instrumental, that is, to solve 
deep-lying conflict and tension. 
7.4 Implications for language policy 
 
The participants’ viewed their language policy as a manifestation of the Norms and 
Standards (DoE, 1997b:2) or a unique application thereof. All participants had 
something unique to add to how they viewed the promotion of multilingualism through 
their perspective of the language policy. Due to the introduction of the IIAL (DBE, 
2013), Grades 1 to 3 are being taught to speak an African language, which is 
determined by the most spoken African language in the province, viz. isiXhosa in the 
Western Cape. This is a national step towards bridging “additive bilingualism” and for 
learners to be taught new concepts. Furthermore, the non-compulsory second 
additional languages that are taught in Schools A and C are a step towards broadening 
learners’ language base.  
The findings suggest that parental involvement is not only important for democratic 
school governance, but also for language policy formulation. The involvement of 
parents in the policy process brings with it creative insights and expert knowledge that 
can be used to formulate a unique language policy for public schools. Language policy 
in public schools portrays the movements in language policy nationally. Issues with 
language policy in South Africa nationally come from the fact that African languages 
do not receive as much spoken attention and use as Afrikaans and English, although 
the linguistic diversity of South Africa shows that two African languages are spoken 
more that Afrikaans and English.  
It seems as though democratic school governance is strongly correlated with language 
policy formulation. An SGB has the power to fulfil its functions/powers such as 
language policy formulation through the inclusion of a diversity of stakeholders. One 
must still be aware that parties are sometimes excluded from this practice, which 
diminishes the democratic intent of school governance with regard to language policy 
formulation. It seems rather idealistic to assume that all SGBs have the same amount 
of power when they formulate school-based policy like language policy. However, this 
idealism guides language policy formulation as a function/power of the SGB in Schools 
A and B. Due to a lack of a strong parental base, School C might have a problem with 
inclusion with regard to language policy. Yet it is also true that the SGB of School C 
has a diverse set of members, and the parents did vote for the parents serving in the 
SGB. Although a diversity of members in an SGB does not ensure an inclusive 
language policy formulation process, it is a step towards a more democratic praxis. 
Although the participants indicated that policies such as SASA (RSA, 1996a) and the 
Constitution (RSA, 1996b), and others such as the CAPS (DBE, 2011) document, it 
does not follow that these policies are implemented accordingly. Because the racial 




medium language policy. Given the fact that the Constitution (RSA, 1996b) promotes 
11 official languages and mother-tongue education, it does not mean that this is 
followed. The reason for choosing Afrikaans as the HL and LoLT is because the school 
mostly serves Afrikaans people. But with this comes a culture and, as I have noticed 
in schools, schools have a much more diverse inflow than a few years ago. However, 
these three primary schools in the Western Cape of South Africa reflect the socio-
linguistic dispensation of the Western Cape, where the most spoken language is 
Afrikaans. 
Participants in Schools A, B and C did not have direct contact with the HOD regarding 
language policy formulation. Although the preamble to SASA (RSA, 1996a:1) states 
that school governance must be undertaken in partnership with the State, it is unclear 
from these schools how the SGB and the HOD work together. Most participants 
argued that a school needs to be governed with regard to language policy solely by 
the SGB; however, it does not follow how the HOD and the SGB need to fulfil this 
function/power together. This uncertainty leads to tension, as the SGB does not know 
what the HOD expects of them. It seems as though participants identified deliberation 
as being necessary to mediate the tension between the HOD and the SGB with regard 
to language policy formulation. The idealised partnership of the HOD and the SGB can 
only be realised through communicating with each other and having open deliberation 
and conversations about issues regarding language policy formulation. The schools in 
the sample offer a bona fide reason for the choice of Afrikaans as an LoLT. Parent A 
identified co-operation and collaboration as the founding principles, which means that 
School A’s language policy is not exclusive to a particular race or language group and 
does not discriminate against any party, culture or religion. Along with Parent A, 
Principal B argued that their language policy depicted the demography and “feeder 
zone” of the school, which indicates efforts to promote multilingualism in an equitable 
fashion.    
7.5 Recommendations  
 
Language policy formulation as a function/power of an SGB is a broad field because 
it joins the field of the functionality of SGBs and language policy in public schools. This 
creates the opportunity for deliberative democracy to function as a means to mediate 
the tension between the HOD and an SGB with regard to language policy. This study 
accepts the role that deliberative democracy could play in relation to language policy 
in public schools and school governance. It is clear that the SGBs in the sample face 
issues and challenges with school governance and language policy (although not 
directly), which potentially could be solved via deliberative democracy. The following 
section offers recommendations for all stakeholders involved in school governance 
and language policy formulation. All recommendations are derived from the findings 
and could be applied to the field of language formulation and school governance in 




7.5.1 Recommendations for the relationship between the HOD and SGB with 
regard to school governance  
 
The following recommendations are suggested for the relationship between the SGB 
and the HOD with regard to school governance: 
• An understanding is needed of what each stakeholder needs to do in school 
governance in South Africa. This means that each member of the SGB and the 
HOD will know what is expected from them to build a democracy and 
deliberative democracy. This would only be possible if an SGB is trained and 
educated with the idea to enhance democracy and deliberative democracy. 
• Understanding is needed of the role of others in democratic school governance. 
The legislature and the DBE need to communicate what is expected of the SGB 
and HOD under the banner of school governance. Sections 16(1) and 2(1) of 
SASA (RSA, 1996a) need to be clarified and cannot depend on an individual 
reading of SASA alone. This must be interpreted by the legislature or the DBE 
to move beyond legal proceedings and lawsuits, which are harmful to the entire 
education project. 
• A realisation is needed that South Africa has moved away from an authoritarian 
and totalitarian state and rule, which ensures that no party will rule or govern 
on it own. Although section 16(1) of SASA (RSA, 1996a) permits an SGB to 
govern a school, this does not mean that an SGB has a monopoly on school 
governance. As the findings suggest, school governance must be a 
collaboration and a site of working together. Therefore, these sections must be 
read together and not separately to get a holistic picture of school governance 
in South Africa. 
• Respect needs to be the pinnacle of the relationship between the HOD and an 
SGB with regard to school governance. According to the findings, each party 
first needs to know what is expected from them, and then the HOD needs 
contextual information before he/she may intervene. In obtaining this contextual 
information, each party needs to be respected in terms of fulfilling their 
functions/power in order to foster a democratic entity and rule.  
• Deliberative democracy could be used to mediate the relationship between the 
SGB and the HOD. The findings suggest that, when certain situations occur, it 
will be better to create circumstances in which deliberative democracy can 
flourish. Therefore, it is considered wise to create a deliberative democracy 
environment by communicating another’s point of view to gain an 
understanding thereof. The HOD and SGB need not agree with one another, 
but must have mutual respect to grant each other freedom to act. The HOD and 
SGB first need to converse with each another and to make representations 
through rational argumentation before they go over to legal proceedings.  
• Deliberative democracy must not only be the means to achieve a certain 




democracy, it would not be necessary for a party to pursue a lawsuit. SGBs and 
HODs need to converse on a regular basis, and not only when there is a crisis 
in governance. It therefore is important that deliberative democracy creates an 
environment in which there is transmission of bona fide virtues and values that 
diminish conflict over the long term. 
7.5.2 Recommendations for language policy formulation as a function of SGB 
in public schools in South Africa 
 
Language-in-education policies are delicate constructs and my recommendations on 
them are the following: 
• Language policy formulation in public schools needs to be an inclusive and 
democratic process. Parents need to play a pivotal role in formulating language 
policy, because this will create an opportunity for democratic participation and 
deliberative practices. Language policy in schools affects many stakeholders, 
and it is a logical expectation that these members play a role in language policy 
formulation. 
• According to section 19 (1 and 2) of SASA (RSA, 1996a:26), it is the 
responsibility of the HOD not only to provide introductory training, but also 
continuous training for SGBs. Stakeholders must be educated and trained to 
formulate language policy under the auspices of the school. This gives an SGB 
the chance to learn what the HOD and SGB expect from them with regard to 
language policy formulation. Lastly, Educator B argued that language policy 
needs to correspond with the provisions of CAPS. This implies that a language 
policy must state what HL and FAL subjects it will provide. It must also state if 
it will provide SAL subjects. As from 2019, an African language is mandatory 
for foundation phase learners, and this will be implemented incrementally. 
Therefore, an HOD and his/her team need to provide education and training for 
SGBs and teachers so the SGB has the right information and can implement 
the policy with more confidence. However, the DBE and different spheres of the 
government could use policy to curb the rights of SGBs to govern a school, to 
formulate policy and to secure more power for the office. Two policies are the 
Basic Education Amendment Bill 2017 (DBE, 2017a) and, according to media 
sources, the 2019 bill. It must be added that the so-called “2019” bill was sent 
out shortly before the end of the year. With both these bills, the DBE has the 
objective to change language policy formulation by enhancing its own power in 
the formulation process.  
• Clarity must be given about whether language policy formulation is a power or 
a function of an SGB. Although an SGB has the power to formulate language 
policy in public schools, there must be clarity about how far this power/function 
stretches. This could also shed some light on whether the HOD may withdraw 




• Because the DBE and the Minister of Education have a direct say in what the 
Norms and Standards are for language policy in public schools in South Africa, 
i.e. in section 6(1) of SASA (RSA, 1996a), the DBE and HOD need to 
communicate this to the SGB, or have a panel discussion on the expectations 
of the SGB. The MEC could change the national language-in-education policy 
and, as it came clear in Chapter 5, the perceptions and perspectives of these 
norms influence the way in which members of the SGB see their own language 
policy. 
• The language policy formulation process can benefit from deliberative 
democracy. Language policy formulation could adopt certain values that can 
easily be transmitted during this process. Therefore, every party affected needs 
to be taken into consideration when language policy is formulated. Since 
language and the language policy of a school form an integral part of a learner’s 
life, they need to be considered in terms of that value. Every stakeholder needs 
to be involved in the designing of the language policy of a school. This policy 
will only have an inclusive outcome if it was an inclusive practise. Stakeholders 
need to deliberate on national and educational language issues to make 
informed decisions about language policy. 
 
7.6 Significance and contribution of this study  
 
Interpreting the provisions of SASA together with the Constitution does not provide a 
clear reflection of the South African educational field. These statutes are theoretically 
‘perfect’, but when it comes to the implementation thereof and other language policies, 
the picture is not always clear-cut. If one looks at significant case law and weighs it 
against statute, i.e. SASA, one can easily see the discrepancy. Case law can easily 
be ‘grafted’ onto SASA to reflect a better image of the South African educational 
sector. Taking language policy in public schools, for example, case law suggests a 
different picture as to what SASA and other relevant language policies suggest. 
Language policies in public schools are currently (2018/2019/2020) in the news 
headlines. In 2018, the Overvaal case (Governing Body, Hoërskool Overvaal v Head 
of Department of Education Gauteng Province, 2018) caused not only sentiment 
towards language in public school, but also language use in general. The language 
debate in schools is based on false ideas of what language in schools ought to be: 
what the media seem to leave out is the question of language policies and democratic 
school governance, and how these two are intertwined. Therefore, as case law and 
the relevant language policies of South Africa suggest, there is a gap between 
language policy formulation in public schools on the one hand, and democratic school 
governance on the other hand. 
I worked at a high school that imposes Afrikaans as an FAL and English as its HL 
subject and LoLT. It came to my attention that more than forty percent of the learners 




a different mother tongue than English – English is therefore their second language 
and Afrikaans their third language, but English is the LoLT and HL. Afrikaans is their 
third language, but it is offered as an FAL or on second-language level. This reflects 
Durban High School (Nkosi v Vermaak NO & Other, 2008) in that it is unfair 
discrimination to offer Afrikaans at a second-language level, even though it is the 
learners’ third language. It therefore is clear that learners from the surrounding 
neighbourhood do not receive tuition in their mother tongue. The school also changed 
their LoLT from Afrikaans to English, which indicates a movement to a colonial 
language policy and does not reflect equality and social justice, which the Constitution 
seeks to promote. 
This study seeks and hopes to join the fields of language policy and school 
governance. However, several considerations are necessary before these fields 
coincide. There are numerous challenges facing school governance in South African 
schools (see Xaba, 2011). South Africa is also faced with language and language 
policy issues nationally and in public schools (see Cakata & Segalo, 2017, and 
Plüddemann, 2015 respectively). There has been research on the intervention by the 
state in public schools (Prinsloo, 2006); tensions between provincial educational 
departments and SGBs (Clase et al., 2007); and a body of research on the 
Constitution, reasonableness and the HOD (see Malherbe, 2010; Smit, 2011; Visser, 
2006; Woolman & Fleisch, 2007). This study provides new insights into language 
policy formulation as a function/power of the SGB in South African public schools. 
Furthermore, the study revisits SASA (RSA, 1996a), the LiEP (DoE, 1997a), and the 
Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2). I also made use of other education policies and 
language policies to inform the body of the research in the hope of joining language-
in-education into a combined whole.  
My research was undertaken to gain more information about language policy and 
governance in South African schools by taking the perspectives of educators, parents 
and principals into consideration. The outcomes of the research aim to inform SGBs 
to consider more policy options when formulating language policy and working with 
the HOD. Furthermore, the hope is embedded in this study that SGBs will revise their 
practices of governing, and gain more knowledge about language issues in South 
Africa nationally and in the country’s schools.  
7.7 Limitations of the study  
 
This study explores language policy and governance in public schools. The study was 
delimited to three primary schools in the Western Cape of South Africa. It used a 
sample size of nine participants, viz. three educators, three principals and three 
parents from three different primary schools in the Western Cape. Firstly, I decided to 
use parents because their involvement has a direct effect on the democracy within the 
SGB. They also bring creative insights to the SGB due to the fact that they have 




knowledge about the functionality of schools that is carried over to the functionality of 
the SGB. Thirdly, I chose educators because they are have knowledge of didactics 
and what learners want and need. 
The research was also limited by the methods I used, viz. e-mail interviews and policy 
analysis. There are shortcomings to e-mail interviews because one cannot see any 
non-verbal cues, and policy analysis is limited to only evaluating the formulation of 
language policy through the perspective of the members of the SGB and the 
instructions and guidelines of the Norms and Standards (DoE, 1997b:2). Lastly, as I 
mentioned in the problem statement, a problem relates to who is responsible for school 
governance between the SGB and the HOD with regard to language policy 
formulation. I did not interview the HOD of any province, and the participants did not 
have direct contact with the HOD. The role and intervention of the HOD hinges on the 




In this research, I focused on governance and language policy in South African public 
schools. Language policy in schools form part of school governance due to the fact 
that it is seen as a function or power of the SGB. This research then determined that 
the participating schools valued deliberation and deliberative democracy as a solution 
to tension and conflict with the HOD and the SGB’s relationship with language policy 
and school governance in South African public schools. Participants viewed language 
policy as an inclusive process in their school that hinges on democratic participation, 
which includes the voices of a variety of members when it is formulated. School 
governance in the participating schools was of a democratic nature and they made 
use of a variety of inputs while they governed. 
It is for this reason that the participants decided that an HOD must not intervene in 
school governance, i.e. must withdraw its function to determine language policy and 
appoint efficient people to do so. The participants thought an HOD only needs to 
intervene in the above process when the SGB misuses its power to govern and 
formulate language policy. However, it does not suit a democracy if powers are taken 
away by force without the necessary mediation. The current issue of language policy 
and school governance in South African public schools asks for a creative process 
that would yield multiple fruitful outcomes. I offer deliberative democracy for this 
purpose. 
Language policy and school governance could benefit from deliberative democracy 
through the process of rational argumentation. Rational argumentation is not in vain, 
but has bona fide outcomes. Deliberation suggests a predetermined outcome, viz. 
consensus. However, I propose that an HOD and an SGB need not agree on certain 
arguments, but need to respect each other’s point of view and learn to accept this in 




a opportunity to be open and to argue about things that are sensitive. The HOD and 
the SGB must have a communication session in which they are taught the value of 
deliberation in conjunction with the transmission of key values that support a 
deliberative democracy. 
Going forward, it is of the utmost importance that the HOD and the respective SGB 
communicate and formulate policy together, rather than doing it alone and inviting 
conflict to worsen tensions. Deliberative democracy will contribute to a fruitful outcome 
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Division for Research Development. 
 
Your information and response to the survey will be protected by will be kept on my 
personal computer in a file which requires a password. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to e-mail me, 
Rikus Retief, at 16613392@sun.ac.za and/or the Supervisor, Professor Nuraan Davids 
at nur@sun.ac.za. 
 
To save a copy of this text, and if permission is given, download this document and save 
it to your computer.  
 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information provided 
for the current study. 
YES NO 
☐ ☐ 
























Sal u asseblief so gaaf wees om hierdie vrae vir my te beantwoord. As u voel hierdie 
vraag is onvanpas, het u altyd die reg om dit oor te slaan. 
1. Hoe dink u behoort taalbeleid in skole gevorm word/How do you think 
language policy must be formulated? 
 
2. Hoekom dink u behoort ouers/ (lede van die beheerliggaam) seggenskap te 
hê oor die vorming van taalbeleid in skole/Who do you think must have a say 
about a school’s language policy?  
 
3. Het die beheerliggaam volgens u al druk van die department ontvang om u 
taalbeleid te verander. Bespreek die moontlike gevalle./Have the SGB 
experienced any pressure to revisit the school language policy?  
 
4. Op watter basis dink u sou die onderwysdepartement inmeng oor die 
taalbeleid-vormingsproses/On what basis does the education department 
intervene in connection with language policies in school?  
 
5. Wat is volgens u demokratiese skoolregeerskap/What according to you is 
democratic school governance?  
 
6. Dink u dit is verkeerd/reg dat die department onder leiding van die die 
departementshoof van die WKOD, inmeng in demokratiese skool regeerskap. 
Verduidelik/Do you think it is wrong/right of the HOD op the provincial 
educational department to intervene in the democratic fibre of the school? 
Explain 
 
7. Hoe kan ouers (u) volgens u spanning tussen die onderwysdepartement en 
die beheerliggaam oplos/How can a parents resolve tension between the 





8. Wat dink u is moontlike oplossings vir die spanning tussen die 
onderwysdepartement en die beheerliggaam in terme van die taalbeleid/What 
do you think is the resolution for the tensions between the education 
department and the SGB? 
 
9. Kan beraadslaging gesien word as ‘n moontlike oplossing? Hoekom sê u 
so/How could deliberation be seen as ‘n method to ease the tension. Why do 
you say that? 
 
10. Hoe kan ‘n beraadslagende demokrasie help om die die spanning tussen 
die onderwysdepartement en die beheerliggaam in terme van taalbeleid 
moontlik oplos/How could deliberative democracy help to ease the tension in 
schools in terms of language policy?  
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